



Early Japan and the Taiwanese Aborigines in Colonial Taiwan a Love-Hate Relationship

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Abstract

The ruthlessness of Tōkyō's rule and the military authority's prolonged domination over the civilian administration reveal the characteristics of Japan's early colonial endeavour. The colony's main utilization was as a base for further expansion towards Southern China (Amoy 1900) a fact that demonstrates the political preponderance of the military and of expansionists circles in the metropolis and periphery alike. Taiwan as the first overseas colony served Japan's colonial experiment; colonial methods previously used in Hokkaidō and Ryūkyū were implemented while the way that Taiwan was managed set the pattern for the future administration of Korea.

Keywords: Imperial attitudes, colonial Taiwan, Japanese colonialism

1. Introduction

Modern Taiwanese history commences with the occupation of the island's southern part by the Dutch East India Company in 1624. Taiwan was known to the West as Formosa (beautiful) a denomination given by passing Portuguese mariners in 1517. The Dutch after overwhelming the Spanish garrisons located in the north expelled their competitors in 1642 and held the entire island until 1662. In 1644 the Manchu dynasty also known as Qing ousted the Mings and ruled China until 1911. General Cheng Ch'eng-Kung

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(Koxinga), a Ming loyalist born in Japan, tried to overthrow the Manchus but after a series of defeats, he led his troops against the Dutch in Taiwan. In 1662 the Dutch governor surrendered and Cheng established a Chinese type administration sympathetic to the Mings but hostile to the ruling dynasty in Beijing. Eventually, the Qings attacked, destroyed and absorbed the defiant Ming stronghold in 1683. Throughout the centuries immigrant waves hailing from Southern China mainly from the Fukien and Kwantung provinces populated the island. The Fukianese known as Hokkien or Hoklos due to their different dialects and customs were distinct from the Hakkas that had inhabited the island long before them (10th century), although ethnically they were both Han Chinese. The larger numbers (70% of the population) of the Hoklos allowed them to expel the Hakkas minority (15%) and obtain the most fertile plains; disputes among them were quite common. After 212 years of rule, Beijing ceded the island to Japan in 1895 as a result of its astonishing defeat during the Sino-Japanese war.

The island's remote interior was the homeland of Taiwan's 9 major aboriginal tribes. The three largest, the Ami, the Paiwan and the Atayal, make up to this day 85% of all aborigines. The more "advanced" tribes were living in the lowland area, paid taxes in kind to Beijing and practiced agriculture whereas the more turbulent "raw savages" survived by hunting in the forests and mountains having a minimal contract with the settler society or the imperial state (Cooper, 2003). Tribal conflicts and violent episodes with the Chinese inhabitants and Qing authorities were frequent. Typically, when immigrants mistreated or infringed on aboriginal territory Taiwan's ancient inhabitants ambushed them and in return, the Chinese attacked aboriginal settlements. Due to these guerilla actions, many aborigines were killed and others decided to move to the mountains. Qing immigration regulations and the absence of a firm central government in Taiwan led to communal violence and constant uprisings. To eradicate these phenomena Qing officials banned Chinese citizens from penetrating native lands and marked the aboriginal territory by a trenched boundary to restrict the raiding uncivilized savages in the interior. During the last period of Chinese rule, military pacification campaigns and a state policy to gradually civilize the lowland, "less barbarian", "ripe" aborigines were implemented (Roy, 2013, pp. 15-27).

The new Japanese masters of Taiwan in order to justify their presence there and present it as a restoration of their supposedly former rule gave prominence to fictitious or marginal historical facts. After 1895, 1593, 1609 and 1616 expeditions to the island were suddenly recalled while others claimed that Taiwan was settled by Japanese Wakō pirates and merchants that had to abandon it under the pressure of the Tokugawa seclusion policies in 1628. Thus, the Takasago colony on the northeast coast had been regrettably relinquished. Japanese scholars sought to legitimize Tōkyō's possessions historically. In 1930 the author Fujisaki Seinosuke emphasized Taiwan's strong ties and subordination to Japan, a colonial relationship that dated back to Hideyoshi's era (Caprio, 2009, p. 73). The same kind of pseudo-scientific rhetoric had been employed to rationalize the seizure of the Ryūkyūs and Korea as well. It goes without saying that the legend of Koxinga, the son of a Japanese mother and the brave hero that fought against the barbarian Manchus and the European imperialists was appropriately exploited (Matten, 2006, pp. 167-128, 186). Koxinga was famous even before the Japanese seizure of Taiwan; during the Tokugawa era, novels, poems, toys, a shrine in Kyōto and 104 plays exalted his loyalty and courage, traits that derived from his Japanese inheritance. A Taiwanese temple in his honour dating from 1662 was elevated to a State Shintō shrine by the colonial authorities in January 1897. This way the deification of Koxinga came to glorify not only the patriotism of a particular samurai but also the virtues of his Japanese mother, virtues that both colonizers and colonized should admire.

