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Security as Freedom in the Quest for the Value of Human Life: A Conceptual Analysis

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Abstract

This article attempts to demonstrate that the problem of national and human security is a product of deficits arising from the governance in nations wherein protection, peace and well-being of the citizens are not considered to be of primary importance. The article traces the conceptualisations of security in the work of several philosophers with primary focus on Jeremy Bentham to propose an alternative conceptual analysis of security as 'freedom from evil'. In examining several parameters of social progress, the authors offer a critical evaluation of current security practices. They propose that the security practices have failed to achieve stability and viability in several nations because of the conceptual gap between understanding security as founded on the social-philosophical principles of human value and dignity, and the current conceptualisations of security, prevalent in most nations, as a mechanism of inducing fear and driven by hunger for power, egoism, crass military might and brute force.

Keywords: Security, Value, Jeremy Bentham, Imagination, Human dignity

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Introduction

The problems of national and human security in this modern era can be seen easily in the deficits in the promotion of the value of human life. There is an inability of the various governments and state agencies to consistently and institutionally guarantee the adequate protection, peace and well-being of their citizens. It is pertinent therefore, to ask what the benefits of simplifying and clarifying the meaning of security for social action are. Are there any practical and theoretical benefits that accrue from a conceptual analysis of security as freedom from evil? How can a conceptualisation of security construed in a wider sense of an application of social principles like values, visions, imagination, to name a few help us situate the parameters of social progress? What set of other human and humane values beyond the propagation and operations of mere raw power, naked fear, unbridled egoism, crass military might and brute force can be adopted as the directing principles of stable and viable security?

Jeremy Bentham's Philosophical Analysis of the Idea of Security: A Conceptual Framework

The ideas of the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham most aptly picture the character and trajectory of a philosophical interest in security. Scholars have observed that Bentham's theory of security seeks to make a connection between property and security by weaving a theory around the concepts of community, law, punishment and evil. The primary concern of Bentham was to "establish a code of laws-a social system-which would automatically make men virtuous" (Russell, 1995, p. 741). This concern was situated against the backdrop of a thorough devotion to intellectually benefiting humanity by introducing "into morals and politics, habits of thought and modes of investigation, essential to the idea of science. Bentham's method may be shortly described as the method of detail, hence his interminable classifications, his elaborate demonstrations of the most acknowledged truths" (Mill 1974, p. 85).

In his theorising on the ideas of security, Bentham is clear on the following presuppositions. Security can only come from the principle of utility, which serves to promote the interest of the community. The interest of the community can also be understood in terms of the principle of the ascetic. For Bentham, utility and asceticism taken together, "may be considered as having been a measure of security" (Bentham, 1971, p. 264). The task of security is the more important when juxtaposed with the overwhelming role of law to obstruct the stocking of the "body politic with the breed of highway men, housebreakers, or incendiaries, swarms of idle pensioners, useless placemen, robbery" (Bentham, 1971, pp. 264-270). Thus Bentham insists that security can be maintained if those concerned know and play their parts effectively. As such, "the business of government is to promote the happiness of the society, by punishing and rewarding" (Bentham, 1971, p. 267).

For Bentham a security problem can be encountered knowingly or unknowingly. Hence, "when a man suffers, it is not always that he knows what he suffers by" (Bentham, 1971, p. 266). But Bentham makes it clear that an act violating security can be a mischief. This can be classified as primary, where it affects specific or assignable individuals or secondary, where its outcomes extend to the community. At the secondary level, a mischief can be construed as a pain, where people worry about the insecurity they may face or a danger, the actual risks open to those that are most vulnerable to the threat (Bentham, 1971, pp. 268-269). Thus, Bentham arrived at the conclusion that insecurity can be said to be an evil that has both immediate and remote consequences. There are different kinds of evil. We have "evil of the offence and evil of the law; every law is evil for every law is an infraction of liberty. An evil seldom comes alone. A portion of evil can hardly fall upon an individual, without spreading on every side, as from a centre" (Bentham, 1972, pp. 204-205).

Bentham insists that insecurity was to be seen as an evil that had the strong potential for dispersal and projection. Insecurity of the first order impacts on assignable persons. Primitive insecurity impacts directly on the victim. Derivative insecurity impacts on the well wishers and beneficiaries of the victim. Divided insecurity is defined by a loss that is not exclusively the victim's burden, but

rather a shared liability. Consequential insecurity can be the further losses incurred by a victim after the primary loss. Insecurity can be permanent where the loss incurred by the victim is final or irreparable. Insecurity can also be evanescent where it is capable of being forgotten by restoration or obliteration. Insecurity of the second order permeates the entire society. Second order insecurity can be based on alarm or the fear and anxiety of falling victim. At another level, second order insecurity can be based on danger or the fear that such threats will proliferate and mutate in other sundry evils. Furthermore, insecurity of the second order can be extended where it embraces a large class of affected persons (Bentham, 1972, pp. 206-207).

