



Metaphor and Concept: Some Reflections on the Derrida-Ricoeur debate

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Abstract

The debate between Jacques Derrida and Paul Ricoeur on the philosophical status of metaphor has been seen as between two positions, one which privileges the destabilizing power of the metaphoric over the conceptual (Derrida) and the other which domesticates the metaphoric in the service of the conceptual (Ricoeur). Commentators on this debate, no matter where their sympathies lie, seem to predominantly be in agreement on this issue. In this paper I attempt to invert the frame within which this debate has been viewed. I argue that the debate can more fruitfully be read not as one on the status of metaphor in philosophy, but rather on the task of concept-construction in philosophy. I also argue that in reading this debate from this perspective, we come across a rather surprising conclusion: that it is Derrida, rather than Ricoeur, who provides us with a more robust and profitable mode of concept-construction that can accommodate scientific revolutions, epistemological breaks, and paradigm shifts. Ricoeur's model of concept construction, I argue, only functions within what Thomas Kuhn has called 'normal science'.

Keywords: metaphor, concept, Derrida, Ricoeur, paradigm shift, deconstruction, hermeneutics

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Introduction

The Derrida-Ricoeur debate has occasioned a wide variety of commentary, especially because the terms of the debate seem to be on the status of metaphor in philosophical discourse. Scholars of this debate have made various points regarding the two thinkers and elaborated on their position vis a vis the philosophical problematic of metaphor. The dominant consensus is that Derrida is placed more on the side of the abyssal generalization of the metaphoric to such an extent that the philosophical task of concept-creation is direly threatened, making him more a 'literary' thinker; while Ricoeur on the other hand is read as someone who seeks to stabilize and domesticate metaphoric discourse in the service of speculative and conceptual schematization.

Leonard Lawlor's book on the debate, *Imagination and Chance: The Difference Between the Thought of Ricoeur and Derrida* argues that Ricoeur's book *The Rule of Metaphor* operationalizes the imaginative work of living metaphor to "produce an image referring not to the nothingness of absence but to the nothingness of ideality" (*Imagination and Chance* 125). Lawlor argues that for Ricoeur, the polysemy of metaphoric discourse is negated through the function of distancing. Distancing, as he defines it in Ricoeur, "cancels a subjective, singular content in an objective, universal form. Because, however, distancing also preserves the singular, the universal is never entirely abstract or formal" (54). Through distancing, the polysemy of metaphoric discourse is negated and sublated, almost in Hegelian terms, in the service of forming a univocal, objective concept.

As Lawlor goes on to write, speculative discourse performs the function of distancing on metaphorical discourse in its aim for univocity, so that the metaphorical can finally be "turned into concepts". Distancing, he argues "cannot not prioritize continuity" (125). It is a continuous process of enlargement of the conceptual horizon. On the other hand, Derrida's thought "cannot not imply discontinuity". In Lawlor's words, "radical alterity...is expectable...for Ricoeur, distancing is horizontal, telic; for Derrida, difference is nonhorizontal, atelic" (127). In the final instance, in Lawlor's reading, Ricoeur "imposes an imperative of univocity" that

leads to an understanding of “Ricoeur’s hermeneutics as a revival of the most generous instances of Western metaphysics” (128) while Derridean deconstruction is on the other hand characterized as “a perversion of philosophy” (129) that would hardly be amenable to the univocity desired from the concept. What is of significance to us in Lawlor’s reading is that Ricoeurian distanciation prioritizes continuity, while Derridean *differance* implies discontinuity. Lawlor, however, reads these in a highly traditional manner, placing Ricoeur’s emphasis on continuity on the side of the concept, while Derrida’s implication of discontinuity is on the side of the metaphoric, not noticing perhaps that there is no necessary connection of one with the other. I call this a traditional reading because it inscribes conceptual work within a continuous, progressive horizon, and cannot imagine that concept-construction might imply the existence of disjointed and incommensurate paradigms.

Giuseppe Stellardi’s book *Heidegger and Derrida on Philosophy and Metaphor*, which on the whole is more sympathetic to Derrida than Ricoeur, makes similar points. In his second chapter which is entirely on the Derrida-Ricoeur exchange, Stellardi argues that the debate encompasses radical reflection on “the enormously intricate problem that goes under the working title of ‘metaphor and philosophy,’ or ‘metaphor and concept’” (67). Stellardi constantly and consistently places Derrida on the side of the metaphoric, arguing that “the beams of his discourse are not concepts, but...indecidables” and that from his perspective, “it is essential to note that Derrida’s discourse is often and at all levels openly metaphorical” (69) while Ricoeur’s is “never openly metaphorical”.

