Determining the Bench Size for Constitutional Adjudication
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12728/culj.8.1Abstract
The Supreme Court of India acts as a Constitutional Court as well as the highest appellate court. The Constitution imposes mandatory minimum requirements for the strength of the Bench for constitutional adjudication. The apex Court has been criticized for constituting fewer number of Constitution benches, and for delaying the disposal of constitutional matters. Many Constitutional questions are being decided upon by Division benches or Constitutional benches, consisting of merely three members, due to prolific appeals in the Supreme Court. The researcher aims to analyze the question ‘whether the size of the Bench matters for constitutional adjudication?’ The article in the light of Constitutional provisions and the Supreme Court Rules, focuses on the impact of small and large benches, particularly in the highest Court of the land, where constitutional questions are decided upon. The Kesavananda Bharati case has been employed to examine the pros and cons of a large Bench, and the recent NJAC case is analyzed to bring out the problems of a smaller Bench, in overruling the decision of a larger Bench. The researcher therefore, attempts to answer the * Assistant Professor, SRM School of Law, SRM University, Kattankulathur, Tamil Nadu, India; muthukumarml@gmail.com question whether a minimum required strength of the Bench in constitutional adjudication is required for the organic development of constitutional jurisprudence in our country.References
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