Bentham therefore insists that the law has a key part to play in the provision and maintenance of security. In his view, "the general object which all laws have, or ought to have, in common, is to augment the total happiness of the community; and therefore, in the first place, to exclude, as far as may be, everything that tends to subtract from that happiness" (Bentham, 1971, p. 270). Put more directly, Bentham was of the view that "civil law should have four aims: subsistence, abundance, security, and equality" (Russell, 1995, p. 742). According to Bentham, security is a dominant end of civil law, thus it "acts injurious to security, branded by prohibition of law, receive the quality of offences" (Bentham, 1978, p. 42). Therefore, security is an object of law in so far as it necessarily embraces the future. Insecurity is capable of overturning social order. Without security, nothing is attainable, that is why the law must engage with matters of security. Thus "in legislation, the most important object is security, laws are directly made for security" (Bentham, 1978, p. 43).

Bentham emphasises on the powers of laws as guarantors of subsistence, understood as existing, remaining alive or surviving either as individuals or groups. Therefore he argues that laws are effective to the extent that they "provide for subsistence indirectly, by protecting men while they labour, and by making them sure of the fruits of their labour" (Bentham, 1978, p. 44). The connection between laws and security are profoundly valuable when we realise that existence and survival can be threatened by variable factors such as "bad seasons, wars, and accidents of all kinds"

(Bentham, 1978, p. 45). It is for these reasons that laws are also made to serve as buffers for the periods of vulnerability and insecurity. Therefore the work of law is to enhance the prospects of man, not only "to secure him from actual loss, but also to guarantee him, as far as possible, against future loss" (Bentham, 1978, p. 50).

It becomes clear that the law is central to establishing security for the reason that everything that is of value centers on man and his possessions. A human-centered conception of security must be conceived in combination with other vital notions such as values, vision, human nature, cosmology and genealogy. Security remains an imperative for the humanity and is not only good, but also, an essential public good, in so far as insecurity is seen as an evil. Bentham further holds that poverty, exploitation and stupefaction are signs of insecurity. Therefore, non-possession or the loss of a good, knowingly or otherwise, is insecurity. If my possessions are part of my expectations, then insecurity comes from either dispossession or the pain of losing my possessions. Also, where dispossession is quite strong to vitiate existing supplies of materials, then the results can be understood as the following

> The fear of losing prevents us from enjoying what we already possess, besides, I am unwilling to give myself cares which will only be profitable to my enemies (Bentham, 1978, p. 54).

Therefore, it is security that has turned "frightful solitude, impenetrable forests, or sterile plains, stagnant waters and impure vapours" (Bentham, 1978, p. 56) into cultivated fields, pastures, habitations, rising cites, roads, harbours, and other abundances of human imaginative ability. Thus, from the above analysis, Bentham is right to say that man has a definite picture of the progress of security and "it is necessary to prolong his idea of security through all the perspectives which his imagination is capable of measuring. This presentiment is called "the expectation, the power of forming a general plan of conduct" (Bentham, 1978, pp. 50-51). Let us examine some key concepts in security arising from the above analysis starting with imagination.

Imagination and the Quest for Security

A possibility of an original security theorising or conceptual discourse cannot be separated from a review of the concept of imagination. According to Thatcher (1997, p. 51) "the power of reason and imagination is undeniable. By man's ability to think, science is possible; by the sheer power of the creative mind, men have travelled to the moon and released the enormous power of the atom." By man's ability to continuously think and evolve, some level of security is possible. It has been emphasised that building up human talent constitutes the linchpin of national security whereby more work needs to be done in increasing scientific discoveries and outputs in the areas of technology, education and languages for instance. This is the view of America's security requirements in the current era (Kay, 2012, p. 333). Specifically in the domain of security, "the thief's imagination is the only limiting factor. Today's battles with criminals are far more often battles of intellect than they are of muscle" (Fischer & Green, 1992, pp. 460-462).

On the issue of imagination, Russow (1978, p. 57) states that "imagination is part of the mental life of most people, and, as such deserves to be considered as a legitimate topic in philosophy of mind." Also, we insist that imagination is a legitimate topic in the discussion of security. In confronting this problem, we cannot avoid some level of theorising such as is available within metaphysics and modality, as well as philosophy of mind, and so forth. That or being which is necessary for conceiving a viable idea of security is the power of imagination.

