



Metaphysics of Communication

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Abstract

The Metaphysics of Communication explores the foundational principles of communication that extend beyond the transmission of information, delving into the nature, intention, and ontological significance of linguistic interactions. This paper presents a comparative analysis of various philosophical traditions, including Western thinkers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, alongside Indian philosophical perspectives like Bhartrihari's Sphoṭa theory and the Nyaya concept of śabda-pramāṇa. Central to this investigation is the question of whether language inherently communicates intention or functions through an underlying mechanism rooted in shared cultural practices and contexts. Wittgenstein's notion of forms of life suggests that language gains meaning from its use within communal activities, where shared practices enable understanding. However, this shared understanding remains fluid, resisting confinement within fixed frameworks of reference. This insight challenges the assumption that intention is a stable and fully transmittable entity. In contrast, Bhartrihari's Sphoṭa theory posits an indivisible unity of sound and meaning, emphasizing an intuitive grasp of the speaker's intention. By juxtaposing these perspectives, the analysis examines the ontological and epistemological dimensions of communication, highlighting how diverse intellectual traditions address the questions of intention, meaning, and the limitations of linguistic representation. This study ultimately argues that communication is not merely a mechanical transfer of ideas but a dynamic interplay of intention, context, and shared existence, revealing the profound connection between language and human experience.

Keywords: intent, communication, metaphysics, Sphoṭa, Wittgenstein, Bhartrihari

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Introduction

Language has been a subject of intense debate and discussion across various intellectual traditions, with scholars grappling with questions of meaning, intention, and the nature of linguistic communication. (Gleitman & Papafragou, 2013) Philosophers have long wrestled with the idea that language so profoundly structures our experience of reality that it becomes the very medium through which we perceive the world. (Shochat & Stam 1985; Gleitman & Papafragou 2013) The question that we should then ask is: What do we communicate when we communicate using language? Is language inherently communicative, or is it communicative through a specific mechanism? (Gregg, 1987). Certain Indian and Western philosophical theories regarding communication assert that the speaker's intention is conveyed through verbal expressions, which the listener comprehends. Wittgenstein posits that meaning is distinct from language, and that fact does not equate to meaning. For him, meaning is derived from the representation of facts, thereby conveying the speaker's intention. According to Wittgenstein, the shared forms of life that underlie the functioning of language are what allow the listener to understand the speaker's intent. (Fox, 2010) Forms of life serve as the reference framework within which individuals are trained in the language of their community, encompassing the learning of the rituals and practices of users that are intrinsically linked to language usage. Can intention be conveyed through language? Is it capable of being shared? Is life constituted by intention? If so, the subsequent question is: is intention synonymous with ideas or propositions? If it is not, how is it related to communication? Prior to addressing the aforementioned question, I would like to make a brief remark regarding the narrative of the form of life. A framework of references or propositions makes up the form of life, which is neither fixed nor definitive. Consequently, complete agreement is unattainable, as this framework can provide a set of ideas for explaining specific phenomena but cannot encompass total communication. The propositions and their meanings cannot be confined within a fixed boundary or a definitive framework of references. I do not identify any authentic Wittgensteinian rationale for equating intention and frame of reference. (Gustafson, 1984)

Is it possible to convey the intention?

A fundamental insight from classical Indian philosophers like Jayanta Bhatta and Dharmaraja is that language functions independently of the speaker's intention (Gleitman & Papafragou, 2013). They challenge the notion that linguistic meaning can be reduced to the expression of a speaker's internal mental state, as this would imply the infallibility of language in conveying the intended meaning. Wittgenstein's critique of the idea that language is a vehicle for transferring thoughts or mental contents between individuals

echoes this perspective. (Glendinning, 2000) Instead, Wittgenstein suggests that meaning emerges from the situated use of language within specific forms of life, where the speaker and listener negotiate and construct meaning through their shared cultural and contextual understandings. The fundamental issue is whether intention can be communicated through language, as it is often assumed in theories of communication.

