Revisiting Rule Consequentialism

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Abstract

Under mounting pressure from the international communities and organizations to curb carbon emission causing disturbing climate change, and the growing pressure of domestic environmentalists and the common man in India, the government is hard-pressed to enact laws on carbon emission. However, the moot problem is whether to consider a pro-active rule of action seriously to curb carbon emission while keeping the collective scenario in view or to consider a case-by-case scenario in view. A number of people argue that a collective approach is much better, and for that matter, pro-active general rules of actions are desirable for their outcomes or consequences are good or worthwhile. This is what we now call rule consequentialism, which is much different from the case-by-case act consequentialism. In this case, the rightness of political action is determined by following some rules (or policies) which are amenable to worthwhile consequences. Similarly, we may conceive of a number of general rules of action such as “curb corruption”, “curb apartheid”, “curb exploitation of woman” and so on. In this paper, I would like to revisit rule consequentialism as a normative theory of rightness of action that is not immoderately overdemanding on moral agents. However, I would justify why rule consequentialism is not only overdemanding of moral agents but immoderate as well. Hence, it is an untenable normative theory of rightness of action.

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1. Introduction

Consequentialism is a widely discussed normative ethical theory. It has been explained variously for its nature. The moot point is consequentialism is a normative theory in ethics that advocates the production of good consequences over evil by virtue of our well-intended actions. Only those well-deliberated actions are good, which produce good over evil in the world, and urges for maximization of good produced in the world by moral agents. However, act consequentialism holds that we need to evaluate which acts in given situations maximize the best consequences. Satisficing consequentialism, on the other hand, speaks of good enough consequences to be produced in a given situation. These normative positions are not accepted by rule consequentialism. Rule consequentialism argues that in a given situation, the crucial factor is neither evaluation of facts that maximize good nor is it crucial to evaluate good enough consequences; rather, it is crucial to evaluate which rules moral agents should follow inviolably in a given situation that maximizes good. In this paper, I will consider clarification of nature of rule consequentialism by analyzing definitions and formulations and move on to the arguments in favour of the theory and against the theory. The concluding part of the paper intends to show why this theory is immoderately over-demanding of moral agents and therefore untenable.

2. Definitions

Let us consider a few definitions of rule consequentialism (RC) for better understanding. Shelly Kagan has raised the point that RC is a foundational Consequentialist Theory. It is a theory related to the justification or foundation of consequentialism. It pronounces that the production of worthwhile or good consequences and maximizing it is morally desirable, though not in view of evaluating what acts we ought to do to realize the desired end but in view of evaluating which rules we ought to follow to realize the desirable end. Kagan observes: “Rule consequentialism ... [is] the
foundational view, the evaluating standpoint provided by maximizing consequentialism is used in the first instance, not to evaluate acts, but rather to evaluate rules… we ask what set of rules would lead to the best possible results. Acts are then evaluated only indirectly, in terms of whether or not they conform to the optimal rules” (Kagan, 1998).

RC is a foundationalist theory in so far as it speaks of the production of overall good as the basis or ground to justify that following certain rules of action amenable to the production of overall good is morally desirable and following these rules, in turn to evaluate certain acts are morally right. RC further holds that production of good consequences by following a set of rules goes hand in hand with the idea of production of maximum good consequences. Hence, an act must conform to an optimal set of rules, following which the best consequences are obtained.

However, is it not true that the production of the best possible consequences by virtue of acts in given situations is the crucial factor in act consequentialism? Yes, it is a crucial factor. Hence, as a theory, act consequentialism recognizes the value of the production of the best consequences. The problem is, what does RC hold as a theory? Moreover, act consequentialism (AC) recognizes in the main the value of following secondary rules or rules of thumb. Crucially, for RC, following rules are not following some thumb rules mechanically because these rules may be violated if better consequences ensue. Hence, RC asserts that inviolable rules be conformed to despite violation of rules produce better results. Thus RC as a theory speaks of a crucial factor, which is, conforming to an optimal set of rules, the status of which is inviolability; from this, it is also clear that following an optimal set of inviolable rules need not always produce maximum good results. Therefore, RC, in some cases might allow ‘enough good’ consequences, which we find to be crucial in the case of satisficing consequentialism.

