



## **(De)constructing Dasein in Cyberspace: On “Essence” of a Digital Being from Lacanian Understanding**

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### **Abstract**

Human beings are ontological designers. We build the tools, and then the tools reshape our identities. The ontological status in an electronically mediated world always implies a referential whole, a “totality” that endows “language”, “events,” and “actions” with meaning and significance. The ontological discourse is all about the chain of signifiers; surprisingly, the events of appropriation by which the *being* is (un)folded depend on a synchronic axis. The twist is that the axis can only be visible on a diachronic background. Questions of the existence of a digital being are always associated with the notions of time and space. Being-in is different than being in as it is located in the “now.” The spatiality of “now” in cyberspace is important as this “now” talks about the forms of time – past, present and future of Dasein via the unconscious. Each post we share and each comment we put on cyberspace opens the possibilities for new ways of thinking – a thinking pattern involves the other avatars through the interplay of who they are and what they experience in “the desert of the real” (Žižek, 2001, p.15). Thus, the function of the “in-between” becomes *différance*, and in this act of deferral emerges the prospect of “*poiēsis*.” Bernard Stiegler, in his book *Techniques and Time: The Fault of Epimetheus* (1998), describes that the epiphylogenesis of man “[b]estows its identity upon the human individual: the accents of his speech, the style of his approach, the

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force of his gesture, the unity of his world” (p.140). Identity is like a (un)concealed truth, full of potentialities, yet to be discovered, but never arrive at the ending. Language is a special equipment to understand the notions of identity, especially in the Heideggerian world, where “essence” precedes “existence”. That is why we refer to beings in their connection to other beings. To know why and how they connect to other beings, and even to the digital “spectre” (in Derridean understanding), we must revisit the Lacanian understanding of lack and Freud’s tripartite structure of the human psyche (Tombras, 2019, p.119). The subject splits in the course of its striving to fulfill the lack forged by the desire of others. Therefore, the signifying chain is an automata – a lifeless network of signified jouissance in the virtual world. Lacan’s Seminar XI is primarily taken up for its potential to radically suspend Heideggerian questions of the primary meaning of Being. Therefore, this paper explores the genealogy of the “essence” of a digital being taking up multiple roles in a true posthuman world by highlighting the newly emerging socio-cultural avenues cohabited with artificial intelligence and human beings – a world where the matrix disguises itself in its simulation. For fictional examples used in this paper include William Gibson’s *Neuromancer* (1984).

**Keywords:** *Dasein*, Unconscious, Simulacra, Cyberspace, Lacan

What is being, the knowledge of being, that is, a true discourse? (Stiegler, 1998, p.97)

Time present and time past  
 Are both perhaps present in time future,  
 And time future contained in time past,  
 If all time is eternally present  
 All time is unredeemable (Eliot, 1943, p.7).

## Introduction

Human beings are ontological designers. We build the tools, and the tools reshape our identities. In this 21<sup>st</sup> century, our genealogy

of being “human” has transpired with the exponential growth of Artificial Intelligence. The modern human “Being” is an ultimate discourse” in this techno-cosmopolitan world overflowing with embryonic ideas, processes, and templates. Before the 20th century, we only had physical access to tools, but now we can reshape our anatomy by implanting electronic chips and devices into our bodies. With his “Neuralink” project, Elon Musk has upgraded the human-machine interface of cyberspace communication. Musk’s project shows that Artificial Intelligence can be linked to the brain through interfaces. Jamie Wheal and Steven Kotler’s “Genome Project”<sup>1</sup> is another milestone in studying the human-machine interface. So, inventions like these ‘fleshed out’ versions of templates float in continuous ‘mode’ beyond the reach of our senses. Additionally, Ray Kurzweil, in his seminal text, *The Singularity Is Near*, describes the “Human Body Version 2.0”. This type of evolution indicates that the creation of a non-biological yet humanoid body, along with an avatar in virtual reality, is possible nowadays. However, the notion of a virtual body is argumentative (2005, p.313). The neural network system helps to connect with the electromagnetic reality flowing from the brain to the atmosphere. Sherry Turkle (1999) noted that in cyberspace, our brains perceive all these electrically encoded pieces of information from the constant news feed, and the subject vis-à-vis the virtual avatar can experience others’ projection of on-line lives by sharing his own virtual identity which may not be true all the time, may be an imaginary projection of the self (p. 643). This is a path from the collective to private swarming via a/an (un)conscious flyover – a flyover that is merely the psychological projection, connected to the neural network system of the augmented/virtual/mixed reality world. Each unit of encoded information varies from one to another because of perception. Now, the question is, how does this *Being* incorporate time and space in cyberspace where *time* only exists in our consciousness, and *space* is constantly in flux?

