Tolerant Values and Practices in India: Amartya Sen’s ‘Positional Observation’ and Parameterization of Ethical Rules

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Abstract

In explaining the reasons for sustained existence of tolerance in Indian philosophical mind and continuation of tolerant practices in socio-political life, Amartya Sen argues that tolerance is inherently a social enterprise, which may appear as contingent, but for all intents and purposes is persistent. Basing his thesis that is opposed to Cartesian dualism, which makes a distinction between mind and body, Sen submits that Indian system of universalizing perception finds a subtle form of connection between mind and body. He expands the ancient core worldview, Vasundhara kutumbakam (entire world as one family) as a secular tolerant civil code, which makes a connection between the transcendental and the pragmatic planes of consciousness, and reconstructs a thesis about tolerance around human consciousness, which is collectivized and anchored in an acknowledged public space in society that is joined together psychologically as well as philosophically. Tolerance as consciousness can be regarded a necessary condition for playing the role of intentionality as stipulated by classical philosophy (Advaita Vedanta; buddhi, or intelligence as in Samkhya and Yoga). Aware of this ancient wisdom that accepts relativism as an impasse over some evaluative matter, Sen avoids the pitfalls of cultural relativism in tolerance by offering an argument that is based on the metaphysics of Advaita Vedanta and other religious and secular

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literature, and epitomizes an internationalizing virtue in tolerant traditions. I would examine some interconnected issues, such as the ethical “perimeter” of Sen’s philosophical observation of totalized value system and Indian tolerant attitudes in real life, etc., raising the broader question about the location of cultural identity in relation to supranational state organization. My chief argument is that Sen has been able to observe a connection between the Advaita Vedantic moral philosophy that informs that viewed from the Brahmanic perspective of absolute knowledge in unity, the apparent subject of duality is not the ultimate subject. My conclusion is that valuing of tolerance, individual liberty as well as civil rights is a particular contribution of Western thinking and philosophy; the Western advocates of these rights often provide ammunition to the non-Western critics of tolerance and human rights.

Tolerance and the Dualism Debate in Indian Literature

The use of tolerance/toleration in its current form as diversity and openness to the life choices of others was presented by John Stuart Mill (On Liberty, 1859). Following this tradition, the value of tolerance as coexistence of faiths was developed within European religious debates that were at first completely separate from the elaboration of “rights.” On the other hand, characterizing Indian tolerance as “inclusiveness,” Paul Hacker (1913-1979) makes a distinction between “practical tolerance” and “doctrinal tolerance” to define rationality, knowledge, and philosophy, and recognizes the existence of tolerant attitude that has been common in Indian comprehensible expression of transcultural human ability, corresponding to reality. In this sense, Indian thought process in tolerance remains suspicious of the isolated self, because “I-maker” (ashamkara) is believed to be the source of all human conflicts. The problem of consciousness comes down to the problem of how to give an objective third person account of what is essentially a subjective, first person phenomenon. Thus, the noted Indian neuroscientist V.S. Ramachandran recommends that there is a need “to reconcile the first person and third person accounts of the universe” as the “single most important problem in science” as well. Today, the problem of conscious perception marks the very
limit of human striving for tolerant understanding that discusses, among others, the usefulness of the non-dual perception of self. The Advaita Vedanta philosophy contends that with certain identifying marks (laksanas), the self may be distinguished from everything else that is not self. In this way, it adds, the referent (sakya) of the word “self” or “I” becomes mixed. In this instance, perception becomes our intentionality, subjectivity, sustained self-consciousness, and our ability to form intentions, whereas in indeterminate perception, a qualifier is directly recognized, and thus, an epistemological regress concerning qualification is blocked. Indeterminate perception as awareness gives rise to determinate awareness through a natural process that has nothing to do with human desires, acts, or intentions. The relation between the two is not merely psychological, as the Dharmakiriti insists, confusing many Naiyayaikas of the earlier School, who submit that with justificatory grounds as casual instruments (pramanas), we can have “cognition” of the objects of the knowledge (prameyas). Advaita-Vedanta insists that in the reflective stage, the mind integrates the mental contents corresponding to the object with recognized precepts. Tolerance here forms part of his “capability” and assessment of “what a person can do in line with his or her conception of the good.”

Awareness of plural truth and possibly a measure of existential perplexity constitute the seed which grows into tolerance, provided tolerance is “watered by inner freedom and nourished by truth as subjectivity and culture as historical contingency. Apathy is not any index of tolerance, but only unconcern for others. (Jamal Khawaja, Madras, 2007). Amartya Sen frames the ethical rules in Indian tolerance in general terms arguing that the concept of universal tolerance in the broad sense of norms of every human being is not a relatively new idea, but insists that the means to this knowledge has been different. In the West, dualism as divisive perception relates to the concepts of Kant, Hume, Berkeley, and Locke, to Descartes and beyond, but to Indian philosophical discourse it is more elaborative, because interactionism may not embrace a Hume-like account of causation. Thus, Sen argues that the “so-called Western values of freedom and liberty,” sometimes viewed as an ancient Western inheritance, “are not particularly ancient, nor exclusively Western in their inheritance.”
conclusion depends on accurate analyses. The mainstream Advaita School, for all its doctrinal commitment to defending a-conceptual reality, developed its own complex logical formalism as early as the 1000s. This so-called mahavidya mode of syllogistic reasoning even influenced the practice of dialecticians such as Shri Harsha, and became an object of debate in the Nyaya School before it elaborated its own roundabout methods in the form of Neo-Nyaya. Eventually, Neo Nyaya became like the European logical positivism of the early 1900s in its concern for extreme formalism. What is interesting is that this philosophical argumentation could not give up the overreaching bhakti-religion’s emotionalism that generated a new scholastic school to practice the value of universal acceptance of many values. Tolerance became ingrained both in concept and logic. Tolerance in India is an intrinsic value like love, whereas appeasement is a strategy for avoiding conflict and achieving success.