Intention is predominantly a psychological construct. (Gustafson, 1984; García-Valdecasas, 2012) It is neither a reference nor an object to be referenced. Wittgenstein does not regard it as a form of life that can be communicated and shared. References can be transmitted and perceived due to biological fitness; however, they must first be produced. Speaking and hearing are only a small part of communication; language also facilitates awareness, which in turn triggers responses. (Witzany, 2016; Naguib 2006) Frames of reference are abstract constructs; they can be objects of awareness, yet they do not constitute awareness itself. The concept of intention as *asabda* (without language) is inherently uncommunicable. (Neuman, 2004; Duranti, 2006) The psychological entity may influence behaviour, yet it may not facilitate communication. Language conveys meaning that can be literal, intended, or non-intended; however, it is impractical to assert that it exclusively conveys intended meanings in all contexts.

Intended meanings cannot exist without prior acceptance of the literal meaning that serves as their cognitive foundation. Language conveys meanings rather than the objects themselves. The meanings of language and the intentions behind its use are distinct. The meaning is explicitly conveyed through language and intention, which is inferred based on meaning that is identical to the language used. Determining the intention behind language use and subsequently formulating a response is a complex task. Individuals interpret the speaker's intention in various ways. Different listeners, due to varying intentions, interpret the speaker's address in distinct ways. The sun has set. A neighbour of an ailing prominent individual may interpret the situation as "the prominent individual has died," while a herdsman might perceive it as "it is time to herd the cows in." A student may view it as "it is time to take a break from studying," and a dancer may interpret it as "time to prepare for the performance," among other interpretations. The language is not figurative; it is inherently expressive. The meaning of the sentence "Sun is set" is interpreted by listeners, influenced by their various allegiances, which leads to the emergence of multiple intended meanings. (Lakoff, 1993) The meaning conveyed by language is not the outcome of the speaker's intent, but rather a joint construction between the speaker and the listener. Several scholars have examined the concept of joint meaning, challenging the traditional view that language is a means of transmitting the speaker's intention to the listener. They contend that meaning is not solely determined by the speaker's mental state, but rather emerges from the shared social context of the communicative act.

Accepting intention as a communicable phenomenon underestimates the power of language and represents a fallacy by attributing a psychological phenomenon to public communication, leading to absurd conclusions. The intention is not a communicable entity; rather, it represents a psychological inference of the hearer's understanding based on the speaker's locution. This can lead to unnecessary confusion about the actual communication, potentially hindering effective interaction. The expressive meaning that language conveys serves as the cognitive framework for the various intended meanings of a given sentence, so no intended meaning can exist without it. (Whiteley, 1964) In other words, language does not merely transmit intention; it also constructs meaning through a collaborative process between the speaker and the listener.

Wittgenstein must face the challenges as inherent realities if the representation of facts defines meaning. He neither acknowledges meaning as a fact nor dismisses language as a fact. As a representationist, he cannot accept the equivalence of the representation and the entity it signifies. The speaker's intention is central to communication, leading to inherent subjectivism and arbitrariness in understanding. This may also reflect an underestimation of language's power. (Gauker, 1992) The fact that language can express a wide range of intended meanings, some of which the speaker may not fully understand or anticipate, suggests that linguistic meaning is not entirely reducible to the speaker's intentions. It is a joint negotiation between the speaker and the listener, constrained by linguistic conventions and social contexts. (Carassa & Colombetti, 2009; Fox, 2010; Sperber & Wilson, 1987; Wilson & Sperber, 2012)

This analysis aims to interpret the cognitive holistic understanding of language and communication, with maxims serving as a guiding framework for the discussion. This theory posits that philosophical reflection is both grounded in and limited to the objects articulated by language, which in turn conveys only cognitive or intelligible entities, reflecting its inherent nature and meaning. Cognition ceases when separated from language because language is a constant influence on it. Language serves as a fundamental guide in cognition; it functions not only as a means of communication but also as the cognitive foundation for conversation. (Mondal, 2019)

What does the term “communication” mean?