In this article, the author articulates the ontological status of *Being* in an electronically mediated world such as cyberspace. To develop my arguments, the author divides the article into three sections. Firstly, the discussion is on Martin Heidegger’s notion of *Being-in-the-world*. This discussion will show how *Dasein*’s *Being-in-the-world* implies a referential whole – a “totality” that endows “things” and “actions”

with meaning and significance. Secondly, the author explores temporality and its relation to the unconscious. The author employs the theoretical model of the Lacanian description of the human psyche, which is linked to Freud, to deal with the unconscious part of the human psyche. In the third section, the author focuses on how temporality creates a new episteme at the core of *Dasein*, especially in cyberspace. Finally, the counter-argument is on the ontological status of *Dasein* or 'Being-in-cyberspace' in the Gibsonian world, with reference to his *Sprawl Trilogy*.

The term identity is a late 16<sup>th</sup> century Latin word derived from "*identitas*," which itself is borrowed from the word "*idem*," meaning the same (Merriam-Webster, 2018). In cyberspace, the virtual *avatar* is our second self, which is, at the same time, *us* and not *us*. Cyberspace is an alternative world where the subject 'jacks in' and becomes (an) Other. According to Slavoj Žižek, the second self in cyberspace first becomes the substitution: the substitutive nature is exemplified in the Hegelian reflective reversal ("*Slavoj Žižek-Bibliography*", 2020). He also discussed the subject and Other in "*The Interpassive Subject*", "When the Other is sacrificed for me, I sacrifice myself through the Other, when the Other acts for me, I myself act through the Other; when the Other enjoys for me, I myself enjoy through the Other" (Žižek, 1998, p.5). The subject in this virtual world acts through signifiers, not fixed, but through fissures. As a *de-centred* subject--the idea is to focus more on the process while any communication occurs. Cyberspace welcomes us into the simulation of the "real", where the boundary between the real and the imaginary becomes blurred: the catch is that the signifier becomes the signified for itself. Jean Baudrillard, a postmodern cultural critic, in his work *Simulations*, describes the virtual world, "[i]n fact, it is no longer enveloped by an imaginary, it is no longer real at all. It is hyperreal. The product of an irradiating synthesis of combinatory models in a hyperspace without atmosphere" (1983, p.127).

Cyberspace communication represents a quantum leap of an altogether different nature. Disseminated pieces of information and knowledge have all been shifting the "mechanical" way of pen and paper, reducing the time and transport cost to access the information. This quantum leap is the missing link between the sender and the

recipient. The experience of being human in both the 'real' and virtual worlds creates new epistemological knowledge. Cyberpunk literature exposes the indeterminacy of being human and, at the same time, through such exposure, presents a certain nostalgia depicted by the *Being* for a *prior* state which never had been. However, this "nostalgia" also opens the possibilities for new ways of thinking involving human beings through the interplay of who they are and what they experience. Thus, the function of the "in-between" becomes *différance*<sup>2</sup>, and in the act of *deferral* enters the prospect of *poiēsis*<sup>3</sup>. Bernard Stiegler, in his book *Technics and Time: The Fault of Epimetheus*, describes that the epiphylogenesis of man<sup>4</sup> "[be]stows its identity upon the human individual: the accents of his speech, the style of his approach, the force of his gesture, the unity of his world" (1998, p.140). Identity is like a(un)concealed 'truth', full of potentialities that have not yet been discovered. David Perishing, in *The Soft Machine: Cybernetic Fiction*, says, "The technology is us, man" (1985, p.95). However, in cyberspace, the embedded identity is a real (un)concealed truth. To understand the ontological questions of *Being*, we must know that there is always a difference between "ontic"<sup>5</sup> "ontical,"<sup>6</sup> and "ontological"<sup>7</sup> (Heidegger, 1962, p.31). The ontological questions of *Being*<sup>8</sup> are associated with experience and essence, both of which are part of our existence. According to Martin Heidegger's book *Being and Time* (1972a), "Essence" always precedes our "existence" and the notion of "experience" is embedded in time and space which can be mentioned here:

Being is *not* a thing, thus nothing temporal, yet it is determined by time as presence. Time is *not* a thing, thus nothing which is, and yet it remains constant in its passing away without being something temporal like the beings in time. Being and time determine each other reciprocally, but in such a manner that neither can the former- Being-be addressed as something temporal nor can the latter-time to be addressed as a being (Heidegger, 1972a, p.7).