Given that there are basic data or impressions in the world around us, and the nature of such data is varied, then everyone may not have the same capability for processing these data, in the same way, at the same time, and even with the same level of imagination. In discussing the idea of imagination and its linkage to security, we can appeal to Ryle (1973, pp. 117-119) who holds that imagining is linked to the concept of 'seeing' or picturing. People are capable of 'picturing' or 'visualising' things. The operations of imagining are exercises of mental powers. However, Ryle's view raises the

problem of whether there is only one univocal idea of picturing or visualising.

Shorter (1973, pp. 155-156) holds that the notion of 'imagining' can be clarified by distinguishing visualising or picturing, from the sort of imagining that a drunkard does. A perfectly healthy woman, who casts her mind back to some experience, is engaged in an experience that is different from that of a person suffering from 'delirium tremens' or hallucinations occasioned by high fever. Although Shorter (1973) holds that to visualise, is to do something, yet he notes that a man's excellence at visualising may not count at all in favour of saying that he is imaginative. Indeed, the fact that one can visualise complicated diagrams, solve problems in her head or have a good visual memory does not mean that one is imaginative. Rather, the notion of imagination is close to that of originality.

In discussing the idea of imagination and its linkages with the futuristic realms of real and possible worlds, we can still appeal mildly to the view that imagining is linked to the concept of 'seeing' or 'picturing'. What do we see? What can we picture? A range of things can be pictured; simple or complex ideas, mental or physical images, logical or factual possibilities, fictional or actual existents, spiritual or abstract categories, micro-or macro – life forms, ontological or cosmological entities. Given whatever it is that we see, Rabb (1975, p. 76) has insisted that "this imaging or imagining consciousness is necessarily intentional. That is, it must be a consciousness of something." This point is shared by Russow (1978, p. 57) who says that "when we imagine we always imagine something, but the object imagined is usually not present, and may not really exist at all." People are capable of 'picturing' or 'visualising' things. The operations of imagining are exercises of mental powers.

However, there is the problem of whether there is only one univocal idea, procedure or result of picturing or visualising. But then Rabb (1975, p. 77) has observed that "there is a distinction between visualising and imagining in the sense between thinking in images and imageless thought." To escape from this conceptual confusion, there is a need to disaggregate the idea of imagination

from imagination-induced forms of consciousness such as hallucination, delirium, neurosis, psychosis, delusion of persecution, delusion of grandeur, illusion, phobia, monomania, and megalomania. Hence, we cannot depend solely on imagination for security because "imagination alone cannot be trusted. Unaided imagination cannot differentiate fact from fancy. Indeed, it can breed illusions and delusions" (Perlman, 1995, p. 17).

To escape from some of these problems we may hold that imagination must include a cocktail of experience among which are; the power to visualise, to extrapolate, to configure original or novel ideas, to initially solve real and anticipated problems and generally exhibit a methodical, meticulous and holistic perspective on things. The ultimate aim of imagination is, in the words of McLean (2000, p. 73), to "enable one to take into account ever greater dimensions of reality and creativity and to imagine responses which are more rich in purpose, more adapted to present circumstances and more creative in promise for the future." Imagination makes sense only if it effectively and efficiently ties action with vision, which together then tilt towards strategies for the good of humanity.

Palma (1983, p. 31) makes it clear that there is some connection between imagination and action. For Palma (1983, p. 31) "one's imagination can of course be guided by reason. But one's imagination, as a source of action, is not necessarily governed by reason. In this context, by 'imagination' I do not mean the wherewithal by which we postulate possibilities (sometimes fantasies). I mean the ability to seize and act upon a certain course of behaviour." Imagination, if it is to enhance or guarantee security must link up with action, values and visions.

Vision, Action and the Security Imperative

Security depends on imagination, and both are inevitably linked to the ideas of vision and action. The point must be made that without imagination, vision and action, no amount of information, prowess and resources can make a difference in the determination of things. The question of human action is significant when we note that the philosopher is interested in, and makes his or her contributions

through ideas. The philosopher must seek to understand ideas and how they come to exert so much influence on the lives of human beings. Ideas make more sense when they are defined as visions. Visions are attainable if they can be translated into action. This is why the analysis of the interface between vision and action is significant.

To escape from the quagmire of defective and purposeless action such as is inimical to security we are definitely in need of rethinking the value of vision for action. According to Locke (1991, p. 49), the idea of vision can be referred to as "overarching goal, mission, agenda, central purpose; an ideal and unique image of the future". A vision is an instrument or a means by which an individual or group integrates and guides his or their efforts. Without a vision, other qualities such as motives, knowledge, traits, skills and abilities will not amount to much. They cannot be appropriated, channelled or diverted innovatively and systematically for security inclined designs and goals. More than that, a vision is valuable since it is an idea and unique image of the future as elicited from a combination of current facts, dreams, dangers and opportunities.

