The Ticking Region of Korean Peninsula: A Playoff between Deterrence and Détente
Reviewing “The Korean Nuclear Imbroglio: Can India be a Muted Spectator?”
Keywords:Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Deterrence, Détente, Korean Peninsula, Nuclear Strategy, Denuclearization, North Korea
The article in review, “The Korean Nuclear Imbroglio: Can India be a Muted Spectator?”, written by Sitakanta Mishra, brings to light the strategic environment of the region of North Asia and the Korean Peninsula. The region in question is increasingly characterised, for good reasons, by the impact it has to endure due to the nuclearisation of North Korea. Efforts to denuclearise North Korea has only, till now, achieved nothing more than a stalemate. This has raised concerns all over the world as North Korea progresses in the path of nuclearisation under the direction of an authoritarian regime to which the world has limited access. At a time, such as this, it is impractical to focus on approaches to manage the crisis without properly understanding and recognising North Korea’s security concerns which prompted it to become a nuclear power. Only after grasping the full picture should the focus be on how to contain North Korea when it is engaging in activities which reflects an increase in its nuclear capabilities, thereby challenging the preservation of stability in not only the region of North Asia but the whole of Asia and the world. The strategic environment in the region is largely dictated by the dynamics of deterrence employed by both U.S-ROK and North Korea, which may have contributed to the ongoing crisis. The article then proceeds to highlight the need for a reevaluation of the Korean crisis from a non-western standpoint. Sitakanta Mishra attempts to usher in an Asian nation’s perspective by raising an important question as to what role should India, being a nuclear power itself and an aspiring superpower, play in this strategic narrative to resolve the worrisome nuclear crisis of North Korea.
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