However, the point is that experience gradually develops through connecting new things, and the essence is a product of continuous evolution. Stiegler wrote, "For there to be, in becoming (there can be

an origin only when becoming is; the question of origin could never arise in a world of *Being*), something after all, for *Being* to be itself always the same, for it to have an identity in essence, a threshold should not be crossed but experienced" (1998, p.115). How does the essence of an embedded identity in a *hyperreal*<sup>9</sup> world become a part of an existence? Most importantly, this embedded identity is incorporated within virtual space and time. This can be explained using a concept of Heidegger, "Time-a matter, presumably the matter of thinking if indeed something like time speaks in Being as presence" (1972a, p. 8).

Heidegger did not invent the word *Dasein*, which comes from the German adverb *da*, which means 'there' (or 'here'), and the infinitive *Sein*, which means 'to be', or 'being' (Heidegger, 1962, p.20). In the seventeenth century, the word came to define the sense of presence. In the eighteenth century, philosophers used it as a synonym for *Existenz*<sup>10</sup> (Heidegger, 1962, p.42). In (at least pre-Heideggerian) everyday speech, *Dasein* was used to describe the *being* or life of persons. At the heart of Heidegger's quest, the notion of *Dasein* focuses on a world that does *not* contain things; the world is itself within all of these things, *vis-à-vis* all of these things are the world at the same time. The human being *qua Dasein* cannot but *be-in-the-world*, which is a unitary phenomenon. Christos Tombras explains this unitary phenomenon in *Discourse Ontology: Body and the Construction of a World: From Heidegger through Lacan*, where he wrote, "This primary datum must be seen as a whole" (2019, p. 7). *Dasein* cannot but be conceived in its *Being-in-the-world*. We are in the world in the complete sense of the verb 'to be.' This is not a 'meta world'; it does not exist parallel to some other world that could be thought of as more 'real' or as the world *proper*. It is not a world of epiphenomenon or ideas that hide (or cover) a material world presumably existing alongside it. In more than one sense, *Dasein's* world is collectively formed and shared with all other human beings. It is the world that *Dasein* has in a way where the relational totality can only be experienced through the chain of 'significance.' Hubert L. Dreyfus explains these particular activities which define *Dasein's* existentialism in his book *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division*, "... the one is nothing, but it is also not a worldly thing which I can see, grasp, and weigh. The more public this one is, the less comprehensible it is,

and the less it is nothing, so little that it constitutes two of one's own *Dasein* in each instance of everydayness" (1991, p.247).

According to Martin Heidegger, primarily, at the core of *Dasein* is 'I' (Dreyfus, 1991 p.178). However, it is not the 'I' which incorporates "entirely in the sense of [one's] "being", but rather the 'I', which always incorporates the sense of *other(s)* within the self. The *being* is always influenced by the existence of *other(s)*. In terms of these *other(s)*, the *being* or the 'I' can experience one's own existence. This is *Dasein*, and it remains in this way for the most part. The Heideggerian world of Being is always co-created and shared by all humans. Heidegger also explains the self, "the self of everyday *Dasein* is one's self [...] As a one's self, the particular *Dasein* has been dispersed into the 'one,' and must first find itself" (Tombras, 2019, p.167). Surprisingly, the *events* of appropriation by which the *being* is unfolded depend on a synchronic axis--- the twist is that this axis can only be visible on a diachronic background, (Tombras, 2019, p.43), precisely a "metaphoric interconnection"<sup>11</sup> (Tombras, 2019, p.141). Questions of Being are always associated with the notions of *time* and *space*. Space is *not* about an empty potentiality where the human world might take place. The notion of *space* is always connected with the notion of corporeality, "Dasein makes room in space (in German: *einräumen von Raum*)" (Heidegger, 1972a, p.16). The modern scientific view of space where natural processes occur is an abstraction. This abstraction can be traced down by the initial disclosure of space via *Dasein's* bodiliness, as Heidegger argued that the core of *Dasein* depends on its spatio-temporal nature (1972a, p.19). However, there is a slight difference to note here: *Dasein* is not spatial because it is embodied and embedded, which needs to be encoded appropriately. Therefore, space is not *where* *Dasein* finds its ontic bodiliness. Instead, it is *something* that can be ontologically disclosed. Heidegger connected the notions of being to the origin of space to understand how *Dasein* plays its role in several corporeal activities: "Building, by virtue of constructing locales, is a founding and joining of spaces [...] Building is closer to the essence of spaces and to the essential origins of 'space' than any geometry and mathematics" (Heidegger, 1972a, p.22). In his understanding of *space*, the notion of separation is also essential. It can only be understood when boundaries are put in place. For example, when we build a wall or raise a roof, the visibility and the understanding of space become explicit. It is only then that *presence* and *absence* can be thematized.