Another important feature of RC has been well depicted in the definition provided by Tim Mulgan. Rule consequentialism holds that “An act is morally right if and only if it is called for by a set of rules the following of which by everyone would result in at least as good consequences judged impartially as any other” (Mulgan, 2001).
Mulgan’s definition brings out two important facts of RC. First, it is a theory that underscores the rightness of an act on the basis of following (inviolable) rules by everyone. Second, it also speaks of the promotion of good consequences by following (inviolable) rules which are as good as any other consequences. Mulgan is of the opinion that the crucial point is what if everyone followed a set of optimal inviolable rules. Hence, for Mulgan, RC is a collective rather than individual consequentialist theory. Further, the collective approach is less demanding than, say, act consequentialism because RC speaks of the promotion of consequences ‘as good as’ other consequences and not the ‘best among all conceivable alternatives’. Importantly, in doing the ‘best among all,’ an agent is pressed hard to the extent of sacrifice. This is not the case with RC. Moreover, in speaking of ‘everyone’ following rules, there is no inordinate demand for case-by-case consideration of what an individual does in promoting the best among all consequences. RC rather speaks of moral agents doing fairly well or as good as any other agent and not doing more than what she should, keeping in view the fact that many other agents may be unable to promote good.

In recent times, Brad Hooker, in different papers, has defined RC in most unambiguous terms, and these definitions count importantly. In his essay: “Rule Consequentialism”, Hooker states: “Two features of this theory (RC) should be noted. One is that it assesses the rightness and wrongness of any particular act, not directly in terms of its consequences, but indirectly in terms of a set of desires, dispositions, and rules, which is then assessed in terms of a set of the consequences of everyone’s having that set. The other is that it assesses the rightness of any given act, not in terms of the desires, dispositions, and rules which are such that the agent’s having them would bring about the best overall consequences, but rather in terms of the desires, dispositions, and rules which are such that everyone’s having them would bring about the best overall consequences” (Hooker, 1990).

Apart from the distinctive features of RC noted before, which are, the rightness of act or a set of acts is assessed indirectly in terms of a set of rules, and a set of rules assessed in terms of everyone following these rules would promote the best overall consequences.
This is to say that RC is an ‘indirect’ theory of assessment of rightness and wrongness of fact and that; it is a collective theory, not individualistic in nature. Hooker, in his essay, stresses on a set of desires, dispositions and rules, not merely a set of rules or a set of inviolable rules. However, it is important to note here that adding desires and dispositions does not in any way alter the nature of RC because following a set of rules or what Mulgan calls ‘dictates’ of rules, is to have a set of desires to do something necessarily (or inviolably) and to have a set of capacities to do that thing. Merely having rules amenable to the promotion of best consequences is not enough; moral agents ought to have the required desires and dispositions to follow rules which are amenable to the production of the desirable ends in question. Hence, ‘a set of desires, dispositions and rules’ amenable to promoting good are required, and these things, in turn, assess the rightness and wrongness of actions. However, on the ground level of reality, there may be disparate desires and dispositions among moral agents to follow the rules. In such cases, as stated above, the agents lacking collective desires and dispositions to follow a set of rules optimizing good consequences would in reality be left out of the collective in achieving the desirable, not the individualistic desires and dispositions, for that is sheer individualistic moral predilection.