A vision retains ethical propensities that impute into it some normative and prescriptive value. In this way, a vision is a mental image of a possible and desirable future state of affairs. In the course of establishing a vision, there is a corresponding sharpening of the power of choice, discern alternate forms and chart a trajectory or direction. There can be no security without action and vision. This point is reinforced by Alaya (1977, p. 262) who says that vision could be contained within the simple principle that "bad external circumstances inhibit human development, and good ones foster it." Hence, there is a need for a clear, distinct and positive vision if we are to have security. Furthermore, security can be a vision that an individual or a group possesses. It may be an outcome of the possession of certain gifts, talents, resources and abilities. Such a vision may be a positive or negative one and it will have the consequence of promoting the survival or annihilation of a person or a group at any level (cultural, physical, social, political, etc).

Vision without action is vacuous creative instinct. What do we mean by action especially in relation to the notion and operation of security? Grimm (1980, p. 235) holds that "actions are purposive, every action is performed by an agent with some purpose." The end result of an action, physical or conceptual, is its purpose. Grimm (1980, p. 235) argues further using the illustration below, that if every action has a purpose, then every action is performed by an agent with a purpose. It is performed in order to achieve some goals, either the performance of another action, the bringing about of some state of affairs, event or condition or the obtaining of something or some experience.

There is another dimension, which suggests that an action may have no purpose or that an action is its own goal. Some actions can be performed for their own sakes. Doing something for its own sake is doing it, just because one wants to. It is doing that thing for a reason and not doing it for a purpose. Thus, the issues of intention, intentionality, purpose, reasons, results, consequences, causes, performance, and so forth are key concepts necessary for the clarification of the meaning of security. However, we must transit to a discussion of the idea of values.

Axiological Imperatives in the Quest for Security

For vision and action to make sense and yield results, we must retain values that define the basis of our actions. The maintenance of security implies the protection and preservation of certain values. The significance of values for security can be drawn from the analysis of Appadurai (2002) who says that in the context of terrorism, "the attack on the World Trade Towers was not merely an effort to kill civilians. It was an effort to end the idea of civilians. And surely values are part of the carnage of the battles that have taken place since then" (p. 97). However, we can understand the nature of values better when we realise that every society sets for itself "an ideal form of life or an image which it seeks to attain and to which it constantly refers in the process of going through life" (Sogolo, 1993, p. 119). These ideal forms of life refer to the standards that guide the society. These standards, therefore, are known as the values of that society.

Given the variation existing in human social systems and its effect on the diverse values people uphold, it has been argued that "the issue of the nature of value is one of the central and most persistent problems of human existence" (Titus, 1970, p. 331). It is clear from the above that the existence of values is a generally admitted fact and, more importantly, values form the basis of all cultural life. They are in fact the foundation of all cognition and they constitute the category structure of the human consciousness" (Brunner & Raemers, 1937, pp. 87-88). To capture the essence of the notion of value, Perry affirms that a thing or anything has value when it is the object of an interest, which is a train of events determined by an expectation of its outcome (Perry, 1968, 336). Thus Titus (1970, p. 331) affirms that when people make value judgements on the function of their values, their efforts are to be seen as an appraisal of the worth of objects. So he suggests that value can be found in terms of the positive property of having worth or being valuable.

Singer, on his part, adds an extra dimension to the conceptual analysis of values when he suggests that a "person's values are what the person regards as or thinks important" (Singer, 1989, p. 145). The same is applicable to the society insofar as a society's values are what it considers important. According to Ackermann (1981, p. 451) "values must, then, be considered in intimate connection with what could be called the collective interests of the very social groups that hold them." By way of analysis, if value is that which is desirable, important or interesting, then something can be desirable but not necessarily important. Something can be interesting but not important. Something can be important but is neither desirable nor interesting. Something can be both important and desirable but not interesting. We have utility value, instrumental value, intrinsic value, ethical value and aesthetic value among others.

Kupperman (1972, p. 259) has made the important point that "the aesthetic value depends on ethical values, and we become aware of the aesthetic value by means of awareness of ethical value". For these reasons we must analyse our ideas of value and security further. A value is a belief about what is good or what ought to be. The link between values and security has been captured by Nietzsche (1986, p. 104) who says, "A society in which the members

continually work hard will have more security." This suggests that the value of hard work or diligence and commitment can enhance security for a person or a group. The truth is that not every society or person shares the same values with others especially when these affect the conceptualisation of security. For instance, in most postcolonial African societies there cannot be security because of inefficiency, carelessness, lawlessness, ineptitude, laxity and levity of the part of the leaders and followers.

