Metaphysical Realism and Naturalised Epistemology


  • Pragyanparamita Mohapatra Utkal University



Metaphysical Realism, Anti-Realism, Truth, Naturalised Epistemology


The paper aims to examine Michael Devitt’s arguments in favor of metaphysical realism where he argued that the issue of realism is devoid of the issues of semantics and epistemology. He has tried to compress his argument by focusing on the metaphysical or ontological questions of realism but he states that the epistemological concerns can be taken only when epistemology is naturalized. Devitt therefore has considered naturalized epistemology as a method to give potency to his Realism. Realism as defined by him is having majorly two characteristics, the independent dimension and the existence dimension that is, the view of the reality in which the reality exists independent of human mind. This independence and existence dimensions are not mutually exclusive.


BonJour, L. 1995. “A Priori.” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, R. Audi.(ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995

Devitt, Michael. 1983. “Dummett’s Anti-Realism.” The Journal of Philosophy 80, No. 2, 73-99

Devitt, Michael. 1984. Realism and Truth. 1st edn. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell,

Devitt, Michael and Sterelny, Kim. 1987. Language and Reality: An Introduction to Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Basil Blackwell,

Devitt, Michael. 1991a. Realism and Truth. 2nd edn. Princeton: Princeton University Press,

Devitt, Michael. 1991b. “Aberrations of the Realism Debate.” Philosophical Studies 61, No. ½, 43-63

Devitt, Michael. 1996. Coming to Our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism. New York: Cambridge University Press,

Devitt, Michael. 1998. “Naturalism and the A Priori.” Philosophical Studies 92, No. ½, 45-65

Devitt, Michael. 1999. “A Naturalistic Defence of Realism.” In Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings, S.D. Hales (ed.), 90-03. Wadsworth Publishing Company, Albany: New York

Giere, R.N. “Naturalism.” In A Companion to Philosophy of Science, W.H. Newton-Smith (ed.), 308-310. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000

Putnam, Hilary. 1979. “Reflections on Goodman’s Ways of Worldmaking.” Journal of Philosophy, 76, 603-618

Putnam, Hilary. 1981. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Putnam, Hilary. 1987. The Many Faces of Realism. La Salle: Open Court

Quine, W. V. O. (ed.) 1953. From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press

Quine, W.V.O. 1969. Ontological Relativity. New York: Columbia University Press

Quine, W. V. O. 1975. “The Nature of Natural Knowledge.” In Mind and Language, S. Guttenplan (ed.), 57-81. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Quine, W. V. O. 1981. Theories and Things. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press

Quine, W. V. O. (ed.) 1986. Philosophy of Logic. 2nd edn. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press

Quine, W. V. O. 1995. From Stimulus to Science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press

Rorty, Richard. 1982. Consequences of Pragmatism. USA: Harvester Press




How to Cite

Pragyanparamita Mohapatra. (2023). Metaphysical Realism and Naturalised Epistemology. Tattva Journal of Philosophy, 15(2), 21-38.