3. Formulations of RC

Rule consequentialism may be formulated in a number of ways, thus enabling us to understand the ways in which the theory has been approached and classified. One way is to conceive that rule-following amounts to actual results, which are good than rationally expected good results. We may thus conceive of ‘actual’ and ‘expected’ RC. Actualist RC holds that the only criterion of the wrongness of an act is that the said act is forbidden by the acceptance of a set of rules which actually results in the promotion of the greatest good. Hence, Actualist RC (ARC) may be formulated as: An act is wrong if and only if an agent does not accept rules or a set of rules which would actually result in producing the greatest good. ARC will thus allow accepting some such rules following which the consequences of an act will not be sub-optimal.
On the other hand, the Expectablist RC (ERC) holds that the only criterion of an act subjected to blame than praise is that the said act is forbidden by acceptance of rules or a set of rules which would result in the greatest expected good. Hence, ERC may be formulated as: An act is subjected to blame if and only if an agent does not accept rules or set of rules which would result in producing the greatest expected good. This means that according to ERC, an act following a rule or set of rules will be subjected to blame than praise when the sub-optimal consequences of the act must be foreseeable, that is, rationally expected in principle. Further, wrongness and blameworthiness are difficult to dissociate (Hooker, 1990). Hence ERC may be formulated as: An act is morally wrong if and only if an agent does not accept rules which would result in the greatest expected good. ERC, therefore does not have any drawback in replacing blameworthiness with wrongness or vice versa, and though ‘actually the greatest good’ of ARC is problematic, there would be no great problem with ERC’s ‘the greatest expected good’. Rather, ERC might enjoy the benefit in advocating rational expectability as criteria of moral wrongness. However, an amendment is needed in formulating ERC, keeping in mind the problem of deciding over one rule over the other having greater expected good. It is suggested that we should take refuge in the rule that is proximate to conventional morality or the rule that is in our common knowledge. Hence, ERC’s lacuna may be covered up by another formulation: An act is morally wrong (or blameworthy) if and only if an agent does not accept rules which would promote the greatest expected good, and in case of alternative rules equally worthy of promoting greater expected good, the agent does not accept the rule proximate to our common knowledge.

Other formulations of RC are enabled by distinguishing between compliance of rules and acceptance of rules. Likewise, we may conceive two types, namely, compliance rule consequentialism (CRC) and acceptance rule consequentialism (ACRC). An important aspect of accepting some rules of action is that the said rules are complied with. Hence, in the above formulations of ARC and ERC, references to ‘acceptance’ are closely related to ‘compliance’ of rules. Nevertheless, Shelly Kagan is of the opinion that the consequences that ensue from compliance with the rule
and those that ensue from acceptance of the rule are different. To comply with rules need not necessarily mean that the rules have been strongly accepted. Hooker observes that the development of rule consequentialism owes largely to assurance to moral agents and its encouraging effects. Thus, the cost-benefit inquiry into rules and consequences of strongly accepted rules by moral agents are closely related (Kagan, 2000). This has also been accepted by Richard Brandt in his works, particularly in Facts, values and morality (Brandt, 1996). However, Hooker further observes that a cost-benefit analysis of rules should take into account the costs already incurred by people in internalizing (accepting/embedding) rules. But rule consequentialism should not allow this cost-benefit analysis of rules to be influenced by the cost of giving up the rules that people have already internalized. One reason is that rule consequentialist evaluation of rules need not give weight to any moral idea that comes from moral theories other than rule consequentialism. The other reason is that moral benefits are relative to different social conditions, and therefore, “a way of assessing proposed codes that considers the costs of getting people already committed to some other code will end up having to countenance different transition costs to get to the same code” (Hooker, 2015).

Let us now come to the issue of formulating RC in terms of complete acceptance of rules (CORC) than their incomplete acceptance (IRC). This issue is of great importance because even though the internalization of moral codes by new generations and the cost incurred to do the same are realistic, it is equally realistic to think that the internalization of codes to new generations may not get to the last person. A number of people will still be at moral fault about what codes are morally permissible. Moreover, some people will not at all accept any morality. It is important to formulate RC, keeping in mind the realistic position of little or no internalization of moral rules. Hence, the formulation of RC has to take account of absolute vis-a-vis partial acceptance of moral rules in society. In the case of living a secular form of life, for instance, it is quite obvious that the secular code may be followed by a number of people, and in many cases, a substantive number of people will both refrain from it and follow the hard-core form of living, much like fanatics. The point is RC may be formulated such that its acceptance is
complete or absolute. Let us call it CORC, which amounts to: An act is morally wrong if and only if moral agents do not follow the rules, which, when fully accepted absolutely by everyone, would produce the greatest expected good.