The two broad, traditional and competing theories of mind are dualism and materialism (physicalism). The former holds that the conscious mind, or a conscious mental state is non-physical in some sense, whereas the second one holds that the mind is the brain, or is caused by neural activity. In this context, many answers are framed. Dualism faces the problem of explaining how a non-physical substance or mental state can causally interact with the physical body. Unlike Cartesian dualism which involves a distinction between mind and body, mind in Samkhya philosophy, as in many other systems of Indian thought, has remained a subtle form of matter. Like others, the classical Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of mind and self also provides judgment that juxtaposes Western physicalist dualism and psychophysical dualism. Thus, the juxtaposition of at least two individuals, the dependence of one on the other, is the condition of possibility of all speech. Every time I take to speech, what I say depends on the other toward whom my language is directed: indifferent, adversary, or friendly, or ally. Meaning in any juxtaposition is always the fruit of collaboration, not conflict. Tolerance, combining mind and body in India, Sen posits, is inescapably plural in concept and hence in evaluation (Sen’s parameterization). Sen’s account, drawing our attention to the internal pluralism of the concept and practice, he then refracts the interpretation on our measurement through his economic and
philosophical account. His source is mostly ancient texts and logic. The Nyaya inter-actionists do not have Descartes’s interaction problem because they embrace a “Hume-like” account of causation. Hume introduces the causative factor in inter-action-ism. We know well that our knowledge and action are related. We expect mental states to occur significantly in causal explanations of actions, because otherwise postulating mind looks like redundant. But Hume assumes that attributes of knowledge in causal explanations of our action can be replaced without explanatory loss by corresponding elements of belief. This causal connection has another implication in explaining unification of diverse elements, despite apparent contradictions. Tolerance implies active participation and active participation in social interactions. Sen argues that if we express our tolerance as a subjective perception with our own situation or even personal preference then we ignore many variables that remain divisible. He recognizes that “the value of toleration” or the importance of individual freedom have been preached all along in literature, but it has remained relevant only “for the selected few,” because in the caste system and women’s position in a family and social abuses, the idea of tolerance has remained dormant, mostly for political reasons.

**Tolerance and Realism in India**

Realism in tolerant acceptance of various national and international cultural values is vividly projected in Raj Kapoor’s movie song, “Mera Jhootha hai Japani…,” etc., reporting that Indian slippers are Japanese and hats are Russian, but “my heart is Indian.” Partha Chatterjee interprets this interaction as utilization of the inner/outer divide, whereas for Homi Bhabha, this is an acceptance of others’ norms and practices as acceptance of a hybrid norm. R. Radhakrishnan, of the University of Massachusetts, writes, “One just lives it as the Real, i.e., a Real that has imploded into self in total flight from historical forms of representation.” This assessment, for Sen, is an acceptance of tolerant well-being based on his “functioning approach.” Our knowing is a state of mind, and a state of mind is a mental state of a subject. Paradigmatic mental attitudes include love and hatred, and even pain. Our attitudes are propositions, believing that something is so. In short, knowing is
merely state of mind but actual knowing is not, because it is factive; truth as realism is a non-mental component of knowing. Thus, Gayatri Chakravarty argues that “there is no more representation; there is nothing but action,” which is a theory and action of practice which relate to each other as relays and form social networks.¹⁰

Sen cites ancient text and logic to argue that tolerance needs to be evaluated in the form of realism. The realism question comes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, especially in Varanasi, as interest in Raghunath’s reappraisal of ancient Vaisakha metaphysics. Raghunath’s new realism as “new” awareness consists in the first instance as the rejection of a variety of reductionist hypotheses. Later, early modern thinkers demonstrate that a reductions is compatible with realism, a type of realism called “sophisticate realism.” Among the Indians, the Vaisesikas are usually considered to be most robust advocates of an “across-the-board realism.” They admit, among many, a single real connecting relation to bind the objects (dravya) to their qualities, motions, “universal features,” and distinguishes (samavaya). Each self is thought to have an accompanying but distinct mind (manas), responsible for performing a range of subconscious executive functions, including the regulation of respiration and relay the signals between the body and the self (consciousness). In this instance, both political intolerance and social discrimination in patriarchal interest in social conflicts have gone against the lessons of the accepted texts of the earlier times. The solution can be found in a compromise.

The Advaita Vedanta’s position accepts a compromise position. There are external objects out there. When consciousness objectifies an object, a mental state called antahkarnavrti, assumes the form of that object, and this state is manifested by the self-shinning witness-consciousness. We observe the substance drop as well words, consciousness is only self-shinning and is not intentional. According to Advaitva Vedanta, consciousness is intrinsically non-intentional and formless, and intentionality and form are superimposed on it. As against this, Nyaya Vaiseskia suggests that consciousness is formless, but intrinsically intentional. According to the Jogacara Buddhists, consciousness is intentional in the sense that the act-content distinction is internal to it. Other Buddhists
such as Sautrantikas, accept the internal act-content distinction, but also admit an external object. Not unlike Hume, the Buddhist philosophy does not find an abiding enduring self within, and so resolves the putative self into an aggregate of the five aggregates, skandhas: sensation, feelings, conceptions, traces and awareness. Each of these events is self-cognizing. On the other hand, then, cit means not an event-present abiding principle but the instantaneous event of consciousness, self-shining. Thus, J. N Mahanty argues that formal-mathematical rationality, devoid of consciousness, provides the anthropological, local, and cultural rationality which sustains relativisms of all sorts and which resists attempts to impose universality ab extra. For Sen, this stance seeks hybridization of tolerant values, reflected in Vaishnavism of Tulsidas, presenting tolerant consciousness as an all-encompassing “ocean of doctrines and traditions,” which are expanded to neo-Hindu usage in the works of Swami Vivekananda.

Sen, a product of Enlightenment’s rationalism, breaks convention by drawing on resources from the principle of inference, such as Bhagavad-Gita and the moral dilemma of warrior Arjun as an integral part of his moral argument. This position assumes two interconnected dimensions, as Sen affiliates with bhakti radical religion and Sufi Islam with the idea of “universal brotherhood” conforming to the metaphysics of Upanishads and Vedanta, and leading to the epistemology of Nyaya, even to the materialist Lokayata/Carvaka materialism. For Sen, this consciousness, being an act of self-fulfillment, becomes a supplemental achievement whereas there may be a wider capacity to acknowledge what can cope with inner conflicts, such as us and them, culminating in the integrating system. A conscientious-conformist passes through the transitional stage to be a model for general acceptance, as consciousness which is both private and public self-consciousness, incorporating a measure of social anxiety that has no relevance to relativity. In this way, Sen conforms to the universal aspect of Neo-Vedantic consciousness of Vivekananda, Gandhi and Tagore and derives faith from the classical realist tradition of “all-inclusive tolerance,” showing religious plurality in the form of Rigvedic ekam and vipra sthanabheda. Madhusudana Saraswati explicitly argues that the tradition of characterizing foreign “barbarians” (melacha) has no “soteriological relevance whatsoever.” In fact, the melachas
are believed to be people coming from unknown “black water” (*kala pani*) that stretched up to Ceylon. Interpreting tolerant attitude of Neo-Hinduism, S. Radhakrishnan argues that the extension and universalization of the tradition of tolerance act as a simple and unproblematic adjustment to the wider context respecting our “perception.” As Jerry Foror argues, identity of causal powers has to be assessed across contexts, not within contexts, thereby raising the question of pluralistic means to social solution.” Contextual analysis is best done by translating the “analysandum into expressions,” which are clearer or easier to use. Ken Wilbur, a leading thinker in Eastern thought, traces the source of conceptual language to evaluate ideas drawn from the East to help in the development of a comprehensive model of consciousness. The idea of the expansion of consciousness points to the whole field of mental health and of growth that deals with the problems of alienation. Sen’s study of the literature demonstrates that eminent Western philosophers such as Plato, St. Augustine, and others sought “preference for order and discipline over freedom,” like Confucius’ priorities for public order, typically ignored the value of freedom and tolerance and eventually human mind. For Sen, the concept of tolerance is a uniting idea coordinating in between-ness.

