The Judicial System of Ethiopia: From ‘Empire’ to ‘Military Junta’ to ‘Federal Democratic Republic’: A Legacy Perspective
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12728/culj.6.1Keywords:
Administration of Justice, FDRE Constitution, Judicial Independence, Judicial System, Military JuntaAbstract
Ethiopia in her journey from an imperial regime to a Federal Democratic Republic polity has witnessed different judicial systems that has emerged from, and premised on, the then prevalent political philosophy and ideology. During the era of Emperor Menelik II, the judiciary was considered a part of the executive as the Ministry of Justice. Afe Negus, was the head of the judges and was entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring that the judges delivered justice in accordance with the ‘Fetha Negast’. Emperor Haile Selassie I, who took keen interest in codification of the laws, promulgated two Constitutions in 1931 and 1955 respectively during his reign and injected the idea of independence of judiciary and adjudication according to law. However, military junta, which suspended operation of the Revised Constitution (1955), made the judicial system amenable to executive and hence a crippled institution. The contemporary three tier judicial system established under, and governed by, the FDRE Constitution (1995) asserts judicial independence and justice according to law. But the constitutional paradigm, contrary to the constitutional assertion, does not assure structural and functional autonomy to courts and through a couple of calculative designs, leaves scope for executive interference in the administration of justice. This paper not only traces the judicial system of Ethiopia which is in vogue, but also highlights the inherent defects in its structural and functional facets and pleads for apposite reforms.
References
/1995, PROCLAMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/Proclamation%20no.1-1995.pdf.
(The Ethiopian Federation is constituted by nine ethnically-based States (for list see art. 47) and two autonomous City Administrations (of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa)).
(A bilingual (Amharic and English) but slim FDRE Constitution contains a couple of ‘Fundamental Principles of the Constitution’ (Article 8- Article 12); formulates a set of ‘Policies, Principles and Objectives’ for State Governance (Article 85- Article 92); gives a comprehensive catalogue of ‘Fundamental Rights and Freedoms’ (Article 13- Article 44), and sketches constitutional anatomy of the Units of the Federal Polity - Executive, Legislative and Judicial - and draws orbits of their operation and inter-relation (Article 45- Article 84)).
See THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1995, Preamble ¶ 2.
(The modern judicial system of Ethiopia is comprised of Regular Courts, Religious Courts (Sharia Courts and Ethiopian Orthodox Church Courts) and Customary Courts. For cultural, historical, and traditional reasons, the FDRE Constitution not only recognises the latter two courts but also allows them to exist along with ‘regular’ courts and to play a considerable role in the administration of justice in Ethiopia. See Articles 34(5) and 78(5) of the FDRE Constitution. The Sharia Courts have jurisdiction over Muslims (who constitute more than 40% of the Ethiopian population) and handle disputes relating to their family and personal matters. These courts are further streamlined by the Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188 of 1999. It has established the Federal First Instance Court of Sharia, the Federal High Court of Sharia, and the Federal Supreme Court of Sharia. The Customary Courts perform traditional tribal administration of justice functions. These courts are operative mainly in countryside areas. There also exist Social Courts established in Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, and Harar regions. They are established at the Kebele (community) levels in rural and urban areas. Their number runs in thousands. The present paper, however, deals merely with ‘regular courts’. Nevertheless, it makes passing reference to other courts for thematic consistency).
See, F. NAHUN, CONSTITUTION FOR A NATION OF NATIONS: THE ETHIOPIAN PROSPECT Chap. 1 (Asmara, Eritrea: The Red Sea Press, 1997); M. ABIR, ETHIOPIA:THE ERA OF THE PRINCES: THE CHALLENGE OF ISLAM AND THE REUNIFICATION OF THE CHRISTIAN EMPIRE 1769-1855 (Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd, London, 1968). (Six ‘emperors’ claimed simultaneously to be the ‘supreme ruler’ of the country. This era of anarchy and internal rivalry is known as Zemene Mesafent (the Era of the Princes). The era was weakened when Emperor Tewodors II came to power in 1855. He initiated reunification of Ethiopia. Emperor Yohannes IV, his successor to the throne, took initiatives for further unification of Ethiopia).
J.C.N. PAUL & C.S. CLAPHAM, ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT: A SOURCEBOOK 317 (Addis Ababa, Artistic Printers, 1971).
A. JEMBERE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA 1434-1974: SOME ASPECTS OF SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL LAWS 219 (Erasmus University, Rotterdaam, 1998).