Stellardi’s placement of Derrida on the side of the metaphorical and Ricoeur on the side of the conceptual, is followed by a demonstration that Derrida has quite successfully deconstructed philosophy’s desire to show a difference in nature between analogy-figure-allegory-myth on the one side and concept-idea-system on the other (74). Using the metaphor of conquest, Stellardi argues that “throughout Derrida’s text, metaphorical power keeps winning further terrain: Rapidly the whole of philosophical discourse, the whole of language itself, is swallowed by metaphoricity; that is by analogy, by impropriety. In this vortex of dissemination any

privileged relationship between words and meaning, effect and origin (that is, philosophy's privilege), is forever lost, and philosophy becomes little more than one of metaphor's drifts" (74). As he puts it more baldly, "concept (from a Derridean viewpoint) is no longer philosophy's element, for this would assume the "stricture" of a system of relations, dominated by a thinking and reflecting subject" (112). On the other hand, in Stellardi's reading, for Ricoeur the concept is philosophy's element; not only that, but "concept lives in metaphor's death" (86) is how he quite metaphorically sums up Ricoeur's position on the concept.

Steven H. Clark's book *Paul Ricoeur* places itself more on the side of Ricoeur than Derrida. It is after all a book that styles itself as a "compact and accessible summary of the major developments" (10) in Ricoeur's thought. But even he seems to agree with Stellardi's claim that Derrida is more on the side of the metaphoric than the conceptual. He relates Ricoeur's confrontation with Derrida to the First Study in *Rule of Metaphor*, where the former had opposed the philosophers with their claim to truth to rhetoricians with their claims to power. For Clark, Ricoeur is the truth-telling philosopher, while Derrida on the other hand becomes a metaphorical rhetorician who uses figures of speech and style to persuade and seduce the reader to dangerous ends.

Taking these three scholars as representative of the larger commentary on the debate, some things become quite clear. Lawlor, who is largely sympathetic to Ricoeur but more convinced by Derrida, finds the former to be too much on the side of conceptual univocity, while Derrida is largely taken to be someone operationalizing a perversion of philosophy's conceptual task. Similarly, Stellardi places Derrida on the side of the metaphorical, and Ricoeur on the side of the concept, just like Clark who puts Derrida in the company of the rhetoricians Ricoeur seeks to separate the philosophers from. The contours of this debate have largely been structured by the idea that Ricoeur is trying to defend philosophy, and by extension the task of concept-construction, while Derrida is seeking to generalize the metaphoric and thus deconstruct philosophical and conceptual work.

In the rest of this paper I will argue that we need to radically re-evaluate our position on this debate. Scholars have read the debate

as one over the problematic of metaphor, and in doing so have ignored and neglected the fact that the debate is equally on the question of concept construction. The above-mentioned commentators are representative of the larger consensus on the debate. This consensus can be summed up as: a) that the debate is about the status of metaphor in philosophical discourse and b) it is Ricoeur who comes off as more concerned with the construction of concepts and theories and thus more 'philosophical' than Derrida.

The basis of this consensus, even among commentators as diverse as Lawlor, Stellardi and Clark, is a model of concept-construction that prioritizes continuity, incrementalism, and progressivism. However, a brief survey of the contemporary philosophy of science in both Continental and Anglo-American traditions can show us that concept-construction need not inhabit a continuous, progressive horizon. In fact, epistemological work of Gaston Bachelard,¹ Georges Canguilhem, Kuhn,² Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault has demonstrated that concept-construction in the natural and human sciences more often than not proceeds through epistemological breaks and radical reconfigurations.

In this paper I will argue that we need to invert the terms of the debate. Rather than the primary focus of the debate being on the status of metaphor in philosophy, it is the status of the concept that is at issue here. I argue that both Derrida and Ricoeur offer us insights into the philosophical task of concept-construction. However, it is quite paradoxically Derrida rather than Ricoeur who offers us a better model of the philosophical task of concept-construction, one which would be amenable to scientific revolutions, paradigm shifts and epistemological breaks and not just function within what Thomas Kuhn called 'normal science'.