Communication occurs through language. Non-communicability arises from external factors such as the use of garments or tokens that are not within our proximity, a lack of observation of their usage by community elders, or subjective interpretations of intention. These aspects influence our understanding of language meaning and lead to conjecture. (Carassa & Colombetti, 2009; Wilson & Sperber, 2012; Fox, 2010)

Distinct linguistic communities utilise various forms of attire, facilitating communication through the garments prevalent in one's immediate environment, which serve as the linguistic markers of the community in which an individual is born and raised. Communication encompasses more than mere transmission; it involves the achievement of understanding through various forms, including spoken language, written symbols, gestures, and sensory experiences. The discussion will address how it functions as a responsive platform, facilitating the exchange of ideas between speakers and listeners, following several steps. (Smith, 1994; Shankar, 2006) Conversation and communication should not be regarded as distinct activities; rather, conversation, for the purposes of this paper, is defined as informal spoken communication. Cognitive activities are involved in both cases. A speaker conveys ideas to the listener, who subsequently replies using language. In what ways is knowledge attained through articulations? What mechanisms enable sharing? Do responses to these questions arise from the concept of language itself, or are they influenced by other factors? We will first examine the nature of language. Is language limited to articulations, which are simply verbal sounds or noises (*dhvaniyan*) and possess a material nature? Is it limited to the marks we utilise as proxies for gestures, data, and verbal articulations, which are material marks or writings (*lipiyan*) on a piece of paper or a board? Communication extends beyond the symbols and sounds utilised in writing, reading, and speaking. Pāṇinian grammarians refer to them as *vaikhart*. They are not random symbols. They are acquired through the observation of their applications by the community elders in one's place of birth. Through convention, practice, and habit, these acquired sounds and written symbols serve as tools for communication. Language exists as a form of life that operates in a manner where its improper uses manifest as grammatical errors. Communication extends beyond the mere speaking and hearing of verbal sounds (*vaikhari*). The achievement of cognition involves the exchange of thoughts via language (*śabda*). In sensory perception, sensory organs such as the eyes are distinct from external objects, such as a pot, which they perceive through contact. However, this does not apply to cognition through language, as the *śabdikas* adhere to the active theory of knowledge (VP 1.55-56). In linguistic cognition, the self is initially revealed, from which meaning emerges. The expresser (*śabda*), akin to the senses, not only illuminates objects but, like the soul, possesses self-awareness and awareness of the objects it illuminates. This duality is why it is defined as both the expresser and the expressed. Self-awareness and its significance (*grahya-grāhaka*) pertain solely to the intelligible objects represented by it. Senses do not initially perceive themselves before engaging with external objects; rather, language articulates its inherent nature first, from which its meaning is uniformly disclosed. The senses distinguish themselves from objects upon perception, leading to ongoing challenges in understanding the cognition of objects, or self-awareness of awareness.

Theorists often attribute this issue to an external source, such as the mind. The mind functions not only in grasping and processing information but also as a dynamic faculty. The mind's capacity for grasping is a significant topic in psychological studies; however, its insights serve as appropriate subjects for philosophical contemplation. Unlike sensory perception, language in verbal cognition is not distinct from its objects. It represents self-awareness of the awareness of objects, which are thoughts or ideas, and functions as the foundational basis for the awareness of thoughts and the responsive awareness of communicated content. (Perlovsky, 2013; Perlovsky & Sakai, 2014) A question is frequently posed in this context. In what ways does language (śabda) function as an expresser (vacaka)? This inquiry pertains to the concept of expressive power (śakti), a topic that has generated considerable debate within Indian linguistic theories. The controversy can be categorised primarily into two perspectives: (i) those who acknowledge the existence of power or powers in language (śabda) and (ii) the view that language (śabda) itself constitutes power, deriving its designation from this inherent quality. The earlier theorists identified three independent powers inherent in śabda: literal (abhidha), suggestive (lakṣaṇā), and implicative (vyañjana). There are three types of language powers that Indian rhetoric and some Naiyāyikas recognise: abhidhartha, lakṣyārtha, and vyangyārtha. These powers help communicate three different kinds of meanings. The Mimāṃsakas acknowledge only the first two powers. Māhima Bhatta, a Mimāṃsaka in his Vyaktiviveka, advocates for the acceptance of expressive power exclusively and contends that lakṣaṇā should be classified under the category of inference. The Nyaya theory of language posits that the inherent power (śakti) within a word (vācaka) enables it to denote its corresponding meaning (vācya). The Naiyāyikas do not consider sentence as power; rather, sentential meaning arises from the association of word meanings and is therefore figurative. Sakti represents, in certain instances, the will of God and, in others, the will of humanity. Desire is inherently subjective. If one claims that something is objective due to its creation by God, then there are substantial grounds to refute that assertion. A śabda is termed as such due to its inherent power. Naiyāyikas do not believe that memory is a good way to learn. Instead, they believe in sentential meaning, which is the connection of word-meaning that you remember (smṛti). (Mohanty, 1994; Kumar, 2019) In this context, knowledge derived from Vedic statements is merely memory and, therefore, lacks evidential value, rendering it ineffective as an authoritative source (pramāṇa). The Naiyāyikas must address whether communication is achieved through a word or a sentence, in alignment with their perspective of the word as sakti. If sakti accompanies the word "then," theorists must either reject the sentential meaning or acknowledge it as figurative. In both instances, the statements, regardless of their source's reliability, cannot be considered authoritative (pramāṇa). Furthermore, meaning is psychological and relies on the subjective element, which renders