2. The Japanese return

Koxinga's descendants briefly returned to the island in 1874 under Saigō Tsugumichi; their second stay lasted from 1895 to 1945. The lack of preparation and of definite plans on how to rule Taiwan demonstrates that the seizure of the island was more occasional and opportunistic than meticulously outlined or deliberate. The annexation was a result of the sweeping victory over China in 1895 and the jingoistic response of the public which encouraged territorial expansion. Both the Meiji leaders and the ecstatic public agreed that Japan for its sacrifices should be rewarded with

territorial compensations at China's expense as the other powers had done. Liaodong's retrocession meant that at the very least Taiwan had to be held on at any cost. Navy officers were perhaps the only ones to deem the island as essential for the nation's future security. In the hands of another power, it would endanger Japan's position in the Far East and shatter its ambition to expand commercially and politically in the South (Roy, 2013). In this sense, early Japanese colonialism was reactionary, a mere precautionary measure to counter forthcoming western encroachment. Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi was convinced and pressed for Taiwan's annexation in the Shimonoseki peace talks. On 10 May, he appointed Admiral Kabayama Sukenori as the first Governor-General in Japan's colonial history. However, it was predominantly the search for prestige, diplomatic pressures and the struggle for equality rather than economic or strategic concerns that led to the decision to annex the island regardless of the subsequent reasoning that was in line with new imperialism's oratories (Peattie, 1984).

The proclamations about the civilizing of the Taiwanese through education were shattered under the pressure and the preponderance of the military in the colony. Economy, legislation, and the relations between the colonizers and the subjugated in these first years of Japanese rule were not regulated in line with the patterns of modern civil administration. Every aspect of economic and social life in a military orientated colony was rather dominated by the needs and aspirations of the army. The authoritarian and bellicose character of early Japanese colonialism is easily perceivable through Taihoku's interaction with the island's inhabitants, both Chinese and aborigines. It was on that occasion that the façade of the enlightened, benevolent and sympathetic ruler resonantly collapsed. For the army, administering the colony was a task too important to be entrusted to the diet and the political parties. According to the "Chronicle of the Police Affairs of the Taiwan Governor-General's Office", the office at a certain point suggested the expulsion of the Taiwanese from the strategically important island so that loyal subjects from the Japanese Home Islands could populate the colony making it safer. On 25 May 1898, the parliamentarian Takeuchi Musashi described the colony as "the only territory that Japan gained in exchange for the blood of our forty million people". In the same session, the goals for Taiwan

were set: “simplify the legal system, utilize local customs, save cost, extend benevolence equality, and gradually bring [the people] to civilization”. On many occasions, Taiwan was described in the General-Government office records as the “key gate” in the south to point out the island’s importance and purpose for the metropolis (Nomura, 2010).

3. The aboriginal problem

The aboriginal problem was synonymous with the exploitation of the island’s camphor supplies, the most profitable of the colony’s products. The first Governor-General, Kabayama, remarked not long after his arrival in Taiwan: “In order to colonize this island, we must first conquer the barbarians”. However, at the time there were more urgent issues to settle (Chang, 2014). The indigenous tribes were called hillsmen (takasago) or barbarians (banjin) by the colonial authorities who saw them as the next savage people to civilize (Kleeman 2014). The aboriginal population according to an unofficial estimation was about 14,000 by the end of Qing rule. They were deemed to be of Malay origin and were classified into 9 distinct tribes (Kokuki, 1973). This classification was based on the fieldwork of the anthropologist Inō Kanori (1867-1925). He visited aboriginal villages in May 1897 studying their customs, culture and social organization. His work entitled *Conditions among Taiwan's Aborigines* published in February 1900 arranged hierarchically the tribes from civilized to savage and renounced the simplistic Chinese classification of “cooked” and “raw” barbarians (Barclay, 1999, p. 199). Through his writings, he criticized the Qing for neglecting and oppressing the aborigines and presented Japan as benevolent and humane. Japan committed to scientific rule and the civilizing mission paternalistically saved the aborigines, the eternal victims, from the “cunning and crafty Chinese” (Matsuda, 2010). As reported by official colonial reports “the savages” despite their low level of organization and numbers were occupying 6/10 of the island. The government’s goal was dual: “bringing pressure upon them and that of gradually inducing them to enlightenment”. Additionally: “the northern savages are vindictive and they have the habit of collecting skulls. They stubbornly rejected our kind effort to tame them and attacked us violently (Scott, 2006). Those