In this inverted reading, the Derrida-Ricoeur debate is more on the question of what the philosophical task of conceptualization actually entails and which model of concept-construction would be more amenable to contemporary science. In this paper I will argue that not only is the dominant consensus on Derrida mistaken, but that he actually provides a more robust and stronger model of concept construction than Ricoeur. While it is true that both Ricoeur and Derrida focus on the creation of concepts through metaphoric utterances, it is Derrida's model which is characterized by an

openness to radical ruptures and transformations in sense which would be more amenable to modern scientific and philosophical work, especially following Gaston Bachelard and Thomas Kuhn's radical refashioning of the philosophy of science. Ricoeur's mode of concept construction through metaphor is wholly unable to account for epistemological breaks and scientific revolutions, and would thus only function within what Kuhn calls 'normal science' and be less useful for modelling conceptualization in revolutionary science.

Thus, the argument I am seeking to make here can be summarized as follows. Both Derrida and Ricoeur accept that concept-construction is indebted to metaphoric discourse. Whereas Ricoeur seeks to domesticate this discovery and postulate a generative productivity that makes metaphoric discourse the condition of possibility of conceptual schematization, he has a very traditional conception of the concept, one which unfolds in a continuous horizon without radical reconfiguration or breaks. Such a model of conceptualization cannot account for epistemological breaks or paradigm shifts. On the other hand, while Derrida has been read as a more 'literary' thinker, I argue that his modelling of concept construction, that is provided to us through his concern with the metaphoric, allows us to have a model of the concept that is open to radical ruptures and thus more amenable to the discontinuist emphasis of contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science.

Ricoeur's Eighth Study in *Rule of Metaphor*

In this part of the paper I will summarize Ricoeur's position on concept-construction through metaphor. In the Eighth Study of his *Rule of Metaphor*, Ricoeur argues that metaphoric and speculative discourse have a dialectical relationship, with interpretation as the intermediary that allows for the production of concepts. He writes that "every interpretation aims at relocating the semantic outline sketched by metaphoric utterance inside an available horizon of understanding that can be mastered conceptually" (358). Interpretation, he goes on to write, "is then a mode of discourse that functions at the intersection of two domains, metaphorical and speculative. It is a composite discourse, therefore, and as such cannot but feel the opposite pull of two rival demands. On one side, interpretation seeks the clarity of the concept; on the other, it hopes

to preserve the dynamism of meaning that the concept holds and pins down." Metaphoric discourse operates by a mechanism of split and suspended reference; what it refers to is and is not existent. Part of the split reference is that what it refers to is not directly a referent. For example, one can say that "Achilles was a lion in the battle" when one does not have the concept of *courage* to refer to.³ Saying that "Achilles was a lion" is to both refer to, and not refer to the animal lion, since the goal is to posit that Achilles is courageous without necessarily having that concept. This necessitates the expansion of the semantic field which creates the possibility (though not the necessity) of speculative discourse. Speculative discourse breaks free of the order of the image in metaphoric discourse in favour of the order of the network of meanings of the same order which are constituted by the logical space itself (in our example, this could be the concept of *leonine* which could then further lead to the development of the concept of *courage* which is then itself placed in a network with other concepts). The conceptual order is able to break free of the play of double meaning characteristic of metaphoric utterance, and then it functions solely in terms of the "configurational properties of the space in which it is inscribed" (357).

The conceptual order proceeds from the speculative, which in its own turn finds its condition of possibility in the metaphoric split and suspended reference. But the conceptual is the order where the polysemy and play of meaning in metaphor is itself suspended and where a systematicity functions to order the meaning of a term based on the network of meanings wherein it exists and the laws of the logical space in which it is inscribed. The model of concept-construction we find, then, in Ricoeur, is that while the conceptual is generated from the metaphoric via the speculative and the interpretative functions, it has its own order with its own internal rules of transformation and modification. Its autonomy is hardly threatened by the metaphoric; rather it is sustained by it. Conceptual transformation is spurred on by living metaphor which "introduces the spark of imagination into a 'thinking more' at the conceptual level" (358).⁴ But the concept can only be incrementally modified by this, it is not open to radical ruptures and epistemological breaks. To say that the metaphoric allows the conceptual to 'think more' is to

have an incrementalist, progressivist understanding of conceptualization and to foreclose the possibility of epistemological breaks and scientific revolutions. We would find it difficult, in Ricoeur's position, to account for radical epistemological breaks and paradigm shifts like that between the Newtonian and Einsteinian concepts of gravity, or between Einstein's theory of relativity and quantum mechanics.