public communication of thoughts impossible. The philosophy of language and grammar does not recognise power (*sakti*) or powers in *sabda*. We acknowledge that “*Sabda is śakti*” due to its inherently expressive nature. It is an expresser (*vilcaka*) as it conveys its own identity and significance (*vacya*). It is referred to as *śabda* due to its inherent power. Language conveys all meanings, including primary, secondary, and implicative interpretations. The predominant interpretation is the widely accepted one for which the language is deemed inherently suitable. The primary meaning of being popular is initially recognised by the audience; if this does not facilitate a particular use, a secondary or intended meaning is derived through some form of similarity. If the two are not suitable for use the unintended meaning is discerned through the proximity of the primary meaning. (Adegbija, 1988) The meaning in all cases consistently pertains to the meaning of language; *śabda* represents *śakti*, expressing all meanings, with the popular interpretation regarded as primary, serving as the foundation for both intended and non-intended meanings. All meanings are directly conveyed through language. This concept identifies three levels of convention, which enable language to convey three distinct types of meanings. (Whiteley, 1964) Language operates autonomously, conveying its meaning independently of external influences and our affiliations with them. Cognition occurs through language, independent of the objects themselves. Without relying on physiological, psychological, or metaphysical entities and our affiliations with them, language facilitates cognition while our sensory experiences are limited to data. This discussion does not address the ontological commitment of language; however, it is worth noting that the theory of ontological commitment arises from two misleading notions: (i) the belief that thought is separate and independent from language, and (ii) the view that language is merely a tool for representing or referring to objects. In contrast, the things-in-themselves. The cognitive holistic philosophy of language posits that *śabda* is revealed rather than produced, with what is produced being merely verbal noise, serving only as an instrument for the manifestation of the former. Meaning is neither a thing-in-itself nor an experience detached from language. Contrary to Wittgenstein’s perspective, meaning is not a representation of facts but rather an intelligible entity that is indistinguishable from language. Language and meaning are the sole intelligible entities. Language manifests independently of any external empirical, transcendental, metaphysical, or psychological entity.

Communication and Conversation

The concept of meaning, as discussed above, has implications for our understanding of communication and conversation. If meaning is inherent in language itself, then communication is not a transfer of thoughts or ideas from one person to another, but rather a sharing or revealing of meaning that

is already present in language. Conversation and communication require both a speaker and an audience. However, their mere presence is inadequate; effective communication occurs through the articulate expressions made by the speaker and the attentive reception by the audience. Verbal noises, referred to as *vaikhari* by Paninian grammarians, closely resemble Wittgenstein's forms of life. (Nooten, 1967; Sharma, 1976; Staal & Shefts, 1963) The observation of the community's elders' spoken and written expressions shapes these forms. One learns to navigate within this framework when trained in the community's language, which encompasses the rituals and practices of its users, with language usage being inextricably linked to these elements. Communication is contingent upon the transmission of signals by the sender and their reception by the receiver. Effective communication requires not only the transmission and reception of information but also the achievement of understanding for any response to the challenges of dialogue between a speaker and a listener. One may enquire about the necessity for a philosophy that endorses the concept of language as a flash (*sphota*). (Lu, 2019; Wang, 2018)

This question is crucial for understanding the dynamics of conversation and communication; therefore, I will address it first in our discussion.