that have submitted can trade with us and receive medical attention and agricultural implements". Their presence obstructed the camphor production and thus the problem had to be dealt by the police (SOAS PCE-FMC archive, 1909).

Taiwan during the Qing and colonial era was divided into 3 zones. The Chinese settlements on the west plains, an area between these settlements and the savage border populated by semi acculturated indigenous and the savage territory where the "raw savages" lived. The rich in natural resources territory was, however, outside the Qing's civil administration. The frontier zone was gradually decreased because of the Chinese and "cooked" aborigines' infringements aiming to secure employment in the production of tea and camphor. The Qing effort to increase the island's profitability and assimilate the indigenous was directed by a General Bureau of Camphor Affairs and a Bureau of Pacification and Reclamation. In the late 19th century increased Chinese military colonization, pacification campaigns, and a system of frontier garrisons to keep "the savages" in check were employed as well (Tavares, 2005). On 31 March 1896, the Japanese reinstated the Office of Pacification and Reclamation (Bukunsho) to deal with the aborigines and address the camphor issue. 11 of these offices were established along the old Qing border, 8 of them in the same location as the Chinese stations. Their goal was to open the aboriginal land for economic development, gather intelligence on the savage social and political structures and regulate the relations between the Japanese, the aborigines and the Chinese. In early 1896 Kabayama wrote to Prime Minister Itō requesting 236,871 yen for the project. He backed his idea by claiming that the aborigines' "hearts must be won over first" in order to open the camphor areas for the Japanese immigrants and avoid disputes. In March, his request was granted but a more limited budget was allocated. That meant that the facilities built between the 2nd of June and the 3rd of August 1896 were somewhat understaffed. One interpreter, two clerks, two engineers, and a few policemen (not as many as Kabayama had asked for) manned these stations. The head of the Industrial Development Bureau, Oshikawa Noriyoshi ordered the Bukunsho offices in order to gain their trust to explain to the indigenous that the Japanese would be better rulers than the hated Chinese. He also ordered them to distribute prizes to the loyal

villages which facilitated camphor production in their respective areas. The disobedient villages would not be granted gifts or firearms that were so important for the aborigines' subsistence hunting (Barclay, 1999). Three months after the creation of the Bukonsho offices military police were dispatched to the aborigines' areas since violence against Chinese workers and settlements was on the rise. The camphor's economic significance for the colonial revenue explained the fact that these offices reported back to the Industrial Development Bureau's Chief, who then reported to Mizuno, the Chief of Civil Affairs (Gotō, 1921). On 31 October 1895, the colonial authorities proclaimed the "Regulations for the Management of Government Forests and the Camphor Industry" which transformed the island's wastelands and forests into state property if those who owned the land could not prove their ownership. Those lands for which no license could be produced were declared void and their output was confiscated. The colonial state issued permits to sell the land to some chieftains and Han Chinese but by 1900 most of them had lost their rights to produce camphor by selling their rights to Japanese capitalists. After the creation of the Taiwan Camphor Bureau in 1899 and the proclamation of the Camphor Monopoly in the same year, the Japanese started replacing the customary system in an effort to rationalize production (Tavares, 2005).

