Bradley’s Account of the Self as Appearance: Between Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and Hegel’s Speculative Idealism

  • Damian Ilodigwe University of Ibadan, Nigeria

Abstract

The constitutive activity of the self and the ground of the unity of the self are two important aspects of understanding the self. This paper attempts to delineate
these considerations, tracing their use, function and implications in Bradley’s thesis on the self. The article argues that for Bradley, the focalization is on the understanding of the self and the relation of thought to reality. Furthermore, the article attempts to locate Bradley’s account of the self as appearance as a middle course between Kant’s transcendental idealism to Hegel’s speculative idealism to demonstrate the overlaps, ruptures, and evolution of the philosophical journey of the concept of the self, its nature, and its expressions.

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Ss Peter and Paul Major Seminary and University of Ibadan, Nigeria

Published
2018-01-01
How to Cite
ILODIGWE, Damian. Bradley’s Account of the Self as Appearance: Between Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and Hegel’s Speculative Idealism. Tattva - Journal of Philosophy, [S.l.], v. 10, n. 1, p. 1-18, jan. 2018. ISSN 0975-332X. Available at: <http://journals.christuniversity.in/index.php/tattva/article/view/1782>. Date accessed: 23 apr. 2018. doi: https://doi.org/10.12726/tjp.19.1.

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