(Fetha Nagast was replaced by the Penal Code of the Empire of Ethiopia of 1930 enacted during Emperor Haile Selassie I’s regime). For an evolution of the Fetha Nagast, See P.H. Sand, Roman Origins Of Ethiopian ‘Law Of The Kings/Fetha Negast 11 J. ETHIOPIAN L. 74, (1980).
See, PAUL & CLAPHAM, supra note 7 at 320-22.
(After Emperor Menelik II died in 1913, Lij Iyassu, one of his grandsons, succeeded him. He did not rule long. He was deposed in 1916. On September 29, 1916, Emperor Menelik II’s daughter Zewditu, after disqualifying Lij Iyassu, , on the ground that he converted to Islam, came to the throne. She was made the Empress. She ruled the country through a regent and cousin, Ras Tafari Makonnen. In 1930, after the Empress died, the regent-adopting the throne name Haile Selassie I, was crowned emperor. During Her Majesty Zewditu’s era, which was dominated by continued internal struggle with ceaseless plotting and counter-plotting for the Crown, the judicial system introduced by Emperor Menelik II could not get further consolidation).
(The Constitution was modeled on the Imperial Japanese Constitution of 1889 (Meiji Constitution of Japan)). See PAUL & CLAPHAM, supra note 7 at 326-36. (Prior to 1931, Ethiopia had a complex traditional, unwritten constitution webbed by the ideal of the monarchy. There were quite a number of regular and non-regular courts, including ecclesiastical and Ligaba Court). See F. NAHUN, supra note 6.
Revised Constitution of the Empire of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 149 of 1955, Negarit Gazeta, 15th year, No. 2.
(Emperor Haile Selassie I constituted Commissions composed of, and headed by, foreign legal experts of eminence to draft: (i) the Penal Code of 1957, (ii) the Civil Code of 1960, (iii) the Maritime Code of 1960, (iv) the Commercial Code of 1960, (v) the Criminal Procedure Code of 1961. The Civil Procedure Code of 1965 was drafted by an Ethiopian expert from the Ministry of Justice. Though some of these Codes are subsequently modified and revised, their basic framework remains intact and they constitute the core of the laws of Ethiopia).
THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1931, Chap VI, Arts. 50, 51 & 54.
THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1931, Arts. 77 & 78.
(However, Zufan Chilot (Crown Court), wherein the Emperor in person had the power to review cases on the basis of equity as law, continued as the apex court of the land). See THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1931, Art. 28.
See A Jembere, Tatayyeq Muget: The Traditional Ethiopian Mode Of Litigation 15 J. Ethiopian L. 82 (1992). (This organised system of courts, according to Emperor Haile Selassie I, was created to enable His subjects ‘to seek redress for wrongs done to them and enforce the rights which the laws and the Constitution guaranteed to them’). See His Speech from the Throne of April 14, 1961, 2 ETHIOPIAN OBSERVER (1961); PAUL & CLAPHAM, supra note 7 at 386, 387.
(This is the court system that was operative for as long as the Monarchy existed in Ethiopia although structure and jurisdiction of the courts were subsequently modified by the Civil Procedure Code of 1965 and the ‘Provincial’ [Tekle Gezat] courts were abolished. Art. 23 of the Proclamation also recognised the then existing traditional institutional adjudication of cases).
Administration of Justice Proclamation No. 2 of 1942 arts. 2-18.
Id at Art. 7. (Judges of British Nationality, to be determined by the Emperor, had to be on the Bench).
See Administration of Justice Proclamation No. 2 of 1942 at Part V. (The regional and communal courts were to be set up by warrant. This resulted in the recognition and systematisation of numerous subordinate courts in the provinces.)
Administration of Justice Proclamation No. 2 of 1942 arts. 7 & 17.
Administration of Justice Proclamation No. 2 of 1942 art. 24.
The Ministers (Definition of Powers), (Order No. 1 of 1943) Negarit Gazeta, 2nd Year, No. 5, 1943 (It was subsequently amended, without altering its basic framework, by the Ministers (Definition of Powers) (Amendment) Order 44 of 1966).
See R.A. Sedler, The Development of Legal Systems: The Ethiopian Experience, 53 IOWA L. REV. 562, 611-12 (1967). (The fusion of judicial and administrative power was in continuation of the past tradition of the Ruler. Proclamation 323 of 1973 formally brought an end to the influence of the administration in judicial adjudication. It, thus, marked the first legislative move for formally making the judiciary independent from the executive).