This is why we can agree with a passage in the work of the popular novelist Clancy (1994, p. 542) that says, "Don't forget, that their culture is fundamentally different from ours. Their religion is different. Their view of man's place in nature is different. The value they place on human life is different." In short, when the lines are drawn, we are forced to reconcile security with ways of life, which are most visibly seen in preexisting values. We can examine the character of existing values as opposed to how they ought to be. If the individual accepts a value for himself, then it becomes a goal for him. Many of the attitudes of the individual reflect his values or his conception of what is "good" or desirable. Shared values express our preferences for goods or things that are considered worth striving for. We are supposed to be interested in those values that can make life in society more peaceful, secure and progressive. We need to distinguish between individual values and shared values. We face the challenge of reconciling our values with the demands of modern change. We seek new values that can effectively provide identity and security for the individual and the group.

The study of values is an inescapable imperative for rational and meaningful security theorising, human edification and national development. But then our vision, actions and values are clouded by the human nature, especially the negative manifestation of this, which, though a central part of life, is yet a major cause of the deliberate and accidental man-made problems facing humanity. What has human nature got to do with security? Before we answer that question, we need to establish a nexus between security, the value of human life and consciousness as a prelude to appreciating human nature.

Security and Human Nature

Latham says that "security is an object of every group organisation if security is understood only in its elemental sense of the survival of the group itself in order to carry forward its mission" (Latham, 1956, p. 236). Traditional security, which places so much emphasis on militaristic structures, tactical weapons platforms, elaborate war-game strategies as well as the cutting edge products of advanced science and technology could not meet some core security challenges. The reason is simple. It had overlooked a critical aspect of human existence in the security factor; which is human nature. The reason in this case is linked to the problem of the person and society in philosophy. We must share the view of Berry (1986, p. xiii) who insists that "social and political organisation has to accommodate itself to the human nature and not vice versa." In other words, human nature is a primal symbol in the quest for security in human existence. The question that is crucial here then is what is human nature? This is a conceptual question, which has far reaching empirical consequences. According to Dewey (1974) human nature can be defined by the innate needs of human beings. Dewey (1974, p. 116) says that "I do not think it can be shown that the innate needs of men have changed since man became man or that there is any evidence that they will change as long as man is on the earth. Needs for food and drink and for moving about, need for bringing one's power to bear upon surrounding conditions, the need for some sort of aesthetic expression and satisfaction, are so much part of our being."

Furthermore, Dewey (1974, p. 118) points out that "pugnacity and fear are native elements of human nature. But so are pity and sympathy." The quest for security and the context of human nature is tied to what Mill (1962) refers to as the natural sentiment of justice, which is defined by the interplay of the ideas of punishment, self-defence and sympathy. What is this idea and how does it connect with the conceptual clarification of security? Mill (1962, p. 306) states that "two essential ingredients in the sentiment of justice are, the desire to punish a person who has done harm, and the knowledge or belief that there is some definite individual or individuals to whom harm has been done. The desire to punish

…is a spontaneous outgrowth from two sentiments, both in the highest degree natural, and which either are or resemble instincts; the impulse of self-defense, and the feeling of sympathy." Furthermore, Mill (1962, p. 307) argues that "a human being is capable of apprehending a community of interest between himself and the human society of which he forms a part such that any conduct which threatens the security of the society generally is threatening to his own and calls forth his instinct of self-defense."

From the above analysis, there is a dimension of security as embodied in human nature and its operations. These natural feelings and instincts of humanity are themselves again constrained by some other factors. According to McShea (1979, p. 389) "men need what other animals do not, a method for the restoration of the functionality of feelings. Their freedom to imagine all possible things cannot, consistently with survival, entail enslavement to the necessity of action on the basis of an emotional reaction to each imagination." The analysis of human nature takes a different dimension when Bacon (1972) sets the pedestals of the operations of human nature at two distinct but important levels. This, he does through the theory of idols.