4. The phase of appeasement

The first contact with these tribes occurred during Japan's colonization effort of Taiwan in 1874. After 1895 and during the initial years of colonial domination, Tōkyō found itself amidst a guerilla war against the Chinese inhabitants and was still not in a position to exploit economically the island. Thus, the Japanese appeared more tolerant or indifferent towards the indigenous tribes. Indeed, the very first administrators were genuinely well-disposed and fascinated by the mysterious tribes. In some cases, the new colonial authorities collaborated with some aborigine villages in the foothills against the Chinese rebels that sought refuge deep inside the savage lands. The "savage frontier" was terra incognita for almost a decade of Japanese rule. It was only when the colonial state wished to penetrate the mountainous interior and exploit the

profitable camphor trees that interaction with the aborigines was increased. After the consolidation of Japan's power during the Kodama administration and the pacification of the island presumably in 1902, when the resistance was officially proclaimed suppressed, Tōkyō focused its energy on the savage frontier (Knapp and Hauptman, 1980).

Mizuno Jun on 31 August 1895 claimed that after centuries of animosity and warfare between the aborigines and the Chinese settlers, the Japanese should adopt a policy of benevolence towards the indigenous so that "submission to our authority will not be a difficult task". He added: "...Like the previous administration [Qing], we should establish a Pacification-Reclamation Office which will gather the heads of the tribes together and other savages and distribute cloth, tools, and hold feasts with drinking. If we add to this earnest and untiring moral instruction, we should be able to produce good relations and can expect to harvest camphor trees in peace, produce camphor, manage the mountain forests, cultivate the savage lands, and build roads [in the savage territory]". The first Governor-General Kabayama and his chief of Civil Affairs Mizuno Jun were veterans of the 1874 expedition. They were aware of the "savage border" and convinced about the Chinese supposed cruelty, incompetence, corruption and avarice; for them, the victimized indigenous had to be protected and brought into civilization. On 25 May 1895, Kabayama made a stop in the Ryūkyūs, on his way to assume Taiwan's administration, where he conferred with local Meiji officials asking advice on how to rule uncivilized peoples. He explained to the heads of the civil and military bureaus his general policy in regard to the savage tribes: He suggested "paternalistic affection" and "kindly justice" for these unfortunates. On 25 August Kabayama concluded: "The savages [seiban] are extremely ignorant and simple, but...once they harbor ill feelings toward a person, it is difficult for them to change course; over 200 hundred years of their enmity with the Chinese and several rebellions is ample proof of this tendency; if we are to cultivate this island, we must first tame the savages. If at this time upon meeting our men, they should think we are like the Chinese, it would certainly result in them becoming a big hindrance to our enterprise; this government must therefore adopt a policy of attraction and leniency..." (SOAS PCE-FMC, 1909). Furthermore,

the second Governor-General, Katsura Tarō upon his arrival in 1896, issued some edicts to his subordinates according to which the aboriginal way of life should not be altered for the time being and they should be treated kindly to inspire respect in return. He noted: “the education of aborigines cannot be neglected even for one day... It goes without saying that it is necessary to cultivate ideas of empire, and at the same time their intelligence should be developed”. In December 1896, the third Governor-General, Nogi Maresuke, during a bureaucratic meeting, claimed the importance of calming the people’s hearts in order to avoid the alienation and resentment of the native population (Chang, 2012).

Accordingly, the first official contacts with the aborigines embodied this sentiment of leniency and appeasement. On 2 September 1895, Hashiguchi Bunzō, head of the Industrial Development Bureau and Taihoku’s Governor Tanaka set out to meet the indigenous of modern Daikei, southwest of the colonial capital. Their aim was to declare to the aborigines that Japanese rule had now replaced the Qing in Taiwan. Hashigushi distributed cloth, alcohol and blankets to the first 23 savages they encountered on the 8th of September. They accepted the gifts, expressed their relief for the Qing withdrawal and 4 of them came to Taihoku for a tour of the government facilities. Hashigushi recounted this episode on 22 October 1895 in his speech to the Tōkyō Geographical Society in his effort to draw the public’s attention to the colony and the “aborigine border”. In mid-September, he ordered sub-prefect Kawano Shuichirō to organize the first official Japanese embassy to Yilan aboriginal lands. Hashigushi wrote that the aborigines’ hate for the Chinese was so great that were happy to see their houses burned by the Japanese military. Their feelings towards the Japanese however were “extremely good”. Not every initial contact between the tribes and the Japanese were felicitous though. For example, a 14-member mission directed by Chief Fukahori Yasuichiro was slaughtered by natives in January 1897 while inspecting the road connection between Taizhong to Hualian. Upon Tanaka’s and Hashigushi’s mission reports, submitted on 9 September 1895, Mizuno established the first office to handle aboriginal affairs in Taikōkan (Modern day Dasi District) 16 days later. The station was built near the aboriginal territory and was given an operating budget to strengthen bilateral ties through

distributions of food, blankets and alcohol. Hashigushi appeared also skeptical about the attitude of the Japanese settlers in the mountainous areas; most of them sought to make as much money as possible in a short period of time and leave. Troublemakers and profit-seekers could disrupt the colony's harmony.