THE IMPERIAL DECREE 1943, Art. 60.
Administration of Justice Proclamation No. 2 of 1942 art. 3.
Revised Constitution of the Empire of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 149 of 1955, Negarit Gazeta, 15th year, No. 2. See PAUL & CLAPHAM, supra note 7 at 388.
See THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1931, Chap V.
THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1955, Art. 109.
THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1955 art. 111. (The Revised Constitution, thus, not only curtailed the unbridled power of the Emperor to appoint and remove a Judge, but also initiated regulation, through law, of the service conditions of a Judge. However, the Emperor took almost eighteen years to bring the spirit of the constitutional provision into reality. In 1973, a Proclamation establishing the Judicial Administration Commission was issued. The Commission was empowered to select persons for appointment as judges, to make recommendations for the promotion of a judge, and to regulate the transfer of judges).
THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1955, art. 35.
THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1955, art. 63.
R.A. Sedler, The Chilot Jurisdiction of the Emperor of Ethiopia: A Legal Analysis in Historical and Comparative Perspective 8 J. AFRICAN L. 59 (1964); Berekat Habte Selassie, Constitutional Development in Ethiopia 10 J. AFRICAN L. 74 (1966) and R.A. SEDLER, ETHIOPIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 8-18 (Oxford, Addis Ababa, 1968).
(Traditionally, the Emperor has been perceived as the fountain of justice. Such a perception, in the Ethiopian context, gets support from two historical facts. First, the Criminal Procedure Code (1961) and the Civil Procedure Code (1965), enacted during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie I after he promulgated the Revised Constitution, contained provisions regulating procedure for submitting petitions to His Imperial Majesty’s Chilot. (See art 183 of the Criminal Procedural Code of Ethiopia of 1961 and arts 322 and 361-370 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1965). Secondly, Emperor Haile Selassie I, in his speech on the occasion of promulgating the Revised Constitution, stressed that he had deliberately kept with him the ‘right to do justice’ and conferred the right on his subjects to ‘petition’ him for doing ‘justice’ to them. See, His Speech from the Throne of April 14, 1961published in the Ethiopian Herald, November 5, 1955); PAUL & CLAPHAM, supra note 7 at 389, 392.
THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA 1955, Chapters IV, V and VI.
(Thousands of suspected enemies of the Derg were tortured or killed in a purge called ‘red terror’. Thousands of cases of summary executions, disappearances and tortures were reported. Estimated numbers of people killed by the red terror ranges from 150,000 to 500,000); See generally, K.M. Wigger, Ethiopia: A Dichotomy of Despair and Hope 5 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 389 (1998); M.J. McCracken, Abusing Self-Determination and Democracy: How TPLF is Looting Ethiopia, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L., 183 (2004); N.B. Herther-Spiro, Can Ethnic Federalism Prevent ‘Recourse To Rebellion’? A Comparative Analysis of the Ethiopian and Iraqi Constitutional Structures 21 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 321 (2007).
(The Suspension of the 1955 Constitution: Proclamation 1 of 1974. Art 5(a) of the Proclamation stated that ‘the Constitution of 1955 is ‘hereby suspended’. However, by virtue of art 10 of the Proclamation, the then ‘existing laws that did not conflict with the Proclamation and future laws, orders and regulations’ were kept alive and operative. Art 7 of the Proclamation also allowed ‘all courts’ to ‘continue their normal functions’).
(It came into force on February 22, 1987. The Constitution, according to its critiques, was an abridged version of the 1977 Soviet Constitution, with two exceptions: (i) it conferred vast powers on the country’s President, and (ii) it declared the country to be a unitary multi-ethnic state rather than a federation). See C. Clapham, The Constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 3 J. COMM. ST. TRANS. POLIT. 192 (1987).
THE CONSTITUTION OF PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA 1987, Art. 100.
THE CONSTITUTION OF PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA 1987, Art. 2. (The Supreme Court was authorised, on request of the Prosecutor General or its President, to review any case from any court of the country. However, interpretation of laws was not the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court. Shengo, the Council of State and the Prosecutor General were also entrusted with the interpretative power). See THE CONSTITUTION OF PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA 1987, Chapter 15.
THE CONSTITUTION OF PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA 1987, Art. 104.
THE CONSTITUTION OF PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA 1987, Art. 101.
THE CONSTITUTION OF PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA 1987, Art. 101.