In that sense while Ricoeur maintains that he has a Kantian perspective on the relation between living metaphor and conceptualization, his position seems more Hegelian in that he operationalizes an *aufhebung* of metaphor, which is dialectically superseded but maintained at the same time. It is this operation of *aufhebung* which I argue Derrida contests, not in order to break with the philosophical task of concept-construction, but to think it through more rigorously so as to produce a model which would be open to radical breaks that cannot be sublated and maintained at the same time.

Derrida and the construction of concepts

Derrida's essays that constitute his contribution to the debate with Ricoeur, *White Mythology* and *Retrait of Metaphor* have been read as arguing for the destitution of conceptual discourse. This is because in his reading of the philosophical desire to construct a concept of metaphor, metaphoric utterance infects and contaminates all conceptual work in such a way that it becomes ineliminable. At least that is how Ricoeur reads him, writing that in his essay *White Mythology* "we are led from Heidegger's restrained criticism to Jacques Derrida's unbounded 'deconstruction'" (336). But Derrida's protestations in his response to Ricoeur in *Retrait of Metaphor* where he argues that "Ricoeur inscribes his entire reading of 'White Mythology' in dependence on his reading of Heidegger and on this 'saying,' as if I had attempted no more than an extension or a continuous radicalization of the Heideggerian movement" (107) should not be seen as disingenuous but as genuine. This is because he argues that he shares concerns with Ricoeur regarding the possibility of philosophical work and the relation to the metaphoric. In fact, I argue that Derrida seeks a model of concept construction that would be more robust and open to radical epistemological

breaks, and would thus be a better and more suitable model for contemporary science than Ricoeur's.

We can better understand this if we look at what kind of projects Derrida is tracking in both the essays. In *White Mythology* he is tracking the philosophical project of constructing a concept of metaphor; in the second half of *Retrait of Metaphor* he is following up on Heidegger's project of creating a concept of being. In the former essay he quite explicitly writes that "metaphor is less in the philosophical text (and in the rhetorical text coordinated with it) than the philosophical text is within metaphor" (258). We already know in advance that whether it is Aristotle, Hegel or Heidegger, these projects of concept construction will come across aporias that will open them up to new possibilities.

In tracking both of these fundamental philosophical projects, he finds that in attempting to construct the concept of metaphor or the concept of being philosophers always come across something which is neither metaphoric nor conceptual, neither word nor thing, neither proper nor figurative (*Retrait* 128). This is what he calls the *quasi-metaphoric, differance* or *pas*. In any fundamental philosophical project that seeks to systematize without remainder, there always remains something supplementary, something outside the system, which quite paradoxically is generative of the system itself despite the fact that it escapes its grasp. When it comes to the problem of metaphor in philosophy, Derrida demonstrates how the philosophical desire to arrive at the concept of metaphor always stumbles upon one more metaphor at the very moment when it has thought it is done with the metaphoric. But that is then neither a metaphor nor a concept, it is neither proper nor literal, it is neither word nor thing. It is what he calls the supplementary trace or *differance*. Similarly, in *Retrait of Metaphor* he looks at Heidegger's diagnosis of the history of the question of being, the most fundamental concept of philosophy. In trying to construct this history of the concept of Being, Heidegger must of necessity resort to metaphors—the forgetting of Being, the withdrawal of Being, the House of Being and so on. But Derrida notes that for Heidegger, these are not metaphors, since as Heidegger quite famously said, "the metaphorical exist only within metaphysics" (*The Principle of Reason* 48), but are what Derrida calls *quasi-metaphors* that have the same structure as the supplement or

the trace. What we get from both these essays is that the philosophical project of systematic conceptualization always opens up to that which is beyond it; radical reconfiguration is part and parcel of concept-construction.