Similarly, when studying time phenomenologically, one sees that far from being a succession of empty 'nows,' time has specific characteristics. These characteristics reveal that "time" is not empty at all. For Heidegger, the human experience of time involves 'something,' which he designates as "worldtime." This 'something' is always part of the collective experience. Thus, this "worldtime" makes the Being connected publicly in the virtual world by locating the "temporalising of temporality": "[w]e designate it thus [as world-time] not because it is present-at-hand [occurrent] as an entity within-the-world (which it can never be), but because it belongs to the world in the sense which we have interpreted existential- ontologically" (1972a, p. 46). Thus, the *world-time* is also dependable the *dis-stance* itself.

Nevertheless, each *Dasein* has its own *dis-tance*, which it carries within itself. This particular *dis-tance* exhibits the ontological opening up of presence and, simultaneously, changing the accessibility of things from the center. It is important to remember that this procedure does not include any physical space. In the virtual world, we could discern several *nomads*, each centered with its own experience of *presence*, and through these experiences, the [shared] spaces could only be (de) constructed in a new way.

### **From the Question of Being to Lacan via Freud**

The notion of separation within the framework of *time* is one of the fundamental keys to understanding the spatio-temporality of Being. *Being -in* is different than *being in* as it is located in the *now*; the spatiality of *now* in cyberspace is important as this *now* talks about the forms of time—the past, present, and future of *Dasein* via the unconscious, "The datable, significant, and extended 'now' is also never a 'now,' merely referring to me [...]. It is a 'now' that is immediately commonly accessible to all of us talking here with each other [...] At any given time, the spoken 'now' is immediately received-perceived by everyone present. We call this accessibility of 'now' the publicness of 'now' (Tombras, 2019, p.27). For Sigmund Freud, the psychological aspects of human beings are always related to the physiological process; there is always some correspondence between psychical and physical sensation (1974, p. 142). Freud considered the unconscious part of our psyche both as necessary and legitimate—



necessary, in the sense that it provides a proper understanding of various mental phenomena; legitimate, because its introduction does not involve any arbitrary steps, at least not in a way one introduces the concept of consciousness. These two postulates suffice as a foundation for the psychoanalytic enterprise. This is the converging point of understanding—a point that discloses both retroactively and prospectively everything happening in this theoretical model of argument. Therefore, how does the psychoanalytic model work within the ontological framework of a human being? In the Lacanian sense, “The gap of the unconscious may be said to be pre-ontological. I have stressed that all too often forgotten characteristic [...] of the first emergence of the unconscious, namely that it does not lend itself to ontology” (1998, p. 143).