The Factors Influencing the Production of Articulations

- i. From the viewpoint of the speaker: These cognitive tasks cannot occur without verbal sounds, and the production of verbal noises for the cognitive activities requires an incentive to speak. Conversation and communication are the labels we use to describe the action of sharing thoughts through verbal articulations. What is the driving force behind the creation of vocalisations? If the intelligible entities that provide the motivation to talk are not identified, there is no chance that they will produce. Let's look at the passage from Panini *Sikṣa* (*Mahabhāṣya* 6.1), which is regarded by practically all masters of the Paninian tradition of philosophy of language, (Adegbija, 2023; Nooten, 1967; Sharma, 1976) to gain a comprehensive knowledge of the process of creating articulate utterances. According to this theory, the expresser's language flashing as an idea or concept before speaking triggers the speaker's expectation (*vivaksa*) to speak. This flashing encourages people to talk. Expectancy causes the mind (*mana*), which is linked to the intellect (*buddhi*), to stimulate the fire of digestion (*jatharagni*). This stimulation of the digestive fire stirs up the vital air (*prana-vayu*), and the touch with stations of various letters (*varna-sthana*) in the skull travels quickly upward from the navel to the head. Air that has been knocked off the top of the skull travels quickly through the throat's vibrating speech centres before externalising as verbal sounds that can be identified as palatal, dental, etc. When these vibrations surround (*vivrta*) the listeners' ears,

they become vocal noises. At least in his case, it is impossible to translate deafness into vocal sounds if the ears are not working properly. We do not mind the complexities involved in the development of verbal noises because we are used to and habitual in the art of speaking. Verbal sounds are not self-producing; they are material in nature. To put it succinctly, if the *sphoṭa*—the epiphany that motivates speech—is suppressed, no vocal sound can be made or speaking is possible. It is acknowledged that *sphoṭa* is what motivates people to produce articulations. (Carruthers 1900; Conant, Bouchard, & Chang, 2013; Guthrie, 1940)

- ii. From an audience's perspective: It should be noted that conversation and communication are an achievement of cognition (*sampratyaya*) through language and go beyond simply speaking and listening to spoken sounds. When the audience grasps the speaker's spoken sounds, the *sphoṭa* is revealed. For cognition, listening alone is insufficient. It is not cognition to detach from speech, which is merely a means of facilitating manifestation. The meaning of manifested *sphoṭa* is exposed in a non-differential way by revealing its own self. As I mentioned earlier, in certain instances, the *sphoṭa* can be revealed even by pronouncing a single letter (*ekopyavarnah vākyarthasya pratyāyakah* – VP 2.40), a single word (*vākyam tadapi manyante yatpadam caritakriyam* – VP 2.225), a gesture, perceptual data, or a sentential garb. In other instances, it might not be revealed even after hearing a lot of subordinate sentences and sentential garbs. Therefore, it is pointless to debate whether understandable language is lengthy or short. Though it lacks length, breadth, parts, and division, the cognition is always a flashing of consciousness; the verbal noises' long and short durations are imposed on understandable language, which causes us to think both long and short of the intelligible being. The following is a concise summary of the speaker's and the audience's involvement, as previously described.

A Review of the Activities from the Speaker's Point of View

- i. The consciousness flashing forth as an understandable entity (*sphoṭa*) to the speaker is what causes the expectation to speak.
- ii. Intelligent beings motivate people to talk or make vocalisations in order to communicate,
- iii. An incentive stimulates the digestive fire (*jatharagni*), which stirs up the vital air.
- iv. The air is stirred up *S0* by effort (*yatna*, from navel to throat) and specific effort (*prayatna*, from throat to skull up and down to mouth). This causes the vocal organs—lips, teeth, nose, throat, palates, etc.—to vibrate and release verbal noises or utterances from the mouth, which is known as the emergence of articulations.

