Referring to Moral Terms:
A Defense of Moral Naturalism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12726/tjp.31.4Keywords:
Semantic, Metaethics, Boyd, Causal theory of referenceAbstract
The project of realist moral naturalism is desirable for many philosophers. Proponents of realist moral naturalism believe that ordinary commonsense assumptions about moral claims are cognitively truth-apt. Realist moral naturalism, in this context, is shown to have developed through the works of Moore, Kripke, Putnam, Boyd, Horgans, and Timmons. Some raised objections and some sought solutions to justify the theory. In this paper, the author argues that the current formulation of Horgan and Timmons’s argument cannot rule out the application of causal semantic theory to moral terms. In addition, the author illustrates that Boyd’s project works well, and the causal semantic theory is applicable to moral terms.
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