Language is a special kind of equipment in the Heideggerian world-- the world of *Dasein* can be formulated by disclosing the phenomenological root of the two words “ontic” and “ontological.” Heidegger finds this world where *Dasein* exists at its magnetic peak as it is the source of both *historicity* and intelligibility for the *being*. For Lacan, the symbolic order is always multilayered, and the subject exists in the chain formed by signifiers (Tombras, 2019, p.192). The subject splits in the course of its striving to fulfil its lack forged by the desire of the *Other*. Moreover, this *lack* that the subject experiences—the “desire” that inspires us to engage with the *Other*—this is what precisely the ontological discourse is. Heidegger emphasized the term “on” (gen: onto-) in the sense of being, entity, thing, and *logos*, and at the same time, in the sense of collection or gathering (of beings). When we speak of ontology, we always refer to *beings* in their connection to other *beings*. The ontological discourse is all about the chain of signifiers. So, the journey is from the signifiers to a signifying chain. Therefore, we have seen that the signifying chain is “an automaton, a lifeless network of *signiferised*<sup>12</sup> *jouissance*<sup>13</sup>. The *speaking being*<sup>14</sup> can only be brought up in a world by their engagement with the network of signifiers (Tombras, 2019, p.189). Lacanian psychoanalysis emphasizes the discursive aspect of time to understand the notions of Being. This aspect reflects *time* in terms of a series of steps whose order is not arbitrary. This ‘logical’ time helps to perceive the *arrow of time*<sup>15</sup> (Tombras, 2019, p.195). Heidegger describes the four senses of time. The first one is the “primordial”

sense working as a backdrop on which all other kinds of time can be thematized (Heidegger, 1962, p.329). Next, time is “a horizon of *being*”. This particular aspect refers to the presence, absence, and repetition. Then comes the notion of time as a flow. This refers to the ‘flowing stream’ of “nows”, as the ‘course of time’ (Heidegger, 1962, p.422). The sequence of “nows” is uninterrupted and has no gaps. No matter how far we go to perceive the now – the moment is always about to flow. This last one is appropriate for understanding the notion of time in cyberspace. We all are part of a configurational framework of relations, part of a signifying chain; therefore, our existence is always part of the *now* or the *instant*. “Instant” is “Ek-static,” rather than (in) static – linked as it is to other “adjacent configurational frameworks of relations” (Heidegger, 1972a, p.14). Moreover, finally, we come to time as *historicity*. This aspect reflects the awareness that as human beings, we evolved from past to present, going towards somewhere (the future); no doubt, the endpoint is unavoidable. These aspects of time reflect a progression, a journey that is also part of a signifying chain. So, the chain of signifiers is also linked to the unconscious, which cannot be separated from the conscious mind.

### **(Un) conscious and Time**

As subjects of language, human beings are under the sway of something that only makes itself seen through the disruption it creates: the unconscious. Tombras argues that Sigmund Freud mentions humans not as the master in his/her/their own (psychic) house. Freud postulated that the unconscious is an agency that can help establish a causal continuity, and Heidegger criticized Freud for being trapped in a naïve Cartesian subject object framework (Tombras, 2019, p.116). For the Lacanian knot, the reflective subjectivity of human beings – the so-called *Ego* – is an *imaginary* construction (Tombras, 2019, p.196). The Lacanian subject is a subject of language, and it is not identical to the subject conceived by Freud or Descartes: it is not an observing consciousness vis-à-vis the world. Unconscious is a description of a psychical function that is continuously evolving. Lacan considered conscious thinking to belong to the chain of signifiers, similar to the Aristotelian *automaton*<sup>16</sup> (Stiegler, 1998, p.133). In this process, *jouissance* is a dead end (Stiegler, 1998, p.117). The divided subject is associated with disruption, specifically with the disruption of the

chain of signifiers, where there is a *gap*. The *gap* creates a disruption where the speaking being stops and thinks. The disruption is brought about by *desire* or *lack*—that is, what is still beyond the immediate reach of the *Symbolic*. This is where the unconscious part of the psyche is to be found.


We began with the philosophical notion of humanity reflecting *as being as human*, what Heidegger called *Dasein*—that is, the human being considered “optically” in its factual existence and “ontologically” in its concern about being -in -the -world--the world being reveals is very close to, but not identical to Lacan’s *speaking Being (parlêtre)*<sup>17</sup> (Tombras, 2019, p.158). Drawing a linguistic tradition, the Heideggerian notion of *Dasein* always focuses on the spatial aspect of *being* human. For Heidegger, *Dasein* is (ontically) a localized being, a *being* that is (t)here: *Da-sein*. For Lacan *speaking, Being* is corporeal and characteristically, but not exclusively human. According to Tombras, “*Speaking Being* is specifically intentional, coordinated by bodily activities, and hence a *prototype*, which can only be found in the intentional consensual interaction between two or more speaking beings” (2019, p.198).