According to Bacon (1972, p. 92) human nature is captured by the idols. He asserts,

> The idols of the Tribe have their foundation in human nature itself, and in the tribe or race of men. The idols of the Cave are the idols of the individual man. For everyone (besides the errors common to human nature in general) has a cave or den of his own, which refracts or discolours the light of nature; owing to his own proper and peculiar nature." Human nature and its significance for security make further sense only in the context of the social nature of man. According to Mackenzie (1963:35) "human association, societies are first formed for the sake of life; though it is for the sake of good life that they are subsequently maintained. The care of the young, the preservation of food and drink, the provision of adequate shelter and protection would suffice to

> account for the existence of human societies (Bacon, 1972, p. 92)

This implies that society is necessary for some level of security for the human being. We also know from history that human associations have been the core sources of security crises or problems. For example, there is the crisis of women's security as seen in the operations of the family. There is the problem of tyranny and man's inhumanity to man, as seen in the internal operations of human actions in a society. There is the wider social insecurity generated by human intercultural conflicts among human associations. We can connect the human factor in cosmological security by illuminating what Grayling (2003, p. 131) says is the "murderous grip of humanity's various immemorial belief systems, intolerance, bigotry, zealotry and hatred."

All of these forms of security problems can be predicated upon the workings of human nature and human actions as clearly motivated by psychological, cultural or economic factors, among others. Another implication of the above analysis is that we confront the general problem of human nature as seen in the problems of our finitude and limitations as observed by philosophers through their descriptions of our ethical, human and metaphysical imperfections. We also confront the restrictive limitations of our peculiar human natures as individual men. And all of these taken together pose a stumbling block to our search for perfect security. As an example, the truly common human inability to foresee the future of things is a hindrance to personal and social security on a long-term basis.

Behaviourism and the Defeat of Morality and Security

Traditional security also suffers a shortfall by failing to take into adequate consideration the issue of human nature, especially as it further relates to mentalistic and non-observable aspects of human conduct, such as intentions, motives, and levels of moral judgment in the determination of how far anyone or set of persons could go in making a point using a terrorist action. In short, there is the problem of inner states of consciousness and other minds. Ayer (1973, pp. 346-347) has captured this problem of other minds in the statement that "the only ground that I can have for believing that

other people have experiences, and that some at least of their experiences are of the same character as my own is that their overt behaviour is similar to mine." The problem with this kind of position is an irreconcilable binarism that has been aptly put by Malcolm (1973, p. 373) that "when I say 'I am in pain', by 'pain' I mean a certain inward state. When I say 'He is in pain', I mean *behaviour*. I cannot attribute pain to others in the same sense that I attribute it to myself."

The particular problem of finding out whether we can know things concerning the self in the same way we can know things concerning the other is significant in itself. It is also significant for the determination of those features that truly make up the human agent or human being. The person is generally perceived to be made up of two parts, the physical and mental dimensions. These parts do interact. The problem arises because the way by which I can know myself as a self, subject or I, is different from the way that I can know other persons. I seem to know my experience directly without any intermediary. I know myself because I have inner states that essentially constitute my being or myself or my nature. These inner states that I have are exclusive to me. No two inner states are the same. No other person has access to my inner states except by my consent and through my disclosure. This is one of the essential definitive features of a human being; the almost intrinsic inaccessibility of the inner states.

The ability of other persons to know my inner states depends significantly on whether I reveal certain experiences that define myself. Thus the details of my consciousness, experiences, plans, inclinations, desires and thoughts are virtually hidden from others except myself. This is the reason why criminals, looters of state treasuries, tyrants, terrorists, and so forth succeed. Sometimes, even aspects of the inner states of a person can be inaccessible or incomprehensible to oneself. We can appreciate this point by recalling the examples of actions tied to amnesia, hypnosis, sub-conscious streams of experiences, beliefs, dream states, trances, dual personality, psychosis, mysterious experiences, hallucinations, to name a few. These unknown factors or qualities can be called up and utilised for specific ends. This can explain the emphasis on the psychological aspect of man in the attainment of projects.

There is a more serious problem of knowing the inner states of other persons, whose experiences are not directly available or accessible to us. To escape from this contradiction, the theory of behaviourism emerges as the idea that we can know the other by watching her behaviour or overt activities. The pitfall of behaviorism has been that there is a logical possibility of error. I can pretend or deceive others, if all that people can use to know that I am human is my overt behaviour. I can appear to be what I am not; I can hide my inner feelings or situation. This is one of the key features of human beings that pose a grave problem for security. We can therefore understand the ways by which an individual, groups and institutions can often be hoodwinked by strategies of impersonation, espionage, subversion, deception, and manipulation. In effect, the shortfall of behaviourism has paved the way for insecurity since one does not know the actual experience existing within the mind of the other and thus external behaviour cannot be a reliable or conclusive way of discerning that the other person is really or fully human.