5. The phase of tighter control

Despite the "cordial" bilateral relations Tōkyō put forward more abusive measures. In September 1896, Ordinance no. 30 made entrance to the savage area possible only after the issuing of a permit. The Japanese adopted in 1897 the 18th century Qing *aiyusen* or guard line strategy to protect the civilians and camphor workers from indigenous aggression. The guard line was fifty to a hundred feet wide and was created by cutting a path along the crest of mountains. It climbed up and down mountains and dense forest and was constructed around the uncontrolled aboriginal territory. Entrenchments and wooden barriers were erected along the line. Every half mile guardhouses were built supplied with firearms, fieldguns, grenades, mortars, bamboo drums and later telephones manned by 2-3 policemen (Ōe, 2001). Every 4 or 5 houses a superintendent station was placed equipped with alarms. In later years the line was reinforced by barbed wire and electric fences. The guard line was placed under the authority of the police and thus the whole system became more efficient and centralized. The line was gradually advancing thus decreasing the savage territory pushing the aborigines further up the mountains or into submission. At times, the colonial authorities could blockade the interior, cut off supplies, such as salt, and starve into submission the troublemaking villages. The fence served to confine the tribes. The artificial border separated the civilized from the barbarians; beyond the border, the savages could live as they pleased as long as they remained in the barbarian territory. The rest that inhabited the "civilized territory" would be governed under the policy of direct assimilation (Caprio, 2009). Those that finally submitted were given agricultural implements and land for cultivation. Certain tribes were granted the right to trade but this too was suspended when they became unruly and violent (Semple, 1913). The guard line's extension brought about the appropriation of land first in the

outskirts of Taihoku and eventually up to the eastern regions. The owner-less land was automatically seized by the colonial government (Ching, 1994).



6. Japanese officials inspecting the border

In March 1898, Japanese workers were murdered by an aboriginal tribe signifying that the policy of appeasement had failed. The politician Mochiji Rokusaburō (1867-1923) criticized the colonial administration's adoption of Qing measures. A more drastic policy had to be put forward. In June 1898, the Offices of Pacification and Reclamation were abolished by the new Governor-General Kodama (Barclay, 1999). In October 1900, Governor-General Kodama made clear that the period of moderation for the aborigines, as Mizuno had envisaged it, was over: "These days the various enterprises in the plains are gradually coming together. As this work advances, we must shift our military forces to the savage territory. But those who live there are stubborn, and live like wild beasts; if we hold feasts for them and adopt a policy of attraction, it will take long months and years for them to reach a certain degree of evolutionary development. Such slow and inconclusive measures should not be the basis for the urgent and pressing business of managing a new colonial possession. We must decisively and

quickly eradicate all obstacles in our path". Military campaigns were now organized to subjugate the agitators. In March 1903, Kodama and Gotō arranged a conference with the participation of high officials and Mochiji Rokusaburō, now councillor in the Ministry of Civil Affairs, with the objective of finding a solution to "the Aborigine problem". Mochiji believed that the colony existed not for the welfare of the colonized but the economic advantage of the homeland. In his paper "A Position Paper on the Problem of Aborigine Administration" he explained that the Shimonoseki treaty gave Japan jurisdiction over the Chinese population of the island; the savages were beyond the reach of Chinese authority and since they were not Beijing's subjects they could not be considered Tōkyō's subjects after 1895 either (Gotō, 1921). Their lawless status meant that they were not protected or included in any protocol and treaty. Like animals, they did not have any rights. The previous administrators mistakenly tried to negotiate and ally themselves with a lesser race. In Social Darwinist terms, the barbarians had to be assimilated or be exterminated in the "racial struggle for existence". In the same paper, Mochiji bluntly proposed the annihilation of the savages: "... I refer to the problem of aboriginal lands from the point of view of the empire, there is only aboriginal land but not an aboriginal people. The problem of aboriginal land must be dealt with from an economic perspective and its management is an indispensable part of fiscal policy...It is not a problem than one can hope to resolve by ethical means". Japan had "to exercise violence in order to put an end to violence" and display its "warrior spirit" (Tierney, 2010, pp. 44-45). In April 1898, he exclaimed: "Until we solve this problem with the Aborigines, we will not have sufficient cause to boast to the outside world of our nation's will and ability to expand and be enterprising. The Aborigine territory occupies 56% of the island's surface, and is a storehouse of mineral, forest, and agricultural wealth. Unfortunately, the savage and cruel Aborigines have thrown up a barrier to this storehouse of natural resources". Mochiji's theories were put later into practice (Haruyama 1980, p. 16). Similarly, two newspaper articles by the Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō, established in 1898, proposed cruel measures to deal with the aborigine problem. In the 6th of October 1905 edition, the eradication of the barbarians was suggested but at the same time, the unfeasibility of the project