Thus, complete acceptance of rules by absolutely everyone will bring about the greatest good but not actually, rather expectedly, because we can never be sure if everyone has completely accepted a rule. Such insufficiency or incompleteness in accepting rules allows the following formulation of RC, which may be called, IRC: An act is wrong if and only if moral agents, a great majority of them, do not accept some such code of rules by virtue of which each new generation most expectedly would have the greatest good.

Apart from the notable features of CORC, IRC crucially points out that besides the ‘greatest majority of people’ who accepts a code of rules that promote the greatest good, there is no reference to accepting or rejecting some codes. In fact, clearly stating what is wrong in this formulation, we justify that those besides the majority of people are at fault (because the promotion of the greatest good is hindered thereby). Hence, the formulation of RC in terms of IRC justifies the non-inclusion of those who negatively respond to rules that expectedly would promote the greatest good. It is also notable to mention that Hooker prefers a value of 90% at least to mark out the enormity of people who rightly follow some rules that promote the greatest good. This, having a clear reference to close to the absolute value of 100%, IRC seems to hold its ground. But calling for absolute acceptance of rules does not appropriately refer to ‘close to’ or ‘closer or closest to’. Hence, a range starting with 90% and ending at anything below 100% will be capricious. Absolute or complete and full acceptance of rules may be partly saved of its capriciousness by mentioning ‘expected’ good, not ‘actual’ good being promoted.

Shelly Kagan is of the opinion that though what we call CORC is the ideal form of rule consequentialism, it strongly asserts that the rule promotes the greater good when everyone abides by it. The qualification (everyone) may be a useful aid to avoid the vagueness of Hooker’s ‘absolute conformity’, where absolute, truly speaking, is in percentage terms (of Hooker), 100% and in principle, not less
than that. But that creates a lot of vagueness and even impossibility. Yet, when Hooker conceives of a range not less than 90% to very close to 100%, it does tend to see the said vagueness and impossibility, in actual terms, and then Shelly’s ‘enough conformity’ would do a lot of good in understanding CORC’s formulation. Hence, an act is wrong if and only if moral agents do not conform to rules that might expectedly produce a greater good.

Adding ‘enough’ to the certain formulation of CORC is more realistic than ideal, according to Kagan. Hence, Hooker’s CORC in revised form is not ideal in nature but realistic. Shelly observes, “if we are realistic rule consequentialists, it might be that most people obey it—or perhaps provided merely that many people obey it” (Kagan, 1998). However, “regardless of the precise degree of conformity assumed in assessing a rule’s result, the fact remains that a rule’s being optimal merely guarantees that the results will be good provided that enough people obey it” (Kagan, 1998). However, as we have said before, in the case of IRC (incomplete form of RC), the wrongness of agents’ acts is assessed by remaining below the threshold (90%) maintained by Hooker, which Kagan calls, too low and has disastrous results. In fact, non-conformity to optimal rules is disastrous because they are not amenable to the greater good and thus morally wrong. This is a matter of sheer common sense, and Hooker (Kagan as well) simply thinks that too low conformity is not relevant to RC—optimal rules, in any case, ought to be obeyed even if we are aware of non-conformity by several people. But what if the rules designed are inadequate? If we still obey it, we may invite the folly of rule worship, but that is a different point to consider in a proper place.

4. Arguments to support Rule Consequentialism

The consequentialist argument to defend RC soundly supports the main consequentialist principle that promoting good (or value) is basic to morality. On this main principle, RC enjoys theoretical superiority to direct and indirect individual consequentialism. Derek Parfit says that RC’s collective view enables us to see why both direct and indirect individual consequentialism is self-defeating (Parfit, 1984). However, it is improper to think that, therefore, RC being a collective consequentialist theory is justified
by its being indirect in nature. The indirect element in RC justifies that the intuitive appeal of judgments of RC with regard to particular cases is plausible, whereas the collective element in RC justifies that theoretically. It is plausible that our acts are morally right if and only if they promote value or good. Hence, RC enjoys an edge over contesting direct and indirect individual consequentialist theories in so far as they do not plausibly justify the main thesis of consequentialism, that is, the abstract criterion of the rightness of action along with the intuitive judgments about particular cases. Hence, RC is plausible as a criterion of the rightness of acts and as a procedure of decision-making in particular cases. Evidently, contesting theories, unlike RC, fail to justify why following rules justified by the promotion of good consequences would be efficient in decision-making in individual cases.