Relativism in any tolerance debate survives on extreme contrasts. Ken Wilbur argues that in relativism thinking progresses in hierarchical stages, each stage being higher than the preceding stage. Piaget calls this cognitive stages of development. Each stage contains an emotional stage. The existentialist can remedy the ego self by asking for more tolerance to get rid of anxiety, and looks for transpersonal solution. In contrast, a synthesis of concepts is sought by Hindu self, having two levels: *jiva* or individual soul, and *Atman*, its universal and spiritual aspect, the experience of which is found in Eastern Enlightenment. Troy Wilson argues that what is needed is not a world of one philosophy, but a world that appreciates diversity, a worldview in which there is a willingness to respect and in some instances to assimilate ways of thinking and acting of other peoples. Thus, Indian and Western philosophies may provide analyses of perspectives for worldviews about tolerant views affording a transcendent states. Philosophy provides multi-stage principles designed to access states of consciousness and their corresponding worldviews, which are different but not
relativistic. However, Sen recognizes the limitations of the narrative of internal debates about a moral value, and adds that “cross-cultural linkages (in a moral debate) have more importance in several ways.” This raises the question of the duality of social and personal being. Strawson argues that the concepts of pure individual consciousness does not exist, suggesting that morality does not belong to a particular individual or group. Bandura also argues that certain traits are not a native development but is acquired in social contexts. In sum, pluralism speaks of contextual solutions.

Sen expresses disapproval of Indian intolerance in tradition-bound caste intolerance, and oppressive treatment of women and girls, reflected in the advocacy of “Asian Values Debate,” and the Western mode of intolerance toward the stagnant “Asian mode of production,” all highlighting group intolerance. Even if we assume that the earlier European study of Indian culture has mostly been a knowledge-gathering mission, it is difficult to accept ethics of the arguments. Sen argues that the West has been ignorant of facts that the Mughal rulers in India, with one exception, Aurangzeb, were not only extremely tolerant, but also could theorize about the need for tolerant diversity, and indeed, Akbar’s declarations in the sixteenth century on tolerance “can count among the classics” of political toleration in any part of the world, Sen claims. “The non-comparative motto was to tolerate and protect all religious groups.” Asoka’s propagation of universal toleration, although partly due to his strategy for political legitimacy in uncertain times, was for the propagation of tolerant ethical private life. Martha Nussbaum and Sen argue that human beings as “social creatures” want to “share with others a conception of value,” which is may be rephrased by the Upanishadic lesson that posits that “there must be a link between the energy of human beings and that of the universe.” This simplified message suggests that competition between two sets of ethical relativism amounts to a particular complex, which is “both psychologically disastrous and philosophically unjustifiable.” Both Western and Asian ethical relativists begin with the apparent insight that the real world can only be described from different points of view. The initial picture is that there is a real world (economic growth in Asia), but their representation of cultural values is always going to be relative to a
point of view, because all representation is from some point of view or other, and this is supposed to give someone a relativism of reality but not of truth. This gives a relational version of truth but it is not a version of relativism about truth. Moral theories can be classified into deontology and teleology and so, we can argue that that the distinction is vitally relevant in our understanding of the nature of ethical theories. Thus, Sen’s call is for liberation from anthropological relativism.

Relativism and Cross-Purposes

Sen argues that cultural relativism becomes so entrenched that even the unhealthiest social practicing norms, such as female genital excision, foot binding, human sacrifice, and agricultural taboos attended by chronic hunger, and sati widow burning are being rationalized. Some paradigmatically belief systems claiming that Indians, despite the working vibrant democratic constitution, are culturally incapable of going above the fixed caste-infested social formulations and class differences. This is based on the assumption that the economically powerful elite class has the dialectical dynamics of the karma-samsara-doctrine that have their own conclusion: first, all dalits are souls, second, souls are masters of their fortune, and last, the dalits themselves can change their conditions. The medieval Bhakti religion added to this “ideological drawback.” In short, cultural relativists argue that some human groups being defined by their nationality, language, cultural ancestry, or belief system, are incapable of certain universally accepted norms. For Sen, the assumption of internal conflict of values does at once raise the question of identification. As Kuhn (1962) emphasizes sociological factors leading to the rise and fall of scientific models, and then Rorty (980) defends the impossibility of finding universal ideals on which to ground science, it follows that the concept of finding a regular pattern that makes sense of history seems trivial, a consequence drawn by Lyotard’s (1979) declaration of the end of the meta-narrative, all expressed in the form of uncertainty in postmodernism, eventually failing to identify the value in any cross-purposes. A neutral philosophical space does not accommodate the self-immolating suttee-widow practices. During the 1990s in the northern state of Rajasthan, suttee (widow
burning) was still contained within the interested use of cultural relativism. *Suttee* could not be read with Christian female martyrdom, with the defunct husband standing in the form of transcendental One; or with war, with the husband standing in for sovereign or state, for the sake of a debased ideology of “self-sacrifice” that can be mobilized. The human agency here always be the woman, and the male as protector of morals. If Gayatri Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?” then how to explain the pious deed by women’s sacrifice? For the upper class, this “trace-structure” is the consequence of the emotional political activism, being “moral love,” in the words of B.K. Matilal. That the models in *suttee* are not realistic is obvious. Nevertheless, they enable us to see how sensitivity works, and the startling demands it can impose. The remedy for this pathology is not to relativize sensitivity. That is why there is no direct bridge from action (e.g., widow-burning) to moral at all. Frankfurt argues that morality will show up in the due course of time as conditions will change. For Kant, the connection between action and morality exist and rational will follow the moral law. In Kant’s version the will itself is a kind of causality with a clear causing condition.