was understood since they were hidden high in the mountains. An editorial published either on the 15th or on the 18th of March 1906 described the indigenous as ignorant and violent beasts and thus their breed had to be halted Chang, 2014).



Taiwan aborigines posing in front of the wall

7. The phase of extermination

By mid-1898, the camphor from the Taikōkan area was processed by the Nakamura and Komatsu companies which employed Chinese labour but Japanese techniques and equipment. Nakamura also employed almost 1,000 Japanese immigrants but the aboriginal attacks and mortality rate due to malaria made the Japanese workforce hard to attract. On 13 September 1896, 23 Chinese labourers were beheaded by local tribes. In the entire island, 79 attacks took place in 1897, 271 in 1898, 293 in 1899 and 314 in 1900 effectively preventing the authorities from exploiting the island's

camphor forests. By 1898 the camphor companies and the colonial state started employing Chinese and friendly aborigine guards (1,100 men that year) to keep aggressors away from the production facilities. These forces were responsible in turn for almost 500 indigenous deaths between 1898 and 1901. Paying all these government and private forces signified the importance that the camphor foreign trade held for the ravaged colonial treasury. Camphor export, except for the first year of colonial domination, steadily generated an income rate of 15-25% of the colonial revenue. Nitobe Inazō was interested in the frontier tactics employed by the Americans. They confined the indigenous tribes with the use of guard lines, that were constantly advancing to appropriate Indian land, and they launched punitive expeditions. In January 1900, the First Secretary of the Legation of Japan in Washington requested information on the US Indian policy. In 1906 Oshima Kumaji, Chief of Civil Administration of Taiwan was sent to the US "to study the systems of government and education of the American Indian.". This kind of enquiry went on until June 1910 (Knapp and Hauptman, 1980).

The Nanzhuang Incident of July 1902 or Nanshō in Japanese is an example of Tōkyō's newly adopted ruthless tactics. One of the biggest areas of camphor forests was located in Nanzhuang. By early 1897 two Japanese companies (Fuji shōkai and Kōshōgōshi Kaisha), after purchasing the nominal rights, employed more than 200 Japanese workers in the camphor mountains. On 29 January 1898, 6 Japanese and 23 native firms established the Nanzhuang Camphor Association intending to improve the quality of the product and eliminate the illegal producers. The Governor-General government started prosecuting the illegal producers, routing the workers and destroying their stoves. In 1900 the tribes living in the hills around Nanzhuang did not receive their mountain fees, payment for the use of their lands that is. This and other transgressions gave rise to a riot. The colonial authorities dispatched a company from the Xinzhu garrison to restore order on 6 July; three days later a second infantry company arrived to disperse the 800 aborigines led by the Hakka Ri Aguai (Haruyama 1980, p. 66). The rebels attacked and dispersed the labourers working in the camphor industry and destroyed guard stations and camphor facilities in the mountains. The anti-guerilla campaign

took the Japanese army two months to complete. To quell the riot the colonial state employed the army, and both the national and local police. Artillery bombing and then infantry charges annihilated the riot hotspots one by one. On 17 November 1902, some 20 tribesmen came down from the mountains to surrender but they were ambushed and gunned down by the Japanese soldiers. It is apparent by the cruelty of the Japanese reaction that the colonial state used the riot as a means to eliminate not only their rights but the producers themselves in order to facilitate the Japanese industrial capitalism's penetration in Taiwan's interior (Tavares, 2005, pp. 361-380). The previous gradual assimilation tactics seemed unable to yield any positive results. The fifth Governor-General Sakuma Samata (1844-1915) from 1906 to 1915 put in practice a different, less sophisticated policy called "Five year plan to conquer the Northern Tribes". By 1913-1914 he had dispatched 12,000 troops to the mountainous interior to subjugate the natives. The long warfare cost Japanese colonial forces nearly 10,000 lives, while an untold number of aborigine lives were lost through conflict and starvation (Knapp and Hauptman, 1980).