### ***Dasein* in Gibsonian Cyberspace**

In the virtual world, in every status we upload, every comment we make, every word we forget, mix up, edit, replace, there is always a logic to what we do and to how these actions are forgotten, mixed up, or replaced. This process has a structure and the structure is known as Borromean<sup>xx</sup> topology (Tombras, 2019, p.103). The structure of our unconscious mind is always structured like a language. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, therefore, the “Unconscious” manifests itself through the “gap” of the signifying chain and gives rise to several replacement pathways (Tombras, 2019, p.103). William Gibson’s cyberspace is:


A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators in every nation. A graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations data. Like city light receding (Gibson, 1984, p.16).

Cyberspace is a 'space' or 'world' virtually implemented via electronic mediation—a world of the *simulacra*<sup>18</sup> as representational reality. Once the subject becomes a 'cybernaut' in this hyperreal world, all references to the 'real' can be abandoned; the subject can become anybody. *Dasein*'s identity is already grounded in its horizon of significance called being-in-the-world. Does arguing that we can 'try out' a new identity in a Multiple User domain make sense? Identity is not something we 'are' but something we become. It is of our own making. Through constant making and shifting of positionality – the subject exists 'in-between' the 'gap'. Signifiers are interconnected within the subject's network of signifiers S1 to S2, allowing the subject to be represented through their interconnection. The journey is within S1 to S2, divided by barred subject. The Borromean Knot<sup>19</sup> refers to the tripartite structure of the human psyche comprising Imaginary, Symbolic and Real<sup>20</sup>. I will present three drawings from Seminar XI to establish my counterargument for the trajectory of a Being.




Non-meaning (S1)

Fig. 1 The Veil of Alienation



Non-sense a



S1 Signifying Chain S2

Fig.2 Retroactive Trajectory Meaning

Seminar XI is primarily taken up for its potential to radically suspend Heidegger's question of the primary meaning of being, while Lacan's novel discourse theory regarding the subject's engagement with a signifying chain and with the symbolic Other is articulated in Seminar XVII (Tombras, 2019, p.151). So, the subject's journey also reflects temporality—a journey like the sense of *historicity* that discusses the assimilation of past, present and future. From position S1 to S2, the network can be understood and read through Heidegger's theoretical model of 'time' and 'space.' Another thing is that the way a virtual avatar performs is similar to the communication process of the Lacanian "*Speaking Being*" (Tombras, 2019, p.205). Heidegger indicated that the meaning of things and actions are always already wrapped up and tied to a referential whole- referential whole that lies in its possibilities and within its boundaries. Possibilities and boundaries are both part of the process of "becoming." Cyberspace is just another window. William Dorsett Case is a hacker in William Gibson's *Neuromancer*: [j]acked into a custom cyberspace deck that projected his disembodied consciousness into the consensual hallucination that was the matrix. A thief, he'd worked for other, wealthier thieves, employers who provided the exotic software required to penetrate the bright walls of corporate systems, opening windows into rich fields of data (Gibson,1984, p.5).

We find the pixels in Cyberspace, but these are merely the surfaces of the data net, which hides on the reverse side of the screen (McCaffrey, 1991, p.85). A web of complexity is weaving itself; the matrix disguises itself in its simulation. On the other side of the terminal looms, the tactile density is craved even by the materiality of the data

space. As Marshall McLuhan says, “Everyone I know who works with computers, ...seems to develop a belief that there is some kind of *actual space* behind the screen, someplace you cannot see, but you know it is there” (McCaffery, 1992, p.272).

## Conclusion

So, it is clear that being-in-the-world, especially in Cyberspace, is to be accepted by the *being* as a degree of “thrownness” (Tombras, 2019, p.43). In cyberspace, we find ourselves amid a horizon of significant questions where the holographic paradigm is the closest thing to being turned out to represent human memory. It is a world where Artificial Intelligence can read and access human memory. A world cohabited by machines and human beings—a world that truly is the posthuman world. In any world or environment, the significance of being can never be understood without understanding “thrownness”—a process that helps the being to exist collectively. The horizon of significance in Cyberspace lies in accepting “thrownness” within the possibilities of boundaries. So, these Heideggerian concepts of time and space are deconstructed via Lacan in the virtual world. One cannot have one without the other. One cannot have one’s consciousness without sharing those of others; you are not only yours but part of yourself is also immersed in time and place yet to become more of you. All consciousness is the consciousness of something. Thus, there is no such thing as a world less subject (exemplified by Descartes’ *res cogitas* <sup>21</sup>), nor is there world in any meaningful, phenomenological sense of that word without human being. One might call the root nature of human being awareness, an awareness concerned about its own being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 2013).