Looking back to the concerns that has provoked our discussion, it is useful to interpret rationality in Kantian way. When we derive action from the fixed principle, we fail to be moved by a reason, which is a deliberate error. It is not a lack of subjective connection to the reason’s value. Action requires no separate motive, Kant argues. But on Frankfurter’s view, in reason one has ultimately to depend on what one values. Both these Western arguments leave us uneasy, because, first, this tells that volitional judgment is sufficient ground for action, second, a free cause arises from a practical point of view.33 Both Indian philosopher Nagarjuna and the Greek thinker Sextus see dependent concepts of pairs such as action and result, left and right, are meaningful as they do not recognize the relational existence. Such concepts are like two sticks leaning against one another; if we take one out then the other will fall. It means that action as a cause has a connection result; more importantly, the argument is that both cause and result are unite into one.34 In other words, it is pointless to argue that our action can stand alone with any fear of results. So, “justification” of an action like *suttee* burning must stand to scrutiny initially, not at the
end. As a way of gaining some perspective on the part played by the active-passive contrast, and its relation to the contrast between internality and externality, it is helpful to compare this pair of contrasts with a certain traditional picture of the distinction between and intentional states such as beliefs and desires, which are our attitudes. Kant refers to this attitude, which needs an identification. Thomas Nagel makes a distinction between motivated and unmotivated desires. He argues that there is more than one way to justification. At least, he must take his “other” attitudes as having some voice in determining the course of the desire or attitude. This is the essence in identification of a value.

Although the concept of being relativist in tolerance is anthropocentric and relational, the concept may well be descriptive of an intrinsic feature of relativism, a feature that is constituted by the surface texture. An ethnocentric and relational idea can be used in the justification of the fundamental responses constitutive of the idea. As we describe special feature of relativism about national identity, we simply use the notion as counting features of relativism. Reports of subjective experiences on the basis of introspection do not seem to produce consistent findings. Even the most widely accepted, Noam Chomsky’s famous “language acquisition device,” the inspiration for modular thinking, remains a mere construct.\textsuperscript{35} The purpose of classical Indian thought experiments are to make moral assumptions, intuitions, and principles so that they can be disputed or defended. Moral philosophy is a normative activity which is to say, one establishes, investigates or criticizes norms – which is quite different from a descriptive account, as in relativism, of mental states. Since the time of Socrates, moral philosophy has tried to clarify beliefs and has challenged the conceptual framework within which they have been generated. It is time for philosophy to reassume its basic duty to look critically at the conceptual framework and presuppositions within which consciousness operates. When we speak of “consciousness,” we by necessity address something that is about inter-subjective relationships. Then the question arises as to whether the status of being “objective” is completely independent of subjectivity.\textsuperscript{36} The question facing W. V. Quine(1960) is whether inter-subjectivity is definable without presupposing an objective environment in which communication takes place, for it can be an
instant wiring from Subject A to Subject B, in which the subject-object dichotomy is denied.\textsuperscript{37}

As conscious creatures, human beings have a stream of conscious thoughts and experiences, which deny the ingredients of relativism, and establish the relevance of tolerant attitude, if not habit. Our conscious stream is not continuous as it is interrupted by deep sleep and other periods of unconsciousness, but it is united by a degree of constancy in its elements, by the hidden content of these elements, and by its supposed causal basis.\textsuperscript{38} As a rational creature, we can make judgments about reasons and hence of having judgment-sensitive attitudes such as belief and intention.\textsuperscript{39} The exercise of a capacity for reflection, the acquisition of conscious beliefs and the capacity to employ them flexibly can produce higher order desires and volitions. Its normative parameters have no special rational or metaphysical authority; they arise from material circumstances. Some basic senses including consciousness provide reasons for action as is agent-neutral (Nagel’s “what it is like”) that may well investigate the Rawslian primary goods (liberty, wealth) or Sen’s basic capabilities, having agency power. Sen insists that consciousness is self-transparency of experience and so, it is an act of self-referring in which an individual presents to oneself. Generally, Western psychologies take for granted the idea that our usual egoistic sense of conscious identity is natural, and as such, appropriate.

In contrast, Indian psychological/philosophical conscience views the ego as absent in self-consciousness. The sense of a continuous solid ego, as in Buddhist insight mediation, dissolves on close scrutiny into insubstantiality. For the Buddhist and Hindu philosophies, there is no “ghost in the machine,” and thus, philosophies and psychologies, which are based on assumptions of ego identity, are viewed as based on absence of consciousness that succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity and as such, are in perpetual flux.\textsuperscript{40} Attempts to reach a consensus-based synthesis of human consciousness have been made from different perspectives. Matilal argues that when we talk about relative value of consciousness, our chief concern has to be with ethics. For him, ethical realism is ill-defined, because it is mostly about cognitive realism. It is Hamlet’s dilemma in which neither is good or bad, but
thinking makes it so. Sen prescribes inter-subjectivity to promote the endless rewarding and diversification of consciousness rather than homogenization or Bhabha’s constantly moving hybridized identity with locational fluidity. Merleau-Ponty’s consciousness’s eventual mode of being does not openly manifest itself, but remains a consciousness-as-witness.”

His contribution is that subjectivity is primarily of the body, but in contrast, Hume argues that conscience may exist separately and has no need of anything to support its existence.

Sen argues that the identification of our tolerant values and conscious position in observation depends on our methods of calculation from different angles. He gives an example: The sun and the moon look similar “in size,” but our observation is not beyond “positional independence,” arguing that a legitimate requirement needs to be compatible with variations of what is seen from “different positions,” which report that consciousness as the entire phenomenological being of the spiritual ego. However, consciousness being the phenomenological ego, as “bundling” or interweaving of psychic experiences, conforms to the traditional tolerant attitudes in perception, beliefs, and thus, verbalizes the indications of those experiences, although many of them are not named. Conceptive perception of ethics means an ability to form ideas by attending to perception’s phenomenological angle. If something is known to be a mango, without any further consideration it can be known to be a fruit. Our knowledge can be propositional and heuristic, and diagnostic, Sen argues.

**Positional Observation: Rules of Engagements**

Sen defines Indian tolerance in the wider frame of ancient philosophy that is connected to the world of experience that is not crystalized in the orthodoxy of Hindu “darsahnas.” Early Nyaya consisted in classifying modes of knowledge, including a description of the bodily senses, and of the components of a debate. The Samkhya dualism consisted of *prakriti* and *purusha*, the two world substances roughly corresponding to matter and spirit, and vaguely reminiscent of the mythology of world production from the union of god and goddess. It is in this mode of unity between apparently different entities that Sen constructs the idea of
tolerance. He assumes that the subset of a position of each individual stance acts according to the degree of achievement of a given attainment to one of the indicators, which is considered for the functioning assessment. Here, association values equality to one identity, a condition for full achievement with respect to a given functioning. The choice of association depends on the application of the context as well as an indicator. The power of a theory, in Kuhn’s words, “discloses new phenomena or previously unnoted relationships.” When we build up statements from their parts by observation, we gain new subject matters for the resulting statement to be partly about, but we never lose old ones. Parameter in this sense goes beyond the “bundle theory,” which is merely “reflexive reductionism.” It is relevant to know that the Greek word “para” means “beside,” implying that secondary themes are also to be measured for a comprehensive view of an observation.