End Notes

(!) - In the aftermath (1875) of Saigō's expedition the Taiwan Bureau's "Document of the essentials of managing the barbarians" demonstrates how the Japanese perceived the native tribes at the time: "Alas, the Taiwanese barbarians are vicious, violent and cruel. It is indeed appropriate that all the nations of the world have since antiquity considered them a country of cannibals. This is a pitfall of the world; we must get rid of them all" (Kleeman, 2003).

(@) - In 1898 some Japanese interested in the life and customs of the exotic savages created the Banjo Kenkyūkai (The Association for Research into Aborigine Conditions). The most prominent members were the anthropologists Torii Ryūzō (1870-1953) and Inō Kanori, who surveyed the savage border. Torii photographed, interviewed, and studied the aborigines on Taiwan's east coast in July 1896. In his writings, he suggested that the Japanese were not a "pure" but a mixed race, contradicting the theory about the unbroken continuity and uniqueness of the Japanese people. Ethnographical research and mapping of the aboriginal lands

promoted the subordination of the tribes to Japan by facilitating and justifying colonial rule. Mori Ushinosuke (1877-1926), another famous ethnographer, claimed in 1913 that "If we are to subjugate the aborigines, we must of course first understand them" (Barclay 1999, Tierney, 2010, Shimizu, 1999).

(#) - Both of them had orders to investigate conditions in Taiwan in the summer and autumn of 1873. In August, they met people and surveyed the land in preparation for the proposed expedition. Earlier, in May, Mizuno distributed Japanese products to the aborigines and noted their "goodwill". Kabayama had a similarly amicable experience at the Nanwo village in September 1873. Influenced by LeGendre's reports Mizuno and Kabayama came to the conclusion that the savages could be enlightened and that their violent behaviour was due to Chinese brutality and negligence. They returned to the island to tour its southern part in March-April 1874(Barclay, 1999).

(\$) - On 16 November 1895 Kawano met the aborigines and distributed gifts to their leaders. A similar mission was led by the colonial bureaucrat Sagara Nagatsuna in February 1896 in Taidong in South Taiwan. With Japanese support, a local aboriginal militia was established to confront the unruly Qing troops still pillaging the area. For the success of these efforts the new rulers relied on the services of translators that spoke the native dialects. The reinstated Qing-era interpreters were upgraded to village officials to facilitate bilateral interaction in a system of indirect rule. In several occasions Japanese married aboriginal women. This practice was deemed as detrimental to the colony's harmony by the district officer of Sanjiaoyong, Satomi Yoshimasa who complained to the governor of Taihoku in 1899. A Taiwan minpō editorial in January 1901 claimed that interethnic relations were the cause of friction and violence in Xincheng, Taidong Province. The colonial state never publicly acknowledged these unions (Barclay, 2007).

(%) - At some point the Governor-General government enacted legislation to force the Japanese residents to cover their nudity. For Gotō their behaviour was the "biggest cancer of the administration". In the 1896 "Actual conditions in Taiwan report" the majority of the Japanese settlers was deemed as: "a bunch who banded together with government officials, taking bribes and

enjoyed undue profit by engaging in construction and building, and selling goods for purchase by government offices by every kind of tricky means". As for their attitude towards the natives they "bully and intimidate" and "their conduct is akin to that of thieves... insulting the natives with whom they came into contact as much as they please, giving rein to hitting them, and regarding them like animals without the least feeling of friendship. " Japanese dignity in the eyes of the colonized was at stake according to a 1899 edition of Taiwan Kyōkai's bulletin: out of the 1300 Japanese women in Taihoku 800 were prostitutes, geishas and bar girls. In the same year a Nippon newspaper edition described Taiwan as a "dumping-ground for people from naichi" (Oguma, 2017).

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