Therefore, in time and space, we shrink from the gazes of the human and posthuman others within the dataspace and nostalgically rediscover slower velocities of the flesh in the extra- cybernetic domain. There will be some irony in any such development if we recall that the first hackers may have been taking refuge in the computational universe from the enforced signification of the body in the world beyond. In the second cycle of computational practices and effects, which is still in its developmental phase, this enforced signification of the body is recapitulated in the cybernetic para-space. Nevertheless, as I have

suggested, it may be a third phase of autonomously developing entities and terrains, which constitutes the most profound break with the semiotic systems and, at the same time, predicts that there is another world beyond the digital domain. Only in this arrangement of signifying objects can we trace back the possibilities of the future world. It also echoes the existence of another corporeal form like Elon Musk's Neuralink project, which has already started to inhabit our mediated environments. To quote from *Being and Time*, "It is within the horizon of Dasein's temporal constitution that we must approach the ontological clarification of the 'connectedness of life' (Heidegger, 1972a, p.427).

## Endnotes

1. "Genome Project" focuses on the mapping of consciousness as "flow" and helps to track our "gene" Modification
2. Différance is a French term coined by Jacques Derrida. It is a central concept in Derrida's deconstruction, a critical outlook concerned with the relationship between text and meaning. The term *différance* means "difference and deferral of meaning." *Différance* is the systematic play of differences, of the traces of differences, of the spacing by means of which elements are related to each other. This spacing is the simultaneously active and passive (the *a* of *différance* indicates this indecision as concerns activity and passivity, that which cannot be governed by or distributed between the terms of this opposition) production of the intervals without which the "full" terms would not signify, would not function.
3. In philosophy, *poiēsis* (from Ancient Greek: ποιησις) is "the activity in which a person brings something into being that did not exist before." *Poiesis* is etymologically derived from the ancient Greek term ποιεῖν, which means "to make".
4. Epiphylogenesis, then, designates a new relation between the human organism and its environment. It is technics, as the support of the inscription of memory, which is consecutive of transcendence. The biological human, with its genetic and epigenetic memory, dies. This is the paradox of Man: "a living being characterized in its forms of life by the nonliving," by its relation to death. In other branch words, epiphylogenesis gives human being access to transcendence. The biological human, with its genetic and epigenetic memory, dies. This is the paradox of Man: "a living being characterized in its forms of life by the nonliving," by its relation to death. In other words, epiphylogenesis gives human beings access to transcendence, and thus to time. It is the finitude as biological humans, (which the myth of reminiscence 'forgets') that propels man to invent himself within this structure.