It is this possibility of error, which is both logical, and empirical, that paves the way for the possibilities of insecurity especially the ones constructed by humans. Also, our limitations or our finitude as humans can be linked to cultural, historical and biological shortfalls. These constraints pave the way for errors of judgment with respect to externally induced insecurity. This is called fallibility. This behaviourist challenge can be used as an explanation of terrorism and the problem of human nature as it relates to security. The challenge of behaviourism is itself an emphasis on the character of physicalism. For the physicalist, the things that we do and the things that are in this world are inevitably connected to the material or physical form of things. The only real things are physical things and the only influential things are material categories of consciousness and understanding. One of the strongest material causes of human action is the economic foundation of life. There is also the operation of the (normal or pervert) psychological framework of the human mind. Security can be threatened by greater ethno-cultural intolerance, religious irredentism, ideological demagogy, political manipulation,

economic deprivation and social anomie, all of which operate at the mentalist and physicalist planes.

The Value of Human Life and Non-Selective Humanism as Foundations of Security

What do we mean by the value of human life? What factors may threaten this value? What are the consequences of having or not having this value? To begin with let us review an example of how the value of human life is threatened by a selective humanism practiced in Africa. Selective humanism holds that all men are not equal, that some human beings are superior to others, that only the interest of a class or group should prevail over that of others. Is this really true? Is this really acceptable? Should we sustain such a view of human society or cosmology? The reasons for such a belief could be that there are some differences in wealth, education, racism or even ethnicity. Therefore, the idea selective humanism is that basic elements for building a stable and viable human society such as justice, security, etc should be determined by who is who selectively, and not by our common humanity.

Let us review an African situation. A lot of scholars have pointed towards ethnicity; Ethnicity conceived as the Achilles heel of any African effort to establish and sustain security. Eme Awa (1993, p. 58) rightly stated that "where societies are poorly integrated and primordial feelings are prevalent as in the states of Africa, the representatives of the various ethnic groups in the civil service may perceive the national interest mainly in terms of the welfare of their particular groups." Thus we cannot but insist that ethnicity may need to be captured, bridled and vitiated. According to Odugbemi (2001, p. 70), "ethnicity undermines the fundamental values without which we cannot build a sane, serious, democratic society". It has ushered in convoluted citizenship and attitudes suggestive of de-development and disintegration in a national context. It has encouraged resistance to change (Galey, 1974, p. 270) hence countermanding dominant modernising instruments such as the state, etc. Ethnicity has induced convolutions in social organisation and psychological predispositions. These have triggered questions about human survival and have forced a return

to the study of the basics of human nature. To overcome a recalcitrant human nature and inimical cosmological and political ethnicity, a new set of competing or higher values must be identified, entrenched and given legitimacy as directing principles.

Other higher ideals and positive values must be encouraged and entrenched. If ethnicity is allowed to continue ravaging the spaces, then things will never progress in many parts of Africa. Thus far, ethnicity has largely brought prominent negative aspects to African societies, inhibiting morality, education, religion, law and other instruments that have changed societies for the better elsewhere. At a more fundamental level, the conflict of values arising thereof, and the various abuses and injustices arising from it, have ensured that there were no accepted and established rules for harmonising the diverse interests of the groups for national development such that the lack of shared beliefs, attitudes and values among the rulers themselves, the rulers and the ruled, as well as between the various segments of the Nigerian society ensured that insecurity, indifference and conflicts remained endemic in the nation. It is for these fundamental reasons that some groups have called for the aesthetical reconfiguration of the society through instruments such as the sovereign national conference, self-determination declarations, political realignments, and non-violent agitations for resource control. Other instruments include outright militia violence, social activism for attrition and persistently radical legal actions for widespread national liberation and transformation. All of these illustrate the dislocations, doubts and disagreement over the value that we should place on human life on an individual and collective basis (Ujomu & Olatunji, 2013).

Central to the building a theory of the value of human life as a core element of security is the establishment of a process of appropriating the mechanisms of values and valuation. While value concerns the worth of something and the way we come to attain that worth, valuation is based on the decided weighted cost-benefit of the placement of a price or primacy on something as important, desirable or interesting. In either of these ways the concrete concern is to discover how people can live in peaceful cooperation, obedience to laws, and amenability to organisation and loyalty to the state. As it is, the pervasive injustice, social

neglect of the marginal groups, poor responsiveness by government and truncated legislative representation can only lead to insecurity, disorder and instability in the body polity as we see today. The tragedy of a virulent multi-ethnicity that has bred conflicts and tension is bases on this question of satisfaction. This in turn raises the question of tolerance and dialogue as instruments for change in a multiethnic developing society (Ujomu & Olatunji, 2013).

