David Hume’s Mitigated Skepticism

Abstract

The main objective of this paper is to explain Hume’s skepticism as moderate skepticism. In section one, an explanation of Hume’s skepticism about the reality of the external world has been carried out in order to distinguish Humean skepticism from Cartesian. A discussion on Hume’s denial of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities and his theory of causation takes place in section two. Hume’s denial of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities supports his skepticism, at least to the extent that the said denial refutes a metaphysical realism of Lokean kind. The discussion on Hume’s theory of causation is meant to explain that Hume’s denial of the necessary relation between cause and effect does not entail that he refutes the propositions with certainty, although he refutes the certainty of empirical propositions. In Section III, I have tried to show how Hume’s skepticism on the Self as a substance (Material or Mental) and that on the Necessity of Self Identity is carried out moderately through the notion of memory and resemblance, although he claims that self is a ‘bundle or collection of different perceptions’. In Section IV, I have tried to underline that Humean skepticism is not as radical as Pyrrhonism.