In this sense, parameterization, Sen adds, of observation of some key aspects of tolerance requires generative solutions that appeal to the syntactic theory, examining the difference between inner mental structure and the surface structure, presumably reaching an objective status and attaining a “mean” position. In Indian logic, it is not merely a matter of logical ability because its centrality and commonality stand for unity of our perceptive vision. Although Rorty observes “mean” as a “mean or intermediate disposition regarding emotions and actions, not that it is a disposition towards the mean or intermediate emotions and actions,” in India, sincere “mean” implies a model of perceptive thinking that harmonizes the “opposite extremes.” The Indian logical “mean” suggests that a single encounter does not resolve everything because there will be other matches besides competition between deduction and induction, other playing seasons, other Olympic, where keen rivalry will continue for further grace and glory. This expanded parametric strategy continues to this day, although it is less evident how to handle typological generalizations within the minimalist program.

During the 1920s, the word “parameter” derived from “para” yielded a sense of measurable factor, which now helps define a particular system of observation. Some sincere statements are
entirely about “observation,” but meaningful statements need not be entirely about perceptive observation because observation allows us to produce a long chain of inferences leading to knowledge. In the West, H.P. Grice’s maxim of sincerity requires someone who asserts p and not to believe ¬p, not, as might be expected, to believe p. But if one asserts p while agnostic about p, one is insincere in a way that seems to flout conversational regulations. Conversely, knowing p while unable to rid myself of what I recognize as an irrational belief in ¬p, I might reasonably assert p, contrary to Grice’s maxim but not the more obvious sincerity condition. Grice’s two specific maxims of quality, “Do not say what you believe to be false,” and “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.” This is the ultimate scope of parameterization in which the substitution of “knew” for “did not know” in a statement yields a contradiction. For any reasonable notion of warrant, a true assertion based only on a “lucky guess” will satisfy the truth rule without satisfying the warrant rule. In other words, Grice’s maxim says, “Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.”

What is the difference between the center and the decentered? Decentered perspectives in pluralism may not be an example of a pluralistic ideal that may unduly suggest that “every ideal of human flourishing is as good as every other’s.” Pluralism does not lead to paralysis of responsibility, nor tolerance stands for “neither-nor,” or the Buddhist neutral normative “The Middle Way.” For B.K Matilal, this is “realism without dogma,” realism that lies in the idea of “overlapping” and “emergence” of identity, rather than its “imposition through metaphysical essentialism in which “rationality” may prevail in positional observation of tolerance. From a practical point of view, recognizing the global nature of human migration that is intrinsic to the shifting away from direct confrontation with the nation-state and at the same time creates new social and political areas, Sen invokes Martin Albrow’s “performative citizenship,” which represents potent alternative foci for a tolerant collective action. Pacifist in nature, this tolerant stance toward the older structure, becomes a new social configuration, which is still basically responsive, and indeed,
reactive to the world which it has not made. The new center takes the positions of all decentered positions, not by assimilation but by integration. In this case, intolerance should no more be regarded as central to tolerance, because intolerance does not demonstrate any direct connection with the theory of relativism, which as Putnam observes, is defined by the local cultural norms that are “merely the demonic counterpart of positivism.” Relative prejudice functions as the intellectuals’ internalized world-view and ethical norm, which may only satisfy the holder’s intellectual, emotional, and social consciousness. Halbfass argues that the emerging concept of tolerance/toleration in India has been flexible enough “to be applied to the technological world,” and the issues of “international understanding.” S. Radhakrishnan, a former philosopher/president of the Republic of India, also insists that tolerant dharma ethic is capable of reminding other religions that they also have potential of strengthening tolerance toward the rest of the world. The dynamic tolerant syncretism arising from Navya Nyaya (New Reason) distinguishes the cosmopolitan vision from pluralism, whose main tenet is that the “irreconcilable absence of consensus” is itself something of social, philosophical, and even political value. This is in contrast with the traditional moral relativist’s argument - if there is no objective right and no objective wrong, then might makes right and weakness is wrong. The notion of tolerance remains an alternative to the traditional strongman’s approach to moral relativism. Sen argues that tolerance allows us to discuss, value and judge traditions of the others without making criticism based on that understanding in any external sense. One cannot deduce ethical rules concerning tolerance, such as “Thou shall not kill,” or “Thou shall not tell untruth,” or any other unitary law for all people by a systematic step to tolerance and relativism, because of the idea whatever we can do, others are also likely to do with equal logic. A solution to the debate about rival values is plausible by sociological explanations as well, but not in a convincing way because in any cosmological vein, the reapplication theory gives “X is good” = “X is something we think is good,” and such a debate procedure continues for ever, providing the infinitely regressive steps leading to uncertainty. However, Sen observes the difference between positionally objective illusions, such as the bent-stick or mirage, and
positionally objective non-illusory observations. Even a single daily sunset involves an infinite complex series of consciousness in observation, and, as such, one is obliged to end the regress by accepting the existence of non-consciousness and non-intentional experience. An observation that the sun and the moon appear the same size is an objective but positioned stance, that is, positionality depends on the observer’s certain position in space on the surface. This objectivity requires an interpersonally sharable understanding, a sharing that objectivity in any form must minimally demand. This is not a position-invariant objective truth, because the moon and the sun seen from the earth as same size does not entail that they are of the same size in terms of all conditions of measurement. The objectivity of a particular perspective does not really establish its epistemic status beyond a certain position. Some Nyayayika logicians propose as a solution that it is possible to perceive every instance of a universal property if one is familiar with the universal itself. This is “generic perception” theory, which stands for unity with multiplicity that rely on contexts. An indexical expression is a term that is able to refer to two different objects in different contexts. Standard examples include demonstrative “this,” “that,” “here,” and “now.” However, the treatment of indexicality within the realist theory of meaning is problematic, because if the meaning of a term is identified with its reference, an indexical reference will be ambiguous. The philosopher Gadhadhara resolves the issue by running through (anugama) the various referents.

