Wisdom and Knowledge
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12726/tjp.35.4Keywords:
practical wisdom, epistemology, scepticism, virtueAbstract
A current debate in philosophy focusses on whether propositional knowledge is necessary for wisdom. In this paper I defend the view that propositional knowledge is necessary for wisdom. I call Weak Reductionism the view that propositional knowledge is merely necessary for wisdom, but not sufficient. I also examine two rival accounts of wisdom – Strong Reductionism, the view that propositional knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for wisdom, and Non-Reductionism, the view that propositional knowledge is neither necessary and nor sufficient for wisdom. I critique both of these views and find them wanting in light of various wisdom-related intuitions that we have.
References
Ardelt, M. (2003). Empirical assessment of a three-dimensional wisdom scale. Research on Aging, 25(3), 275–324.
Baehr, J. (2012). Two types of wisdom. Acta Analytica, 27, 82–97.
Brueckner, A. (2012). Debasing scepticism. Analysis, 72(2), 295–297.
Chalmers, D. J. (2005). The Matrix as metaphysics. In C. Grau (Ed.), Philosophers explore The Matrix (pp. 132–176). Oxford University Press.
Conee, E. (2015). Debasing skepticism refuted. Episteme, 12(1), 1–11.
Driver, J. (2004). Uneasy virtue. Cambridge University Press.
French, C. (2012). Does propositional seeing entail propositional knowledge? Theoria, 78, 115–127.
Gisborne, N. (2010). The event structure of perception verbs. Oxford University Press.
Grimm, S. (2015). Wisdom. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(1), 139–154.
Holton, R. (2017). Facts, factivities, and contrafactives. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 91(1), 245–266.
Kekes, J. (1983). Wisdom. American Philosophical Quarterly, 20(3), 277–286.
Kekes, J. (2020). Wisdom: A humanistic conception. Oxford University Press.
König, S., & Glück, J. (2013). Individual differences in wisdom conceptions: Relationships to gratitude and wisdom. International Journal of Aging and Human Development, 77(2), 127–147.
Kunzmann, U. (2019). Performance-based measures of wisdom: State of the art and future directions. In R. J. Sternberg & J. Glück (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of wisdom (pp. 277–296). Cambridge University Press.
Magidor, O. (2018). How both you and a brain in a vat can know whether or not you are envatted. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 92(1), 151–181.
McCain, K. (2020). What the debasing demon teaches us about wisdom. Acta Analytica, 35(4), 521–530.
Nath, O. (forthcoming). Wisdom, action, and knowledge. The Journal of Value Inquiry. DOI: 10.1007/s10790-024-09989-2
Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical explanations. Harvard University Press.
Pritchard, D. (2005). Epistemic luck. Oxford University Press.
Ryan, S. (2012). Wisdom, knowledge, and rationality. Acta Analytica, 27, 99–112.
Ryan, S. (2017). A deeper defense of the deep rationality theory of wisdom: A reply to Fileva and Tresan. Acta Analytica, 32, 115–123.
Schaffer, J. (2010). The debasing demon. Analysis, 70(2), 228–237.
Sliwa, P. (2015). Understanding and knowing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 115, 57–74.
Stanley, J. (2011). Know how. Oxford University Press.
Tsai, C. (2022). Wisdom: A skill theory. Cambridge University Press.
Turri, J. (2010). Does perceiving entail knowing? Theoria, 76(3), 197–206.
Webster, J. D. (2019). Self-report wisdom measures: Strengths, limitations, and future directions. In R. J. Sternberg & J. Glück (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of wisdom (pp. 297–320). Cambridge University Press.
Whitcomb, D. (2011). Wisdom. In S. Bernecker & D. Pritchard (Eds.), The Routledge companion to epistemology (pp. 95–105). Routledge.
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford University Press.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2026 Oushinar Nath
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:
Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgement of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal.
Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.
Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See The Effect of Open Access).