An Examination of Events from the Viewer's Perspective

- i. Rotating vibrations of the speaker's words dispersed across the room.
- ii. The listeners experience vibrations in their ears in the order that the speaker produces them. We refer to this as hearing.
- iii. The listeners' sphota progressively becomes apparent after hearing the sequences.
- iv. The sequence manifests the sphota, which bursts out its own essence from which its meaning is uniformly expressed.

The analysis presented above very clearly shows the idea of production and diffusion of verbal noises, but that is not sufficient for explaining conversation and communication in which there is a sharing of thought. Sharing of thoughts concerns conception of the infusion of language and thought and ubiquity of thought as well. Let us start with the infusion of thought of language first. (Komlev 1980)

It is worth noticing that even the idealists of the East and the West are very close to the realists and pluralists on the relation of language and thought. They accept that language and thought are substantially different. There is no possibility of non-difference of reference and referent or representation and the thing represented. Analysis and translation of one is not acceptable as that of the other, because the other is always transcendental and separate from the former. But, as we have observed earlier, it is due to their infusion that any study of the language by languages becomes not only possible but also interesting and philosophical. If we deny the infusion thesis, we cannot find a cognitive ground for explaining any conversation and communication, which in fact is the accomplishment of cognition to both the speaker and the audience. (Chomsky, 2014)

Most of the philosophers of language accept verbal noises and articulations as vehicles of thought. Hearing of them manifests the thoughts transmitted to the audience. They first make the audience aware of the language's thoughts before revealing its meaning. Sharing between the speaker and audience becomes possible because of ubiquity – the principle, i.e., the flashing of concepts or thoughts.

Systems of Indian philosophy, except Vyākaraṇa, assume language as representation or reference, of which there are entities they represent or refer to in the empirical world or world of experience. Language, if defined as references or as marks/designations (written or verbal) standing by proxy for the things, is not self-operative by itself. It requires a cognitive base for its own acceptance and for cognitive - operations made through them. Material entities vary from community to community and even from person to person in the same language community. It is trivial to take language as

confined to speaking and hearing, or to writing tokens and reading them only and thinking signified as that which is referred to or is represented by those tokens/ marks. The philosophy discussed herein accepts that śabda comprises of unit awareness by nature, and for the revelation of which garbs serve as a tool. (Lawrence, 2003; Kumar, 2019)

The infusion of language and thought is the basic maxim of holistic philosophy of language; the issue is discussed with great clarity in a paper “Cognition, Being, and Possibility of Expressions” (Tiwari 1996:65-73). Their infusion does not mean that the two are different entities that are identified casually. It simply means that language is thought, and the thought is the language; it is awareness. The thought is shareable, but this is not the fleeting physical sounds that are a tool helping only in the manifestation of the former. It is because of language being thought that reading, writing, and speaking are taken as cognitive activities. It is on the basis of non-difference of language and thought that analysis of language by language is possible and the translation of thought from one garb to different garbs is feasible. If meaning or thought is different from language, or if it is transcendental signified, transcendental from language and reality, then no cognitive activity will be possible. Cognition ceases to be so isolated from the intelligible language.

Knowledge means determinate knowledge, and this determination without an infusion of thought by language is unthinkable (Tiwari 2008: 20-24). Meaning is known even by the uses like hare’s horn, barren woman’s son, and sky-flower. Can one think of even “indeterminate thought” isolated from the language “indeterminate”? “Indeterminate” is also known thus, because language determines it so.

