Metaphysical Realism and Naturalised Epistemology
Keywords:Metaphysical Realism, Anti-Realism, Truth, Naturalised Epistemology
The paper aims to examine Michael Devitt’s arguments in favor of metaphysical realism where he argued that the issue of realism is devoid of the issues of semantics and epistemology. He has tried to compress his argument by focusing on the metaphysical or ontological questions of realism but he states that the epistemological concerns can be taken only when epistemology is naturalized. Devitt therefore has considered naturalized epistemology as a method to give potency to his Realism. Realism as defined by him is having majorly two characteristics, the independent dimension and the existence dimension that is, the view of the reality in which the reality exists independent of human mind. This independence and existence dimensions are not mutually exclusive.
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