Virtue Epistemology, Causal Connection, and Gettier Cases: In Defence of Sosa
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12726/tjp.35.9Keywords:
Virtue Epistemology, Gettier problem, Sosa, CreditAbstract
Fundamental to the virtue epistemological diagnosis of the Gettier problem is the assumption that there is symmetry between action and belief. Christian Piller disputes this assumption and challenges Ernest Sosa’s diagnosis of the Gettier problem, which presumes action-belief symmetry. The purpose of this paper is twofold. One is to respond to Piller’s criticisms. It argues that Piller’s criticisms are fraught with difficulties, since the examples he uses to criticise Sosa’s view are not structurally analogous to the example that Sosa provides. This argument is made with the help of the account of causality of Wesley Salmon. The second is to bring out clarity on some important notions which Christian Piller employs in his argument. This paper argues that there is a considerable lack of clarity in the expressions “severing the causal connection” “, loosening the causal connection”, and “diminished credit”, which play a pivotal role in Piller’s arguments. This ambiguity adversely affects the argument of Piller. In conclusion, the paper argues that Piller’s criticisms are not compelling enough to show that Sosa’s diagnosis of the Gettier problem fails.
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