The non-consequentialist defense of RC, as a subset of ‘theoretical justification’, asserts that RC has the most pertinent explanation for the problematic question of the disastrous consequences of everybody following a rule that is said to promote value. Hooker, for instance, raises such a question: what if we actually walk on the park lawn even though it may have good consequences? RC has a pertinent solution to this problem, provided we take vital cues from different moral ideas. For example, we have the ideas of universalizability and fairness. The idea of universalizability banks on whether or not some rules are equally binding on all moral agents situated similarly, and the idea of fairness banks on whether or not demands of morality are fairly distributed. Under the idea of fairness, it is unfair that some people, if they are doing less, others should do more. It is important to compare people with respect to demands of morality—unfair demands of morality would require some people to do more because others are doing less.

Similarly, some people are not walking on the park lawn or using it sparsely, and others turn up and walking on the lawn is undesirable. The idea of universalizability would require us to ask: If I were in the position of others and others were in my position, would it be morally desirable that every one of us start walking on the park lawn? The rule of walking on grass though good consequentially, cannot be a universalizable moral rule that every
one of us uses park lawn at the same time. In fact, the consequences of it will be disastrous. Hence, having moral rules which are universalizable and fair (whether or not conducive to promote good consequences) cogently solves the problem raised above by Hooker. Mulgan observes that universalizability as a moral ideal may nevertheless be competing or complementing other moral ideals (Mulgan, 2001). For instance, with respect to universalizability, RC and Kantian maxims compete with each other, and with regard to contractualism (of Rawls), RC complements or fills gaps in the contesting theory by elaborate explanations. Hence, RC is adequately defended by the ideals of universalizability preached by Kant and fairness advocated by Rawls. The moot point is that Kantian and Rawlsian rules, if adequately understood and revised, extend support to the rules conceived under RC.

Another argument extends the practical justification of RC. It is argued that RC is more intuitively appealing than contesting theories because it is practically more effective in resolving particular cases. For example, it is more effective in resolving the particular case of the moral obligation of well-off people in alleviating the sufferings of strangers. Most of our non-RC moral convictions are discrete and unrelated; they fail to resolve why well-off people are obliged to relieve the suffering of strangers. But RC tries to comprehend and assimilate the discrete thoughts to show why we need to help suffering people. Many people argue that RC would require us to follow certain rules justified by producing greater good in the global community and thus suggest concrete acts such as “give aid to famine relief”, “give aid to overcome disasters”, “donate in charity” and so on. RC’s judgments are intuitively appealing in replying to why we are obliged to follow such rules. However, RC does not demand that we go on providing endless rules or moral judgments. RC is obliged to explain, underscore and justify a number of these rules. The most plausible moral rules are thus rationally justified by the rule consequentialists. Mindless rule-following is not underscored by RC.
5. Objections — Old and New

The major arguments in favour of RC have loose ends. We shall now find out further objections against the theory. Some of these objections are old-fashioned, and others are recent ones. Old-fashioned objections against RC have been countered successfully. But to know about those counter-objections properly, we should first see what the objections are.

The first old-fashioned argument against RC is that though the theory conceives of rules fully complied by everyone, the fact is that, in many cases, compliance with rules is partial. Hence, the theory falls short of considering actual situations of rule-following, and thus full and sweeping rule-following appears to be defective. Whereas the possibility of partial compliance of rules gives us undesirable results, that is, it fails to justify why rules that are amenable to promote good results have been partially complied, and in case of partial compliance, how RC's idea that for promotion of good results, rules are binding on everyone, maybe cogently defended.

It has been further objected by David Lyons that rule consequentialism ultimately collapses to act consequentialism, thus leaving its position altogether. David Lyons provides this collapse argument by saying that in adding qualifications or clauses to rules because ultimately, for RC, in each case, promoting good (or utility) is necessary, then in each case of failing to promote good by following rules will count as harmful or disastrous. Hence, ‘act so that in each individual case good consequences follow’ is nothing but an act consequentialist conclusion. Therefore, RC collapses to AC (Lyons, 1955).