THE CONSTITUTION OF PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA 1987, Art. 86.
(People’s courts were originally established under the jurisdiction of Peasants Association and Kebeles. Members of the tribunals were elected by Association members. Kebele tribunals had powers similar to those of their counterparts in the Peasants Association).
See T. Regassa, Ethnic Federalism and the Right to Self-Determination as a Constitutional Legal Solution to the Problem of Multi-Ethnic Societies: The Case of Ethiopia (Unpublished LL.M. Thesis, ECSC, 2001, available in the Ethiopian Civil Service College Library, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia).
Wigger, supra note 38 at 397-99; McCracken, supra note 38 at 183-84, 190-92; E.A. Baylis, Beyond Rights: Legal Process and Ethnic Conflicts, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L., 529, 568 (2004); D. Demissie, Self-Determination Including Secession Versus the Territorial Integrity of Nation-States: A Prima Facie Case for Secession, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 165, 181 (1996).
(Proclaimed by the Peace and Democracy Conference, Jul. 1-5, 1991, Addis Ababa).
The Phoenix Collective Charter Preamble http:// cybernations.wikia.com/wiki/The_Phoenix_Collective.
(The EPDRF comprised approximately 85% of the Constitutional Assembly. The opposing political parties refused to participate in the Constitutional Assembly elections because they had been excluded from participating in the drafting of the 1995 Constitution). See M Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution: Its Impact upon Unity, Human Rights and Development 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV., 9 (1996). (The Oromo, Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group which comprised 40% of the population, left the TGE and had no role in drafting of the FDRE Constitution). See E.A. Baylis, supra note 49 at 547 and 550.
(The Constitutional Assembly, plausibly, was influenced by the philosophy with which the EPRDF waged and won the long fought civil war against the Derg regime, and the manner in which judicial systems were designed and made operative during the pre-1994 era).
(The phrase, it seems, is used in Art. 78(5) of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution to distinguish these constitutionally established courts from the Religious Courts (Sharia Courts), recognised under, and protected by art 34(5) of the Constitution and the Customary Courts referred to in its Art. 78(5)).
See THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1995, Art. 78(2).
(The Federal Courts Proclamation 25 of 1996 formally established a three-tier court system as envisaged under the FDRE Constitution. It deals in minute details with their structural and functional aspects. It also enumerates powers and duties of the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Federal Courts; lays down the ‘principles’ of jurisdiction’ of these courts, and specifies the substantive and procedural laws to be applied by them).
THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1995, Art. 78(3).
THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1995, Art. 81.
THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1995, Art. 81(6).
THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1995, Art. 79(4).
THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1995, Art. 79(6), (7).
See THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1995, Art. 81.
Federal Judicial Administration Commission Establishment Proclamation No. 24 of 1996, Art. 4(1).
Federal Judicial Administration Commission Establishment Proclamation No. 24 of 1996, Art. 8.
(The reasons for these vague & liberal criteria could be traced to certain historical facts. When Derg overthrew the Imperial Government of Emperor Haile Selassie I’s regime, it, through imprisonment, forced retirement and resignation, removed most of the senior judges who, according to it, had been active players in the previous regime. And during the overthrow of the Derg, members of the legal profession, who were seen as an integral part of the oppressive military junta, were targeted for retribution. Most of the then sitting experienced judges were killed, imprisoned, fled or compelled to retire. When the FDRE Constitution introduced a new three-tier judicial system at the Federal and Regional levels, the then existing pool of legally trained judges, who were unconnected with the Derg regime, was utterly insufficient to sit on the newly created courts. The stipulated qualifications, thus, emerged out of necessity arising from the acute shortage of qualified judges to sit on the plethora of courts established in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia).
See THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1995, Art. 79 (1), 50(7).
Federal Courts Proclamation 25 of 1996, art. 3.
THE CONSTITUTION OF PEOPLE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, Art. 80(1).
Federal Courts Proclamation 25 of 1996, art. 20.
Federal Courts Proclamation 25 of 1996, art. 10; See also THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1995, Art. 80(3)(a).
Federal Courts Proclamation Re-amendment Proclamation 454 of 2005.
Federal Courts Proclamation 25 of 1996 arts. 11-12 and 14-15.
THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1995, Art. 80(2).
THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1995, Art. 80(6).
THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1995, Art. 80(3)(b).
THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1995, Art. 80(4) and (5).