Perceptive Experience and Observation: The Tolerance Debate in Induction and Deduction

In his essay about “Westernizing illusion,” Sen argues that no fixed essence exists, and as such, an impartial discussion may not be served by mere comparison. In cultural relativism, anti-relativists expect us to worry about provincialism that endanger our perception, which temporarily loses its ethical consciousness. On this premise, our attempts to interpret concepts such as \( \text{karma} \), \( \text{dharma} \), and morals will necessarily be frustrated since the meaning of such terms is generated within the linguistic and philosophical framework of cultures which are wholly different from someone’s
own view. Marx brings economy as the central theme in a dialectic process, but our interpretation becomes nearly impossible as induction/deduction processes are invoked to establish determination of perception. Taken at its extreme, this form of relativism about the merit of the two means to perception seems to imply that one can be better than the other. Given the requirement of total evidence in perception, disputes between different theories of evidence and reasoning are not merely verbal; they involve disagreements as to which inductive conclusions are required. The relativism debate is about under-determinacy of our perception of a particular culture. Conventional wisdom posits that the West uses deduction to obtain imperfectly received knowledge whereas Indian logic mostly uses induction to reach “sound” conclusions. The reliance on the notion of two separate systems in logic as a main anchor of culture in tolerance obstructs the promotion of respect for diversity and social justice, an approach that recognizes the conflicting perspectives with tolerant culture. Kisor Chakrabarti argues that the drive to get at a priori essence of natural phenomena, and proceeded by the demonstration of effects from the first cause, is alien to the Nyaya thought. There is an agreement, K. Chakrabarti insists, between the Nyaya and Hume on the foundational role of causation for inferences concerning matter of fact, which refutes the assertion that Eastern logic has a superior claim. Merits and demerits of two logics are themselves relative for several reasons.

First, Indian logic arises out of two traditions - the tradition of debate/dialectics, and the epistemological/empirical traditions, as such, it relies on the problem of validity of inference, anumana pramana, and its mode of justification, and for that purposes, logic has to focus mainly on the relation of pervasion, or vyapti-kendrita sastra, which has a wide scope of meaning. This relation is required also for characterization of Western logical tradition’s central in valid deductive inference, of course, with some difference. Unlike Western system of proof, Indian pramana, truth, is both the originating conditions of true cognition and the normative principle of its validation.

Second, the Nyaya’s five-step process in terms of syllogism is similar to the Western deductive-entomological model of
Nyaya’s two-fold notions in perception are (a) it is sensory knowledge as when we see a table which is before us, and (b) an inner perception, as when we realize that we are happy.\(^{67}\) The means to perceptive knowledge, inference and verbal testimony, points directly to a fact and not in the sense reporting that it is a means to valid knowledge. Thus, perception, being Sen’s investigating tool, points to a jar immediately through perceptual knowledge. Some things such as one’s own self, pain, pleasure, time and space are thus directly known whereas all else through one or other remaining senses. This deductive process may be less central to our beliefs and life, but is essential in our daily logical system. If we believe that shining gold is more expensive than less glamorous silver, and silver is more expensive than tin, deduction enables us to make the implication of our existing knowledge by revealing that we also believe gold to be more expensive than tin. Deduction enables us to make the implications of our existing beliefs more explicit, searching for counterexamples and to know whether our views are logically coherent.\(^{68}\) At best it can be observed that compared to the Greek model of deductive systematization, the Indian system has the merit of not being committed to the doctrine of self-evident first principle. For Matilal, it means an identification of inference vis-a-vis sophisticated arguments and similar topics.\(^{69}\) In general inference, we accept a valid instrument of knowledge, although inferences are wrong and thus any general claim about validity of inferential reasoning should respond to this issue.\(^{70}\) Investigations show that every mystical element in Indian logical thought can be found in Greek thought too.\(^{71}\)

Third, for the philosopher Raghunathia, perception is more than the defense of the seven categories of metaphysics, because it is about what it means to assert or deny legitimacy by induction or deduction.\(^{72}\) Thus, Matilal argues that there is hardly any distinct difference between induction and deduction in Indian logic, and, as such, this lack of distinction adds to the charge that Indian logic is not really logic, while both relativists and anti-relativists invoke the argument that induction and deduction in logic are required to draw a valid distinction. Karl Popper, in his essay, “The Problem of Induction,” outlines several reasons why inductive reasoning cannot be a valid “proof” of scientific theory or knowledge. In
order to avoid a fallacy like begging the question as in the regress justification arguing inductively, one may introduce a new inductive principle. This principle will necessitate a justification from experience, leading to more inductive reasoning. So, Popper rejects Kant’s contention that induction is a \textit{a priori} synthetic truth, but agrees with Hume that inductive system might argue that, while we cannot prove something to be true inductively, we might also be able to show that it is probable. However like Hume, Popper also argues that this also leads to a circular infinite regress, as Popper makes two separate points. Empirical psychology and history are required in the process of obtaining scientific knowledge. There is no pre-set version of a logical discovery. For Popper, scientific logic is deductive, and in that sense, scientific knowledge itself is merely an infinite regress of inductive knowledge. Here, inductive knowledge replaces one theory with a newer one that also hinges on inductive logic.\textsuperscript{73}

Fourth, there are some obvious problems in making separation between logical and empirical inquiries to identify sources of knowledge.\textsuperscript{74} In Western logic, deduction and induction are not just different in character but also associated with different conceptual world-views. Deduction, which is associated with certainty and its formal structure, is not only independent of the world-views but also with the truth related premises. Its “non-implicative character” refers to inference in that no knowledge which is not already present in the premises can be observed in conclusion. On the other hand, induction is not only characterized by an “implicative character,” in which conclusion has more knowledge which is available in the premises, but also by an uncertainty of its conclusions. A logical division by way of making a divisive case between Western deduction and Indian induction gives an erroneous assumption that one line of reasoning is absolutely different from the other, and as such, one is relatively better. No doubt, the deductive mode of knowledge organization is correctly prized in the West, especially in exact sciences because of its precision and economy, but being the means to systematization of grammatical knowledge, it remains inherently universal in the scope of application. The deductive model of knowledge has extensively been used by the great grammarian Panini, who deductively calls for an organized model, calling for the absence of
under-extension, \textit{avyapti}, which is the condition for correctness, and also for the absence of over-extension. This is a process of elimination in over-extension and under-extension.\textsuperscript{75}