5. In philosophical ontology, “ontic” (from the Greek ὄν, genitive ὄντος: “of that which is”) is physical, real, or factual existence.
6. “Ontically” refers to the point of view of real existence.
7. “Ontology” refers to the of metaphysics dealing with the nature of being.
8. Being is essentially different from a being, from beings.” The “ontological difference,” the distinction between being (das Sein) and beings (das Seiende), is fundamental for Heidegger. The forgetfulness of being that, according to him, occurs in the course of Western philosophy amounts to the oblivion of this distinction. In last paper, I use “Being” as a component of the phenomenological study, and “being” with small defines the notion of “I”-the individual component.
9. The postmodern semiotic concept of “hyperreality” was contentiously coined by French sociologist Jean Baudrillard in *Simulacra and Simulation*. Baudrillard defined “hyperreality” as “the generation by models of a real without origin or reality”.
10. Karl Jaspers in the *Philosophy of Existence* (1938), put forth the concepts such as “existence” in a minimal and superficial state. He wrote “Existenz” as a state of authentic actual being and their relationship with the “encompassing”, an elusive being often understood as the totality of consciousness, the world itself, and other forms of determinate objects.
11. It should be noted here that this is a phenomenon that happens at both a synchronic axis and a diachronic axis—synchronic in the sense of the individual and diachronic in the sense of a whole language as a structured system. Heidegger does not employ the terms “synchronic” and “diachronic” directly. Tombras borrowed them from the linguist F. de Saussure, and use them to underline an aspect of Heidegger’s analysis, which, while not explicitly termed by him, is, however, always present.
12. Ferdinand de Saussure’s *Course in General Linguistics* (1916) is a summary of his lectures at the University of Geneva from 1906 to 1911. Saussure examines the relationship between speech and evolution. According to his theory, this is the principle that language is a system of signs and that each sign is composed of two parts: a signifier (word or sound pattern) and a signified (concept).
13. Jouissance, and the corresponding verb, *jouir*, refer to extreme pleasure. It is not possible to translate this French word, *jouissance*, precisely. Sometimes, it is translated as ‘enjoyment’, but the enjoyment has a reference to pleasure, and *jouissance* is an enjoyment that always has a deadly reference, a paradoxical pleasure, reaching an almost intolerable level of excitation. Due to the specificity of the French term, it is usually left untranslated.
14. Lacan offers a conceptualization of the human being as a sexed “speaking being”, a being under the sway of *jouissance* and the signifier
15. The “arrow of time,” also called time’s arrow, is the concept positing the “one-way direction” or “asymmetry” of time. It was developed in 1927 by the British astrophysicist Arthur Eddington.



16. The term 'automaton' was introduced by Aristotle in the second book of *Physics*. Lacan then employed Aristotle's term automaton to describe the 'engine' of repetition. Both 'spontaneous' and 'automatic' indicate that something in the nature of the event itself triggered its occurrence, as in 'spontaneous combustion'. In Lacan's discourse, the automaton coincided with the insistence of the network of signifiers and with Freud's pleasure principle. Such a transformation can only occur if a de-randomizing operator can reduce the chance element.
17. According to Lacan, one of the (if not the) most significant and indispensable conditions of possibility for singular subjectivity is the collective symbolic order (sometimes named "the big Other"). Individual subjects are what they are in and through the mediation of the socio-linguistic arrangements and constellations of the register of the Symbolic. Especially during the period of the "return to Freud," the analytic unconscious (qua "structured like a language") is depicted as kinetic networks of interlinked signifiers (i.e., "signifying chains"). Rendered like this, the unconscious, being of a Symbolic (anti-)nature in and of itself, is to be interpretively engaged with via the Symbolic medium of speech, namely, the very substance of the being-in- itself of the speaking subject (*parlêtre*) of the unconscious.
18. A simulacrum (plural: simulacra from Latin: simulacrum, which means "likeness, similarity") is a representation or imitation of a person or thing. Postmodernist French social theorist Jean Baudrillard argues that a simulacrum is not a copy of the real but becomes truth in its own right: the hyperreal.
19. The Borromean knot in Lacanian psychoanalysis refers to the three registers of human experience, namely Symbolic, Imaginary, and Real. The Imaginary first accounts for identifying the "Self" through the development of Ego, a.k.a. the Mirror "Self" through the development of Ego, a.k.a. the Mirror stage. This Imagination is correlated simultaneously with the other two, the Symbolic and the Real. The Real is at the Center and all these three relate to each other. To know any of these, we must follow the ring reciprocally. Seminar-XXII: RIS (1974-1975).
20. The symbolic, "the real," and "the imaginary" are all important in understanding Lacanian psychoanalysis. According to Lacan, when the infant stumbles upon a mirror (see *Mirror*), she is suddenly bombarded with an image of herself as a whole – whereas she previously experienced existence as a fragmented entity with libidinal needs. The image itself in the mirror is described by Lacan as the "Ideal-I" (Lacan, *Mirror*, 2). This ego ideal, for Lacan, provides an image of wholeness which constitutes the ego. As in Freud, this is formed through an external force; in this case, the sudden realisation of a complete image of self that appears in the mirror to counteract an infant's primordial sense of her fragmented body.
21. *Res cogitans* (thinking substance) is an expression by R. Descartes (R. Descartes, *Meditationes II*, 15). He compares the *res cogitans* with the extended substance (*res extensa*). In this way, he establishes a dualism between the mental and the material.

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