However, a number of thinkers, particularly Hooker, argues that the objections of partial non-compliance and collapse of RC to AC may be avoided if we make a clear distinction between compliance of rules and acceptance of rules. Hooker says that acceptance of rules has consequences better than mere compliance of rules because in acceptance of rules, we are morally motivated. In acceptance, we care about the moral concerns of people. Hence, acceptance of rules is superior to mere compliance of rules. Moral rules are thus closely connected to human disposition and moral
character. Acceptance RC is focused on motives, dispositions and character. Hence, RC does not essentially fall back on partial compliance of rules to give us disastrous consequences. RC, in fact, is grounded on complete acceptance of moral rules by everyone to have good consequences. Furthermore, acceptance of rules fares even better than mere compliance of rules because it gives better moral judgments about particular cases. If this is accepted, the moral judgments of AC and RC are not the same. Hence, RC does not collapse to AC. And if RC does not collapse to AC, then consequences that follow from AC’s acceptance are certainly not the best consequences.

This takes us to another objection against RC. RC is theoretically incoherent because, on the one hand, it is devoted to the commitment of the basic presupposition of consequentialism according to which acts that maximize good is morally desirable, and to enable it, we need to follow certain rules which are binding on us though in doing so we may not have produced the best possible consequences. Now, the objection is that to follow the rules imperative to us (although they may not produce the best consequences) is sheer ‘rule worship’. Mulgan notes, “Instead of using their rules as strategies, decision procedures, or rules of thumbs, they turn them into criteria of rightness, abandoning the underlying consequentialist goal of maximizing the good” (Mulgan, 2001). However, the coherence of the theory has been defended mainly by the counter-argument that the particular judgments that ensue from RC are intuitively appealing, and its prescription of general moral rules is intuitively appealing as well.

In recent times, some stronger objections have been raised against RC. Can RC dispel these objections? An important objection has been raised by Tom Carson in a brief comment on Hooker’s rule consequentialism (Carson, 1991). He says that in many instances, the criterion for the selection of rules may not be questioned, but the selected rules are intuitively unacceptable. In fact, some selected rules are such that the grounding theory (RC) appears to be overdemanding in real-world situations. For example, affluent persons, according to Hooker, ought to give 10% of their income to end starvation. However, if the affluent give just enough to end hunger, billions of people would still be in poverty and hunger.
Hooker then suggests (act consequentialist), that we ought to make a great sacrifice to fight evil. Hence, affluent people, according to RC, face demands by virtue of rules which are very difficult to meet. To suggest that RC allows rules not merely to fight hunger, it demands excessively. Carson further adds that the reason for being excessively demanding on the part of RC is that it calls for not only to sacrifice but to make great sacrifices. Great sacrifices are needed because affluent people are very few, and hungry people are greater in number (and rising). Hence, 10% gratis for hunger elimination will be insufficient, and some great sacrifices are needed. Moreover, it is important to weigh on the one hand the lives and physical demands of hungry people vis-à-vis the guilt feeling and psychological pain of a paltry number of affluent people. In this situation of weighing, it seems to be impossible that the guilt feeling and psychological pain of affluent people are greater than the vast number of hungry people. Such objection has been leveled by Mulgan as well. This brings to our notice that according to RC, justification of some familiar moral rules, in fact, depends on a number of empirical facts like the nature of human beings and the real number of able people who are in physical need and how many are there to help.

Objections are that in case of dependence on empirical facts, some familiar moral rules may be justified on completely wrong facts. To justify the moral rule of necessity that for famine relief, the ‘affluent ought to help in supplying food’ depends on the wrong facts about the size of the population where famine has occurred and the position of supply of food. Rather, rules ought to be framed on the facts of local conditions and institutions such as political institutions and the measures of public relief.

