Tattva Journal of Philosophy

Commentary

Peter Jonkers — 2026-04-28

Living ethically through our concepts: on the need for conceptual enhancement

Abhinav Tyagi — 2026-04-28

Iris Murdoch (1956) famously argued that our moral concepts are not neutral areas but something that determines our vision of the world. They not only shape our moral lives, but also guide and constrain them. Our moral actions depend on our concepts. As Queloz (2025) observes, we cannot act in the name of justice if we do not have the concept of justice. Our moral concepts, therefore, are a necessary determinant of our ethical life. Today, concepts like ‘genocide’, ‘sexism’, and ‘racism’ etc., have become central to how we act and think ethically. However, these concepts have not always been a part of our conceptual repertoire. For instance, the term ‘genocide’ was coined in 1942 by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jew who fled the nazi occupation. ‘Sexism’ was introduced in 1965, and, more recently, the term ‘ecocide’ was coined to call out the destruction of the environment by human acts such as war and over-exploitation. For most of history, these concepts were not available to us. The development of these concepts and their apparent absence in history show that our present moral vocabulary may not always be the most appropriate for a good ethical life. This raises the question: how can we lead an ethical life in the face of the historical contingency of our moral concepts? And, more importantly. How can we enhance our moral vocabulary? These are the central questions of my paper. In section 1 of this paper, I will examine the contingency of our moral concepts and highlight the need and possibility of conceptual enhancement in the moral domain. Following that, in section 2 of this paper, I will build on these insights to answer the question Why should we care about our concepts at all when it comes to ethical life? And why should we care about their contingency? Drawing on Congdon (2024), I will explore how our recent moral concepts have enriched our ethical life while also revealing the need for further enhancement. Finally, in section 3 of this paper, I will examine a way of conceptual engagement called conceptual engineering. In particular, I will aim to explain how this methodology can identify and fix the potential conceptual gaps. For this, I will rely on a functional approach to conceptual engineering. Here, I will also explore the metaphilosophical implications of the same approach and examine the challenges a project like this could face. I aim to address these questions by drawing on recent work in contemporary metaphilosophy and meta-ethics.

Between Practice and Principle: Understanding Ka Jingsneng Jingkraw as the Ethical Foundation of Khasi Moral Life

Wandashisha Mary Nongbri — 2026-04-28

Abstract

“Ka longrynïeng ka longïaid, ka longim ka longmane.”
—A Khasi maxim reminding us that life is both movement and meaning.

Drawing inspiration from this insight, this paper explores ka jingsneng jingkraw as the living moral architecture of Khasi ethical life. Far from being a set of fixed rules, jingsneng jingkraw functions as a dynamic moral practice—shaped by everyday conduct, relational obligations, and ancestral teachings—that binds individual behaviour to communal harmony and spiritual responsibility. The paper argues that Khasi moral thought preserves the ethical significance of the simple and the ordinary, showing that morality is not only about universal principles or abstract rules, but also about the everyday practices through which life is lived.

The discussion situates this practice within the three foundational tenets of Khasi moral philosophy: ka tip briew ka tip blei, kamai ia ka hok, and tip kur tip kha, showing how they anchor ethical life in dignity, righteousness, and kinship. By placing Khasi moral thought in dialogue with Immanuel Kant’s deontology and Aristotle’s virtue ethics, the paper highlights not only points of comparison but also the distinctive features of Khasi ethics as a lived, relational, and culturally grounded moral system. The existential dimensions preserved in Khasi culture further deepen this view, revealing a moral world in which authenticity, responsibility, and relationality coexist. Ultimately, this paper argues that ka jingsneng jingkraw constitutes a distinctive philosophical system—rooted in indigenous knowledge yet resonant with universal ethical concerns—offering a rich framework for understanding moral life as both lived experience and reflective practice.

The Grey Ethics of Fantasy Wars and Trauma

Anushka Malik — 2026-04-28

Wars have plagued humanity since the beginning of time. Wars over territory, over asserting independence, and later the Great Wars (WWI & WWII), largely shaped the world as we know it today. The Great Wars were supposed to be the “war to end all wars,” and yet conflicts between nations have not yet ceased. In the last decade alone, many major world powers have waged wars on each other.
Major events have shaped world literature and art, for artists and thinkers are creators and creatures of the society to which they belong. Thus, this paper studies the portrayal of war in select 21st-century Fantasy Fiction to assess fresh developments in the ethics of war. The chosen fantasy fiction works include To Gaze Upon Wicked Gods by Molly X. Chang (2024), Letters of Enchantment duology by Rebecca Ross (Divine Rivals, 2023; Ruthless Vows, 2023), The Seven Moons of Maali Almeida by Shehan Karunatilaka (2022), and Babel, or The Necessity of Violence by R. F. Kuang (2022)
Using Ray Dalio’s framework on the five major types of wars, and Jeff McMahan’s theory of war ethics (2005, 2006 & 2009) as the theoretical framework, the present study analyses the five primary texts of Fantasy fiction listed above. Additionally, the Fantasy fiction works are studied in the context of Judith Lewis Herman’s recovery model (1992) to analyse the psychological impact of war.

Wisdom and Knowledge

Oushinar Nath — 2026-04-28

A current debate in philosophy focusses on whether propositional knowledge is necessary for wisdom. In this paper I defend the view that propositional knowledge is necessary for wisdom. I call Weak Reductionism the view that propositional knowledge is merely necessary for wisdom, but not sufficient. I also examine two rival accounts of wisdom – Strong Reductionism, the view that propositional knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for wisdom, and Non-Reductionism, the view that propositional knowledge is neither necessary and nor sufficient for wisdom. I critique both of these views and find them wanting in light of various wisdom-related intuitions that we have.