Articulate Utterance Production and Transmission

In previous lines, I have examined the formation of articulate utterances and their causes. I will now address the issue of their transmission to the audience. How does this transfer influence reception and cognition? In this context, we must note a segment from the Mahabhasya that states: śrotropalabdhirbuddhinirgrāhyaḥ prayogenabhijvalitah ākāśadeśaḥ śabdah (1.1). This verse states that Sabda pervades the sky. Articulate utterances are air vibrations produced by the vocal apparatus, which, when spoken, traverse the surrounding air and engage the auditory organs of the audience. (Savithri) They are responsive to auditory stimuli and then develop into the articulate entities of language referred to by grammarians as sphoṭa. The sphoṭa is shown to the listener through the garments articulated in the speaker’s sequence. As sphoṭa inherently represents awareness, its omnipresence corresponds to the self-consciousness of Beings to which it can illuminate. Ubiquity refers to the inherent capacity for consciousness

possessed by all human beings, enabling them to engage in certain insights and facilitating communication between speakers and listeners. It influences animals and insects through their unique instincts, prompting them to engage in social behaviours that facilitate responses to changes, adaptation, reproduction, and other related activities (Moore et al., 2016)

The concept of articulated utterances as pervasive as the sky elucidates how they are perceived by the listener, even when delivered from a remote location. Contemporary scientific innovations have demonstrated that sounds, like vibrations, may be transported over distances using effective conductors such as air and copper wires, and can be received and maintained. The observation of the mahabhutsyakara highlights two factual matters. Firstly, verbal sounds do not pertain to the qualities of the sky or atoms. Secondly, the quality of language (sphoṭa) influences the acquisition of speaking skills through the observation of tones, notes, mouth gestures, diction, and the illocutionary and locutionary functions inherent in the articulations of community elders. This process cultivates the communication skills of both the speaker and the audience, leading to responses shaped by learnt conventions. Verbal expressions serve as instruments for communication; nonetheless, they are specific and transient, rendering them non-shareable phenomena. They cannot be deemed shareable due to the participation of physical exertion (yatna) and specialised efforts (prayatna) in their articulation, as well as the analogous system of the responding audience. (Teodorescu & Păun 2014; Ecirli, 2014) Sharing is a conscious cognitive process that occurs during communication. What enables this sharing? I previously indicated that sharing is facilitated by two factors: the ubiquity of flashing power and its expression through transmittable spoken sounds. It is commonly believed that analogous physiological systems possessed by speakers and listeners, along with their development via convention, are the essential variables influencing communication. The inquiry is: how does it relate to the sharing of thoughts, which are not a physiological entity? The omnipresence of flashing power (sphoṭa) constitutes the cognitive foundation for the shareability of thoughts. The flashing in the speaker prompts the want to speak, resulting in the production of spoken sounds. Their hearing reveals the sphoṭa in audiences who comprehend the speaker's conveyed material through utterances, so enabling sharing, responding, and communication as cognitive actions. Sharing necessitates a response, which serves as evidence of effective communication. Denial of ubiquity, inventiveness, awareness, and self-awareness in the cognitive process of communication undermines the foundational basis for sharing, rendering communication impossible. (Andersen, 1991)

Conclusion

The theory presented above views language as a force; it possesses the inherent ability to express itself and convey meanings when anticipated; it is intrinsically creative, and hence, its creativity is self-sufficient. All linguistic units—letters, words, suffixes, prefixes, and sentences—are universal, and their meanings, when presented consistently, are likewise universal. The universal, when expressed through language, discloses its inherent character, from which its meaning is uniformly revealed. A number of individuals exist within a universal, and some universals also exist within a universal. The countless individuals and universals inherent in the universal are disclosed through various utterances stated by the speaker and perceived by the listeners, which enables their readiness to respond. (Ma & Li 2016; Eldesoky & Aldebsi 2023) Sharing encompasses the generation and dissemination of expressions, as well as the recognition and reaction to cues, which collectively serve as evidence of effective communication. A proper understanding of these cognitive activities between speakers and listeners is unattainable if the omnipresence of *sphoṭa*, the illumination as an object of knowledge, reflection, and awareness, is disregarded. The illumination of consciousness prompts the motivation to articulate, hence generating linguistic expressions in both speakers and responses. This flashing, being inexhaustible in each instance, functions as the subject of cognition and the basis for responding to intellectual operations. Flashing characterizes consciousness, which does not deplete through its numerous manifestations; it occurs whenever confronted with a problem. Cognition pertains to the understanding of intelligible beings, language, and meaning, encompassing both awareness of these entities and self-awareness. Consequently, there exists the potential for timely knowledge and response to the speaker's communications (Chernikova, 2014; Wiley & Jee, 2010).

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