Hooker has championed the cause of the internalization of rules that promote good consequences by at least 90% of the population. But he does not overlook the point of cost of such internalization, particularly by new generations who have not already imbied a set of moral rules. The problem is this huge cost of teaching or imbibing rules to new generations should be undertaken by someone. Who ought to do this? And if the rules to be taught are not needed by teachers who have already internalized the ideal code, how will imbibing rules happen? If the teachers have not
internalized the ideal code, there will be conflicting situations for them between the rules already internalized and the ideal code. In fact, RC is still not in view of a formulation such that conflict among rules may be dealt in a plausible way.

6. Conclusion

In the concluding part, I assert that RC is undoubtedly a member of consequentialist theory. But from the foregoing objections, particularly the recent ones, one finds that RC has many flaws. I would like to focus on the grave mistakes that RC is immoderate and overdemanding.

First of all, to demand that affluent persons in the developed world should give 10% (at least) of their annual income to charity to alleviate poverty is unreasonably demanding. Why should affluent people of the developed world give 10% of their income to such a cause but not affluent people of the developing country? If the charity is a moral code that optimizes good, and if affluent people are well-off in following that code, should it be morally binding on all affluent people of the world? It may be argued that the total annual income of India’s affluent people is much less than those of the affluent people of a developed country like America; therefore, it is reasonable that they follow the demand of developed countries’ affluent people. But the question is, why should the Indian affluent not follow the same rule if the rule ought to be universally internalized? Let us agree that both parties should proportionately give their income to charity. Then the tough question will be, to what extent the big affluent people should go on donating for a great cause and till what time? The simple answer is, till the big affluent people become petty or at least not to be seen as robustly affluent anymore. Hence, internalized rules should be breached when following such internalized rules is inordinately demanding (or telling harshly on people).

Another problem that comes to my mind is that there are at least two important ways in which poverty alleviation is not done under the banner of gratis, or else it is done only exceptionally without making any special consideration for the affluent few (the choice not being limited to capitalists with great financial prowess). The
adherents of the first would champion the cause of social responsibility, which does not mean the responsibility of a few well-off people of one’s society and other societies but collective responsibility that is best instantiated by a political mechanism of society for poverty alleviation. What if a view demands that gratis-rules are not to be universalized, for they hinder a state’s political will and people’s urge for a pro-active social movement for structural changes in polity for policy making leading to poverty alleviation? I think that following gratis-rule ought to be replaced by the corroboration of people’s morally charged views on value-loaded affairs like poverty alleviation. I believe that policy-making for poverty alleviation does not need internalization of moral rules; rather, that is possible (and also morally desirable) through moral dialogues, corroboration of moral views on policy matters and the actual policy-making mechanism that is grounded on people’s moral participation on crucial issues of society which are value-loaded. For me, Hooker’s contemporary RC on ground levels of reality is immoderately demanding for its shallowness of internalization rules limited to people with huge capital. It is, in fact, a cosmetic method. Even if we seriously consider the possibility of following gratis rule exceptionally by those who have internalized the rule but are not benefactors with huge capital, it will fail because these not-so-well-off people, who try hard to eke out a living, would inordinately sacrifice for following gratis-rule. Even these not-so-well-off people will refrain from a people’s movement for shaking up polity and policy formulation for poverty alleviation and structural political changes, though they are morally desirable in poverty alleviation. Hence, following the gratis-rule may not be morally desirable.

However, pro-active people’s movement for resolving value-loaded problems is of great urgency. This is evidenced by the fact that in sound polity corroboration of public moral perceptions on value-loaded issues like having general inviolable rules to curb carbon emission is not a matter of one-sided and chauvinistic social engineering. For this, we need a constant public moral debate in changing social and global (or glocal) scenarios to have generally accepted rules of action for maximizing good. In fact, the internalization of moral rules obtained from chauvinistic moral engineering does not work. If this is taken as a cardinal rule to be
followed universally, though it is not less demanding, but not inordinate and immoderate because such demands of people’s participation do not demand people to do some such things which are partisan, not beneficial if costs are counted and not soundly justified by the ideal of the greatest good. Hence, rule-consequentialism is not a sound theory in many ways—theoretically and practically.

References