Referring to Bachelard and Canguilhem in *White Mythology*, Derrida argues that “this epistemological ambivalence of metaphor, which always provokes, retards, *follows* the movement of the concept, perhaps finds its chosen field in the life sciences, which demand that one adapt an unceasing critique of teleological judgment” (261). He cites two examples from Canguilhem’s work, the development of cell theory where Robert Hooke used the term *cell* to characterize what he saw when he observed cork under a microscope. In using the term cell, Hooke was referring not to the cells of monks or prisoners, but that of bees, which bore with it affective overdeterminations of co-operative labour. This model, Canguilhem argued, was later rectified and abandoned, “experimental embryology and cytology have rectified the concept of organic structure that was too narrowly associated by Claude Bernard with a social model that perhaps, after all, was only a metaphor” (*Margins of Philosophy* 263). The second example he cites is when the biological concept of circulation of blood is substituted for that of irrigation. In both of these examples, we find a shift from one model to another, occasioned of course by a desire to rectify what is metaphorical. However, as Derrida astutely questions, “is rectification henceforth the rectification of a metaphor by a concept? Are not all metaphors, strictly speaking, concepts, and is there *any sense* in setting metaphor against concept?” (264). While Canguilhem might read the move from the metaphor of cell in Hooke to a concept of cell in embryology as a rectification, for Derrida there is no need to think of this as a move from the metaphoric to the conceptual. Rather we move from one metaphoric paradigm to another in such a way that there is no real sense in setting metaphor against concept at all. What is more important is to notice the radical break or rupture between these two paradigms, rather than efforts to classify one as metaphorical and the other as conceptual.

In attempting to construct concepts of metaphor and Being, philosophy does not just come up against its own limits, but it discovers that the construction of concepts necessarily implies the

possibility of radical rupture, incommensurability and discontinuity. Unlike the Hegelian concept (*begriff*) which functions within a space of continuous sublation and recuperation, Derrida provides a model of the concept that is more open to the incommensurability of paradigm shifts and epistemological breaks. Instead of taking this as a sign of the fundamental impossibility of conceptual discourse, we should take it as a quasi-transcendental, what Derrida quite cryptically calls the condition of (im)possibility. Which is to say that the quasi-metaphoric both makes conceptual discourse possible and impossible; moreover it allows conceptual discourse to be open to radical rupture and discontinuity, one which is not predictably regular and internally regulated, but is forced upon it in such a way that radical reconfiguration of the logical space is necessitated. The conceptual space has to be open to radical reconfigurations that are not themselves conceptually produced but come from its confrontation with alterity, the anomalous and that which cannot be explained by an extant theory. This is what in Thomas Kuhn's words is the anomalous object which leads to scientific revolutions. Kuhn's distinction between novelties of fact and novelties of theory⁵ are as he himself admits, artificial (52). In fact, the assimilation of novelties of fact by creation of a new paradigm requires that conceptual space must internally be open to radical reconfiguration. The quasi-metaphoric, I argue, is that operator which makes this radical reconfiguration of conceptual space possible and thus gives us a model of the concept that breaks free from incrementalism and progressivism. It allows the conceptual space to be open to the possibility of the anomalous, which is an integral part of scientific progress without that progress necessarily being mapped in a linear manner within a pre-determined horizon.

Thus, in Derrida's reading we find a model of concept construction that is very different from Ricoeur's. It is not simply the case, as commentators on the debate have argued, that Derrida eschews the philosophical task of concept-construction. Rather, the system of concepts we create have to be open to this possibility of radical reconfiguration for them to be concepts in the first place. Whereas various commentators have read this as entailing the neutralization of conceptualization, I have attempted to argue that it makes conceptualization more open to radical reconfiguration; it

makes it dynamic rather than static, and allows it to transform its logical space in response to new discoveries. This would allow transformations in conceptual space that would be able to accommodate the incommensurability of epistemological breaks, scientific revolutions and paradigm shifts rather than simply being extensions of already existing conceptual frameworks.

Conclusion

Whereas Ricoeur's modelling of concept construction from metaphor favours an incrementalist and progressivist model, one which is spurred on to think more by the imaginative power of metaphoric utterance, Derrida's modelling of concept construction is one which emphasizes radical breaks and ruptures that can completely and unpredictably reconfigure the logical space of the concept in response to the quasi-metaphoric which is arrived at the limits of conceptualization by a theory. The model of concept construction in Ricoeur is thus more insular and enclosed, theoretically insulated from alterity and thus unable to be reconfigured in ways that would approximate to radical change; it is located within the paradigm of what Kuhn would call normal science. Derrida's position allows for the radical reconfiguration of conceptual space, not as an internal function of the conceptual space itself, but one forced upon it by that which is other, the anomalous, to that space. In that sense it is a stronger and more robust model of concept-construction since it allows the possibility and even necessity of a radical revising and reconfiguring of our concepts when confronted with the anomalous and paradoxical, a possibility of reconfiguration necessary for scientific and philosophical work in the first place. As Kuhn argued in his book, an anomalous object can demand the reconfiguration of the entire scientific paradigm, leading to a new and perhaps incommensurable one. Discontinuity in conceptualization is not opposed to scientific work in the perspective of contemporary philosophy of science, but rather an integral part of it.