The search for one or more philosophical principles for building a society is not new in human history or the history of human civilisations. In the unique case of America, it has generated a pragmatic philosophy that has ensured its distinctness, success and ascendancy in history. Other societies have done similar things some have even developed a viable philosophy by combining different elements of life borrowed from within and outside their national spaces. A philosophy of society is fashioned out of a climate of beliefs, behaviour and actions. The climate of a society depends upon the ideas that are prevalent at the time (Viscount Samuel, 1956, p. 208). Progress is made through invention of new global concepts (Harman, 1975, p. 122). Given that some of the more recently embraced paradigms of security analysis and planning that Africans utilise emanate from most parts of the world especially Europe, these ideas face the challenges of blending into the specific cultural nuances and social proclivities of African societies.

What is special and appealing about a good social philosophy is that its basic principles can easily be adapted to the different facets of social and national life. It is this kind of philosophy that a society desiring peace and progress needs. The quest for a philosophy for Nigeria cannot be separated from the recognition of the value of human life. This basic principle will allow for the proper and effective utilisation of the principles of human dignity, solidarity (which is already embedded in the social practice of communalism) and subsidiarity (the freedom to release individual potential for personal and social growth). However, such a philosophy should abide by the core value of respect for the principle of the value of human life of all social members, understood as respect for the dignity of man in his freedom and responsibility.

The recognition of the value of life is an imperative, if any social philosophy is not to suffer the failures associated with the old communalism (which generated hegemony, anachronism, irredentism and disaffection) and crass pragmatism (which generated manipulation, irrelevance, otherness and cultural disdain) in the body polity. In the pursuit of an alternate philosophy of social life understood as a pristine value or an eclectic mix, the value of human life as a moral and political core of any viable social philosophy is to be taken as sacrosanct and consecrated. The practical consequence of the recognition of the value of human life is the intensification of the mechanisms and strategies for the establishment and sustenance of justice in the society. The ontology and axiology of justice will trigger the arousal of a deep belief in the power and capacity of the society, its custodians and its institutions to make a change towards the assurance of the freedom, well-being, opportunities and progress of the generality of the citizens. A philosophy of the value of human life is the totality of the principles, values, concepts and structures that will ensure that individuals give a fuller loyalty and commitment to the society and can have the best opportunities for actualising their potentials and making their contributions.

All of these elements make sense when tied to the goals of security, which comes from the affirmation of life itself, and the value of life. The work of preservation of human and institutional value has become a major aim of security in a developing society. Security is nothing other than the totality of the strategies and efforts to place a value on human life, to make human life worth living. As Ekman (1963) has noted "affirming life means wanting to continue to live. There are elementary needs that must be satisfied in order that the organism may survive, and there are others (also elementary) which although not necessary to survival must nevertheless be satisfied if life is to be endurable" (Ekman, 1963, p. 57).

If the value of human life in the context of the search for a national philosophy of life makes any sense, then this ought to be defined as a realisation and effort towards the rectification of the systems of economy, of infrastructures, structures and institutions so that change can occur. The changes that will attend the rule of the value of life may well translate into an increase in national pride,

commitment, contribution and national consciousness. This is because the concrete application of the principle of the value of life will require a change to a more humane and compassionate society that will take the provision of welfare and the release of potentials through the provision of opportunities more seriously. Even things such as wealth, money and materials will make sense on in line with their instrumental value, which is their use for the good and promotion of human life. This will mark a significant departure from the current value placed on money as an object of idolatry, oppression and consumerism in a deprived and constrained society. The recognition of the value of human life will translate into the emphasis on national and human security. The necessary repercussions of a conceptual and pragmatic rejection of selective humanism triggers a repudiation of personal and regime security will pave the way for the identification and insistence on higher values of collective social interest and organisation or institution wide ethical standards and practices.

Conclusion

We attempted to demonstrate that the problem of national and human security was a product of deficits arising from the way value of human life was promoted in various governments and state agencies wherein it seemed unable to consistently and institutionally guarantee the adequate protection, peace and well being of their citizens. We simplified and clarified the meaning of security and studied some practical and theoretical benefits that accrued from a conceptual analysis of security as freedom from evil. We examined a wide range of principles like values, visions, imagination, etc, that helped situate the parameters of social progress. We reviewed certain human values opposed to the operation of mere raw power, naked fear, unbridled egoism, crass military might and brute force as hitherto prevailing principles that directed the social order and thus truncated the quest for stable and viable security. We conceptualised the norms and parameters of a good social philosophy that would be adapted to the different facets of social and national life. We argued that a quest for a philosophy of social life or a conceptual foundation of security could not be separated from the fact that the value of human life

needed to be recognised. Such an understanding where values are prioritised will provide the conceptual basis of the practical realisation of the human dignity of the members of the society.

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