Aristotle's Concept of Metaphor

Shibin Joseph Pottananickal — 2026-04-28

In this article, I investigate the philosophical significance of metaphor in the works of Aristotle. Aristotle has a comprehensive theory of metaphor in which he defends the use of metaphor in philosophy. I argue in this paper that the scepticism concerning the cognitive significance of metaphor, comes from misinterpretation of Aristotle’s theory of metaphor. Most of the contemporary theories of metaphor are responses various aspects of metaphor outlined by Aristotle in Rhetoric and Poetics. There is an apparent contradiction in Aristotle’s view of metaphor in philosophy. The tradition has highlighted the aspect of embellishment but ignored the fact that Aristotle himself used metaphors in his writings. I highlight the defence of metaphor in the philosophical writings of Aristotle. I invoke his idea of pròs hén ambiguity in order to explain the place and role of metaphor in philosophy. In short, Aristotle rejects the kind of metaphors used by the Sophists in order to deceive the masses. We come to the idea that Aristotle emphasizes clarity of thought in philosophy where refined and context-dependent metaphors can be used.

Translation of Philosophy Texts into Kashmiri Language: Role and Current Challenges

Mudasir Tantray — 2026-04-28

This research paper explores the vital role of translating philosophical texts into Kashmiri, highlighting its significance for linguistic enrichment, enhancing vocabulary, preserving cultural heritage, and promoting intellectual growth. It begins by tracing the evolution of the Kashmiri language through various historical periods, noting its philosophical roots in Sanskrit and later influences from Persian, Arabic, and English. The paper emphasizes the importance of translating philosophical works into Kashmiri to enhance the language's richness and adaptability, especially in the modern era where new terminologies and concepts are needed. It also discusses the challenges faced in this endeavor, such as the lack of direct equivalents for many philosophical terms in Kashmiri, the scarcity of resources, and the limited number of qualified translators. Furthermore, the paper examines how translating philosophical texts into Kashmiri has profoundly impacted science and technology, facilitated global knowledge exchange and fostered interdisciplinary research. The translation of philosophical ideas into Kashmiri has shaped scientific methodologies, ethical considerations, and technological developments, demonstrating the enduring influence of philosophy in the modern world. The paper calls for collaborative efforts to support translation initiatives, which are crucial for sustaining the intellectual and cultural growth of Kashmiri-speaking community, reaffirming their commitment to preserving their linguistic and cultural heritage for future generations. This research paper also explains the transition of the Kashmiri language from the Devanagari script to the Kashur (Nastaliq) script, analyzing the cultural, linguistic, and socio-political factors influencing this shift. The main aim of this paper is on how philosophical ideas are translated into Kashmiri language.

Enactive Perception vs. Zen Perception

Navneet Chopra — 2026-04-28

Enactive Cognition characterizes perception as an 'emergent' phenomenon - not something like a faithful passive representation of pre-existing objective reality, but as something emerging from the coupling between sensory and motor experiences, from a pragmatic need to act in the world under the (action) affordances offered by the environment to the organism, and from dynamically coupled interactions between the person and others under the normativity of the situation one is in. All this suggests that no objective reality or objective perception is possible. On the other hand, Zen prescribes abandoning the encumbrances like competition, greed, fear, jealousy, etc. to perceive reality objectively ‘as it is'. This stance means endorsing realism, i.e., believing that a real reality exists, and a ‘true’ perception is possible. Thus, the two perspectives stand opposite to each other. I reflect on this problematic situation through a thought experiment using the Muller Lyer illusion, and raise a question - "Will a Zen master perceive the Muller Lyer illusion?". And I think they will perceive the illusion because the perception of the illusion is the mark of being an 'enactive being', well acclimatized with one's environment from which even a Zen master can't escape, if they are to achieve a judicious sense-making of the world.

Beyond Positivism: Habermas’ Critical Engagement with Scientific Rationality

Himansu Sekhar Samal — 2026-04-28

Abstract

This paper gives a systematic analysis of the major themes of the methodological unity of natural and social sciences. However, the way in which this debate has been conducted is subsequently found to be misconceived. This is primarily because of the adoption of one particular conception of science, that of positivism, to study of social phenomena. Also it is shown that there are a number of different conceptions of science and that is erroneous to discuss the methodological unity issue simply because of the one particular characterization of the natural sciences. To set the stage I shall try to explain the adoption of Habermas’ critical social theory, an appropriate framework for the social sciences. An analysis of Habermas’ views on knowledge, cognitive interest and scientific method is followed by his social theory. Also his attempt to reconstruct and defend the epistemological views in Marx’s writings which is of considerable relevance to the discussion of critical theory.

Virtue Epistemology, Causal Connection, and Getttier Cases: In Defence of Sosa

Sreejith K K — 2026-04-28

Fundamental to the virtue epistemological diagnosis of the Gettier problem is the assumption that there is symmetry between action and belief. Christian Piller disputes this assumption and challenges Ernest Sosa’s diagnosis of the Gettier problem, which presumes action-belief symmetry. The purpose of this paper is twofold. One is to respond to Piller’s criticisms. It argues that Piller’s criticisms are fraught with difficulties, since the examples he uses to criticise Sosa’s view are not structurally analogous to the example that Sosa provides. This argument is made with the help of the account of causality of Wesley Salmon. The second is to bring out clarity on some important notions which Christian Piller employs in his argument. This paper argues that there is a considerable lack of clarity in the expressions “severing the causal connection” “, loosening the causal connection”, and “diminished credit”, which play a pivotal role in Piller’s arguments. This ambiguity adversely affects the argument of Piller. In conclusion, the paper argues that Piller’s criticisms are not compelling enough to show that Sosa’s diagnosis of the Gettier problem fails.