Last, deductive logic is extensively used by Patanjali to find social meaning in grammar. Katyana’s deductive methodology suggests that the body of truths under investigation constitutes the \textit{laksya} - a deductive system. Matilal argues that the hearer’s language-processing mechanism generates an output belief from any given input sentence. The meaning has two stages. One is literal (\textit{sanketa}), and the other is an indication, and thus derived, \textit{laksyana}. This meaning-relation is called the “word-meaning,” which is also derived. This deduction process is called by Chomsky as “language.”\textsuperscript{76} Thus, \textit{Nyaya-Nyaya} argumentation developed by Udayana (c. 1050 A.D), Gangesa (a. 1200 A.D), and Raghunatha (c. 1500 A.D.), posits that in any logical argument, induction and deduction may not necessarily be separate. In \textit{Nyaya’s} syllogism, there are two elements, induction and deduction, together to reach the knowledge stage. For instance, “All men are mortal” and “Rama is a man,” and “therefore Rama is mortal.” Deductive reasoning needs the universal proposition: “All men are mortal,” which is an inductive generalization. For dialectics, induction, which is broadly used in Indian argumentation, is not the stripping of the individuals down to an abstract, a common feature, but rather the discovery of the principle of the “whole” that unites all the individual parts in a single process.\textsuperscript{77} Thus, Sen accords well with Bernard Williams, who argues that the contrast between two sets of logic seems to be redundant, because consciousness cannot just switch off our logical argumentation when we are confronted with another group, and there is no reason why it should.\textsuperscript{78}

\textbf{Theory of Justification and Infinite Regress}

In the West, propositions about tolerance are accepted as real entities, as something outside language, whereas in India, cognition predicts truth, a real process related to the knower, and yet this cognition is not entirely subjective because there is a logical structure, which can be obtained through reflection on cognition. It is this structure which makes truth objective, but again, a new problem arises as to the means of ascertaining “embedded” morals, 72
which stand at Sen’s core thesis in posing the futility of cultural relativism. Thus, identification and observation of ethical norms are at the core of the cultural relativism debate. Can relativists morally engage in attempts to redress injustice in their own societies, or anywhere? We have so far argued that cultural and social agreements about social ethics in tolerant attitudes have benefits and disadvantages. John Hawthorne (2004), Timothy Williamson (2005) and Patrick Rysiew (2012) argue that the unstable picture of knowledge undermines the trans-contextual role, in which knowledge means retrieving and transmitting relevant facts. Richard Feinberg (2007) argues that moral relativism may not be a conclusion about reality, but is a tool for data collection as well as interpretation. Seema Gupta (2010) argues that deontological theories of ethics maintain that individual motives are to be judged not directly by their results, but by their conformity to moral rules, a position earnestly upheld by Amartya Sen, who exposes the analysts’ contradictions associated with the idea – “infinite regress,” which is hotly debated in both organized religious studies and physical sciences. Sen concludes that infinite regress or eternal regress refers to the sizes of objects, having a beginning of construction, but not the end. One is an adverb, whereas the other is an adjective, and thus, one cannot go backward eternally. It is impractical, he adds, to claim that our regressing motion is infinite. At best, it can be the size of an object. If our current issue is finding the location of ethical elements contributing to an impartial resolution, then our focus is on two rival sets of ethics. Sen resolves the regress problem by concluding that three dimensions “self, others, and the world” belong together as they reciprocally illuminate one another, and thus, can be fully understood only in their interconnection in which relativism in its negative imagination does not fit into the formulation of the concept of tolerance. The Naiyayakia debaters logically argue that a cultural interpretation can avoid a vicious infinite regress, but there is a layered-ness between a property (lotus) and the qualifying relation.79 When repeated challenges to an agent’s perception eventually drives us to identify the contingencies in existence, we view these as potential barriers to full autonomy, rather than barriers to the conceptual possibility of an account of autonomy.
Thus, it is unnecessary to complete an infinite regress before reaching an autonomy-limited perspective.80

Because the regress theory is about the core-periphery distinction (existence and non-existence) in a conceptual typology, the philosopher Dharmakiriti provides the “infinite regress formula,” which has progressive conscious and the logical step; the reflective self-awareness cannot be the effective in internal monitoring, which is a second-order reflection only. Since it is a separate act of perception that takes the original state as its object so it goes on continuously. Thus, on pain of infinite regress, reflexive self-awareness must be a first-element of a conscious state. In order for the second-order mental state to be conscious, it would have to be taken as an object by numerically distinct third-order mental state, and so on ad infinitum.81 The American philosopher Shoemaker adds that the first-order self-consciousness has inherent self-reference without further identification, and so, there is no need of a second-order or meta-act of reflection or perception. This form of self-consciousness is the non-dyadic mode of awareness.82 In simple terms, the easy way to halt the regress is by accepting existence of non-conscious mental states. Defenders of a high order theory at the same time face challenges from the second-order thought or perception.

In the regress theory, there is another question: Is there any sentence that is true/false in any finite ethical moral model, regardless of its size, but not in any infinite atomic intended model? Obviously, there is none, and therefore, we cannot say that there are finitely or infinitely many atoms unless we say that there are something more specific about the number of atoms. “We can define relations that behave in many ways like the membership relation of the set theory,83 which is about parts of classes. For any set, we have its power class by an unrestricted composition, and given a hypothesis that a certain “P” is a small class, and yet it is a “set.” Given this status, something infinite is small, and smallness of number serves more than just aesthetic purposes, and thus, Jerry Fodor argues that there are fewer parameters than there are possible rules in a rule-based framework; otherwise, it would be less obvious that the amount of learning to be done is reduced in a parametric framework.84 The arguments based on “infinite regress”
are sweeping and powerful as spelled out in a set theory, but on the Madhyamika side, the rejection of relational existence is the issue. A clarity is provided by Nagarjuna, who argues that pairs unstable, so, the self-referential condition is not logical. Because the regress problem is driven by an assumption, the ab initio requirement can be rejected. In Sen’s interpretation, self-creating self-consciousness with virtual autonomy does never exist. In Western logic also we are required to accept that the self is not self-creating, and complete self-creation is impossible. The complete self-creation requires two contradictory propositions – that the self-creating thing exists, which seems to be necessary for it to do anything, and then the thing does not exist, which must be true in order for it to require to be created. Thus, we have good reasons to reject the antecedent, that is, the ab initio requirement. Parameters of an observation have not only been assumed to be descriptively simple, but it has been taken for granted that they are manageably small in number as well.