Thus far I have been trying to argue that the Derrida-Ricoeur debate is not so much about the status of metaphor in philosophical discourse, as much as it is about the mode of concept-construction that they both proffer. Ricoeur's mode is incrementalist and

progressivist, proceeding upon a predetermined horizon, with the concept being able to build upon the metaphoric. But it functions only within normal science and leaves no space for radical epistemological breaks or paradigm shifts. Derrida's modelling of concept construction, which he tracks via his reading of the construction of the concept of metaphor and of being, is one that is more open to this possibility of radical reconfiguration in conceptual systems, but with the drawback that this transformation cannot itself be conceptually regulated but is forced upon it in a way; conceptual reconfiguration is not entirely conceptually regulated. But this is congruent with the claims made by contemporary philosophy of science after Bachelard, Canguilhem, Kuhn and Althusser, all of whom argue that epistemological breaks and paradigm shifts are part and parcel of concept-construction in the sciences. Concepts, and systems of concepts (theories) need to be open to radical reconfiguration on the basis of anomalous instances. Derrida's model of concept-construction, born from tracking the movements of philosophical foundationalism, is actually more amenable to revolutionary scientific and philosophical work than Ricoeur's. In that sense, the commentary on the Derrida-Ricoeur debate needs to be re-evaluated. It is Derrida, rather than Ricoeur, who provides us with a more robust model of conceptualization that would be amenable to conceptual revolutions in the contemporary natural and human sciences.

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Endnotes

- ¹ Gaston Bachelard's concept of epistemological break was formulated in his 1938 book *The Formation of the Scientific Mind*. There he argued there is a radical epistemological break between ordinary pre-scientific apprehension of phenomena and scientific phenomena. Bachelard's epistemology was discontinuist, and he thought that scientific work proceeds discontinuously via epistemological breaks rather than in a progressive, continuist horizon. Louis Althusser borrowed this concept of epistemological break in his famous reading of Marx from Bachelard. What is interesting is that in *Reading Capital*, Althusser references the epistemological break in chemistry between the theory of phlogiston and that of oxygen, which is similar to what Kuhn brings up as an example of a paradigm shift in his book. Derrida was of course, like his contemporaries Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, a student of Althusser's at the Ecole Normale Supérieure. What is important for us is that all three, Bachelard, Kuhn and Althusser, are united in their emphasis on discontinuity in the conceptual work of the sciences, and Althusser was well known to be vehemently anti-Hegelian.
- ² As Kuhn writes in his book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, normal science "means research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice" (10). For example, Kuhn writes that today physicists consider light to be photons or quantum-mechanical entities that have features of both waves and particles. Before Max Planck and Albert Einstein's discoveries, however, light was supposed to be transverse wave motion, and even before that it was supposed to be material corpuscles in Isaac Newton's time. Normal science, or what he calls a paradigm, is characterized by continuity in theoretical work. Revolutionary science or the moment of paradigm shift, is discontinuous; it is the shift from light as material corpuscles to waves or from waves to quantum-mechanical photons. As Kuhn writes, much of the work involved in normal science is policing the paradigm, what he calls using the peculiar metaphor of 'mopping-up operations'. These are what engage most scientists throughout their careers (24). He goes on to write, "no part of the aim of normal science is call forth new sorts of phenomena; indeed those that will not fit the box are often not seen at all" (24). Normal science is paradigmatic in the sense that it has a continuous horizon upon which its discoveries play out. A paradigm shift is part of revolutionary science; it is discontinuous and nonhorizontal.
- ³ This is why Lawlor quite astutely claims that metaphor in Ricoeur refers not to the nothingness of absence but the nothingness of ideality.

- ⁴ Ricoeur argues in the Eighth Study of his book that in Kant's *Critique of Judgement* the faculties of Imagination and Understanding seek to figure the Ideas of Reason, to which no concept is equal. "But where the understanding fails", he writes, "imagination still has the power of presenting (*Darstellung*) the Idea" (358). The metaphoric then functions to provide a presentation of the Idea that can be imaged and perhaps later, be integrated by the Understanding.
- ⁵ Kuhn argues that the anomalous can come into being either as novelties of fact (a new fact is discovered which needs a complete revolution in the theory) or novelties of theory (which are reconfigurations of the theory itself).