S. Burbank, What Do We Mean by Judicial Independence, OHIO ST. L. J., 323 (2003).
Federal Judicial Administration Commission Establishment Proclamation 24 of 1996.
(The presence of key executive or influential political figures on JAC creates a chilling effect on its ability to act independently in appointing or promoting judges. The appointment and promotion of judges is conducted behind closed doors by the executive and the role of the JAC is to approve lists before they are sent to the legislature). See A. Fiseha, Some Reflections on the Role of the Judiciary in Ethiopia, RECHT IN AFRIKA, 1, 23 (2011).
The World Bank, Ethiopia: Legal and Judicial Sector Assessment (Washington, USA: The World Bank, 2004) 17-18.
(There are some reported instances where judicial appointments are made with no involvement of JACs at all. In the Oromia Regional State, sixty judges were appointed for the (State) Supreme Court, High Court and Wereda courts by the President of the Supreme Court in 2002. The Regional Council also appointed judges without involving the JAC). See A Tegene, Independence and Accountability of Oromia Regional State Judiciary in Light of the Judicial Reform Program (Unpublished LL.M. Thesis, Addis Ababa University, 2007) 82.
(By virtue of art. 79(4) of the FDRE Constitution, no judge, except on the grounds of proved violation of disciplinary rules, gross incompetence, inefficiency, illness that precludes him from discharging his judicial functions, can be removed from his office before he reaches the retirement age. The retirement age of judges, by virtue of the Proclamation 24 of 1996, is sixty years. Judges can be removed from office based on any of these grounds only when the JCA concerned arrives at the decision and it is approved by a majority vote by the concerned legislature. However, certain instances exhibit deviation from the rule and procedure. For example, in 1995 in the Oromia Regional State, three hundred and eighteen judges were dismissed without the involvement of the JAC and without following any constitutional procedure. In 2000, thirteen judges were dismissed by the Oromia Regional Council without the knowledge of the JAC. See Tegene, above note 79, 68 and 87. In the Gambela Region also three Supreme Court judges were arrested for releasing a suspect on bail and later on dismissed by the regional government without following the stipulated procedure). See O.O. Gilo, Problems faced by the Judiciary in the Gambela Region (unpublished, LL.B. thesis, Ethiopian Civil Service College, 2000) 15-25.
Ministry of Capacity Building of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Comprehensive Justice Reform Program: Baseline Study Report (Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Justice Reform Program, 2005) 160.
THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1995, Art. 53. See Art. 61 for its composition.
See THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1995, Arts. 62(1), 83(1). (The HoF, however, is required to seek investigation of constitutional disputes and controversies through the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (CCI). See THE CONSTITUTION OF FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1995, Arts. 62(2), 82(2).
See Council of Constitutional Inquiry Proclamation 250 of 2001, and arts. 2(5); Consolidation of the House of the Federation and Definition of its Powers and Responsibilities Proclamation 251 of 2001. art. 2(2).
K.I. Vibhute, Non Judicial Review in Ethiopia: Constitutional Paradigm, Premise and Precinct 22(1) AF. J. INT’L COM. L. 120 (2014); T.S. Bulto, Judicial Referral of Constitutional Disputes in Ethiopia: From Practice to Theory 19 (1) AF. J. INT’L COM. L. 99 (2011).
(Under the Institutions Pillar of the 2007 Global Competitiveness Index, Ethiopia was ranked 117 out of 128 countries with respect to judicial independence). See, African Development Fund Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Country governance profile (African Development Bank, 2009) ¶ 3.7.1.
Ministry of Capacity Building, supra note 81 at 159.
Fiseha, supra note 77 at 25.
House of Peoples’ Representatives Legislative Procedure, Committees Structure, Art. 4(2) & 4(3); Working Proclamation 271 of 2002.
Ministry of Capacity Building, supra note 81 at 131.
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) Independence, Transparency and Accountability in the Judiciary of Ethiopia 99 (A Draft for Consultation) (August 2008).
(The historical merger of judicial and executive functions and interference of the executive in the administration of justice is not without impact even today. The Executive, at the regional level, even today, thinks that it is neither unnatural nor unethical to dictate its decisions to a judge or to blatantly interfere, in a variety of ways, with the administration of justice). See Fiseha, supra note 77 at 23-24.
See Ministry of Capacity Building, supra note 81 at 160; The World Bank, supra note 78 at 20-21; CIDA, supra note 93.
See Ministry of Capacity Building, supra note 81, and CIDA, supra note 93.