**Conclusion**

The unity question between two positions, my tolerance versus your tolerance, a value-related issue, has raised the logical controversy over the nature and function of the Brahman, which is apparently the ultimate reality, thereby raising the specific discussion of the relation between the Brahman and finite individuals. J. N. Mohanty conforms to the observation of Ramanuja, Shankar and Vallavaha, who argue that differences are mere appearances. This presupposition is to the finality. Advaita argues that our precepts are apparently material objects, but in reality they are empty (svaya), because they have no self-nature (svabhava). They are only the phenomenal expression, according to Advaitva, of qualities (niguna) of mind. This in turn raises the debatable issue of contact, which is understood to mean the conjunction of two substances that were previously not in conjunction. Conjunctions are relational qualities belonging to two particulars, as opposed to non-relational qualities like colors and shapes, which qualify single particulars. Thus, pramanas or proofs have the dual role, both as the means toward knowledge and as a cause of cognition, and so, J.N. Mohanty explicitly argues that in
the revival of causal theories of knowledge in Western philosophy, perhaps pramana theory that deals with realism could be useful. Interestingly, the unique feature of the mature Samkhya philosophical system is that it rigidly separates the real of purusha from the material world. The idea is that spirit merely looks on as a witness consciousness, illuminating without inferring in the differentiated real at all. At the same time, prakriti is regarded as the source from which has emanated the entire material world, including even the discriminating intellect, our ego and mind, thereby giving this part of the Samkhya system a materialist as well as reductionist slant in reasoning.89 This knowledge gathering is about the parameterization means. However, Amartya Sen views this process not only as an enabling “capability” achieved “functioning” but also as an achieved functioning. With a direct and explicit reference to the meaning of human capabilities, some factors related to personal feature, including habit of telling conformity and co-operative dealings in social life, emphasizing tolerance in life, also are highlighted for practical reason. These are his indicators for “achieved functioning.”90

In making an observation seeking validity of Indian traditional tolerance, Amartya Sen takes the minimalist program similar to a theory of clausal typing, whereby an idea of morality or a perception or a philosophy, must choose one of these two methods of typing. Whether Sen actually succeeds in avoiding an infinite regress is not the entire discussion about tolerance and relativism. Brentano and others argue that avoiding one type of regress gives rise to another. One can still view self-awareness as a special form of object-consciousness. Here, Sen’s task consists of analyzing the precise structure of tolerant empathy and spelling out the differences between empathy and other forms of intentionality, such as perception, imagination, and historical recollection. This is our precise argument in projecting Sen’s means of identifying the elements of impartiality in Indian variety of tolerance as part of his broader concept of perception. We never see any estimate of the number of binary-valued (as in relativism) parameters required to capture all possibilities of core language that exceeded a few dozen. In this case, the Buddhist logic faces a difficulty in the apparent inter-subjectivity of diverse objects because our individual moments of perceiving can be contradictory; sensation is concept-
free but conceptualization is imaginative, a condition giving rise to a problem in the justification of regress, a generative perspective on philosophical typology.  

In hard cultural relativism, one norm is just as good or bad as the other. Husserl argues that there is a difference between the perception of a tone and the original or inner consciousness in which perception is simply objects in inner consciousness in which further objects are constituted as a temporal unit only. Thus, the route to correct perception of paired terms is either intrinsically known, or it requires further action for confirmation, which leads to infinite regress because every confirmatory cognition would need another confirmatory cognition and so on. In other words, an act of reasoning backward from an effect to a cause implies transcending, or outdoing limits so as to connect with something valuable. It is a connection with an external value, but this value may not involve any connection with an infinite value. We may aspire to that value, but to fall short is not to be deprived of meaning because “there are many numbers between zero and infinity.” In a different mode, Matilal invokes the theory of “inference-stoppers,” insisting that “those defects in the input would be inference-stoppers,” and not “generators of wrong inferences.” Nyaya clearly states that there cannot be any generalized “misinference” if inference “is to follow the derivation of A from P.” In conclusion, Amartya Sen argues that in observation of complicated cultural values, such as tolerance and mutual respect, our knowledge has already explicit knowledge running from high theory of Indian logicians, through education, to the design of a fuzzy theory as well as the everyday device, but the trouble is that the basic element of ANT (Actual Theory of Actual Network), which is one of Sen’s means to observation, the actant is without qualities beyond those precipitated by its position in the network.

1 The Sanskrit expression of sarva-dhrama-samana-bhava, has been coined by some for secularism in the highest political sense. On a wider context in India, tolerance means “equal respect for all religion,” since tolerance applies to much that is not religion; it is in use to refer to Marxism, or Freudian psycho-analysis, or manners/morals. The Sanskrit word sahana also means endurance or forbearance whereas the derivative sahansila
means the trait of endurance. A Hindu version is *ksama*, which has been used in the Gita also. The concept of *adhikara* and *ista-devata* or *ista-marga* jointly do the conceptual job of the word tolerance in the Sanskrit circle. See Jamal Khwaja, website of the author, and R. Anabazhagan, “The Role of Tolerance in Indian Culture: A Study,” School of Philosophy, Tamil University, Thanjavur (July 207).

2 For an analysis of Paul Hacker’s “inclusiveness and tolerance,” see Wilhelm Halbfass, *India and European: An Essay in Understanding* (Albany: State University of New York, 1998), chapter 22. Hacker argues that tolerance as a modern idea or ideology has ramifications which we do not find in traditional India. He adds that comparative philosophy cannot be objectifying, juxtaposing, and synoptic; it is best understood as self-understanding. Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti makes an interesting observation that the skeptical position, by way of comparison or otherwise, should be argued for and the explanation offered by the skeptic should be better than of the opponent and, so, qualify as the “best explanation,” Kisor K. Chakrabarti, *The Classical Indian Philosophy of Induction: The Nyaya Viewpoint* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), pp. 68-69. Chakrabarti cites Gangesa to affirm that “perception may take place” even of something in which one has no interest, Chakrabarti, section “Sidhanta,” in *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, vol. 6 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 148.


4 Cognitivists argue that a knowledge must be yielded by certain *pramanas*, but Nagarjuna, Jayarasi and Sriharsa do not accept the validity of any *pramana*. Matilal argues that if reality of *pramana* itself is question, the claim to possibility of knowledge stands refuted. See B.K. Matilal, *Perception* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 64.


12J.N. Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy, p. 12.


14Wilhelm Halbfass, Indian and Europe: An Essay in Understanding, pp. 263-286, a chapter on Darsana (Philosophy).


17Wilhelm Halbfass, India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding, p. 53.
22 Sen, Human Rights and the Westernizing Illusion.”
23 Wilber, *The Spectrum of Consciousness*, p. 63...
49 Mark Ressler, “Relativism and Tolerance.”
64 K. Chakrabarti, *Classical Indian Philosophy*, p. 4.


Sundar Sarukka, Indian Philosophy and Philosophy of Science (New Delhi: Matilal Banarasidass, 2005), pp. 46-47.


Jonardon Ganeri, The Lost Age of Reason, p.203.

Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge, 1961). His basic theory is presented as the limits of analysis and forecasting. His subtractive representation is called falsification of a theory. It is convex – what is wrong is quite robust, and thus, deduction/induction debate become irrelevant.


81 Dan Zahavi, *Subjectivity and Selfhood*, p. 25.


